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ABSTRACT 
 
This study, which seeks to contribute to the shared-body of knowledge on media and war 
crimes jurisprudence, gauges the impact of the media’s coverage of the Civil Defence Forces 
(CDF) and Charles Taylor trials conducted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) on the 
functionality of civil society organizations (CSOs) in promoting transitional (post-conflict) justice 
and democratic legitimacy in Sierra Leone. The media’s impact is gauged by contextualizing the 
stimulus-response paradigm in the behavioral sciences. Thus, media contents are rationalized 
as stimuli and the perceptions of CSOs’ representatives on the media’s coverage of the trials are 
deemed to be their responses. The study adopts contents (framing) and discourse analyses and 
semi-structured interviews to analyse the publications of the selected media (For Di People, 
Standard Times and Awoko) in Sierra Leone. 
The responses to such contents are theoretically explained with the aid of the structured 
interpretative and post-modernistic response approaches to media contents. And, 
methodologically, CSOs’ representatives’ responses to the media’s contents are elicited by 
ethnographic surveys (group discussions) conducted across the country. The findings from the 
contents and discourse analyses, semi-structured interviews and ethnographic surveys are 
triangulated to establish how the media’s coverage of the two trials impacted CSOs’ 
representatives’ perceptions on post-conflict justice and democratic legitimacy in Sierra Leone. 
To test the validity and reliability of the findings from the ethnographic surveys, four hundred 
(400) questionnaires, one hundred (100) for each of the four regions (East, South, North and 
Western Area) of Sierra Leone, were administered to barristers, civil/public servants, civil 
society activists, media practitioners, students etc. 
The findings, which reflected the perceptions of people from large swathe of opinions in Sierra 
Leone, appeared to have dovetailed with those of the CSOs’ representatives across the country. 
The study established that the media’s coverage of the CDF trial appeared to have been tainted 
with ethno-regional prejudices, and seemed to be ‘a continuation of war by other means’. 
However, the focus groups perceived the media reporting as having a positive effect on the 
pursuit of post-conflict justice, good governance and democratic accountability in Sierra Leone. 
The coverage of the Charles Taylor trial appeared to have been devoid of ethno-regional 
prejudices, but, in the view of the CSOs, seemed to have been coloured by lenses of patriotism 
and nationalism. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Research Context 
This study on ‘Media Reporting of War Crimes Trials and Civil Society Responses in Post-Conflict 
Sierra Leone’ deals with five significant issues that have attracted lots of theorisation in 
communications media and international law and relations. The first is the transformation of 
the media landscape and its increasingly pervasive influence on domestic and global issues 
(Newman, 2011: 6-7, Megenta, 2011: 3-6,  Dizard Jr., 2000: 1, Gilboa, 2005: 27-29, Croker, 
Hampson and Aall, 2003: xvii). The second is the reinvigoration of the impacts of Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in hitherto despotic (now democratic) states (Salamon, Anheier, et. al., 
1999: 3-8, Okigbo, 2000: 63-65). 
The third is the issue of intra-states conflicts in ethnically divided societies- the Former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, being the notable examples (White, Little and Smith, 
1997: 4, Ryan, 1997: 174-178, Futamura, 2008:7, Kandeh, 2004: 177-179, Hayward and Kandeh, 
1987: 47, Abdallah, 2004: 5).The fourth and fifth issues are the emergence and resurgence of 
the notions of humanitarian intervention (Harris, 2004: 953-956, Shaw, 2003: 252, 104-8) and 
war crimes jurisprudence (Goldstein, 2001: 333-337, Kegley, Jr., 2007:237, 249-554) as 
international responses to such conflicts.  
Though ethnicity was not the mono-causal factor of the decade long (1991-2002) conflict in 
Sierra Leone, it was singled out by the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC 
Report, Vol. II, 2004: 11) as one of the principal factors that exacerbated a war that has been 
described as the most horrific and destructive in modern African history (Ayissi and Poulton, 
2000:3, Macauley, 2012:31). The war ended the lives of over 160,000 and displaced over two 
million people (Shaw, 2012:109, Kargbo, 2011:190) and left the whole of Sierra Leone and its 
infrastructure in ruins. The amputation of limbs was the signature atrocity of the war, which 
even threatened regional peace and security in West Africa (Hirsch, 2001: 71, Francis, 2001: 
111-113). 
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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in the name of regional peace and 
security, humanitarian intervention and human rights, through its military wing (ECOMOG), and 
with the support of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), intervened in the conflict and deposed the 
illegal Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) de 
facto regime, which had seized state power in a bloody coup d’état on the 25th May, 1997, from 
the constitutionally elected Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) Government of Alhaji Dr. Ahmed 
Tejan Kabbah. 
However, though the intervention tentatively stabilised the situation and restored the 
legitimate SLPP Government, the defeated AFRC\RUF alliance, was resuscitated and supplied 
with arms and ammunition from neighbouring Liberia, under the auspices of the former 
Liberian President, Charles Ghankay Taylor, to launch the infamous ‘Operation No Living Thing’, 
which climaxed the most reckless destruction of lives and property in Freetown in January, 
1999 (Summary of Appeals Chamber Judgment, 2013: 7-8, Gberie, 2005: 117-132, Hirsch, 
op.cit: 71-75). The Lome Peace Accord (LPA) was eventually signed by the SLPP Government 
and the RUF to end the internecine war. However, the failure of the RUF to respect the terms 
and conditions of the LPA and the unnecessary demands of the AFRC, which claimed to have 
gained nothing from the LPA, warranted the signing of the Abuja Peace Accord (APA), which 
eventually ended the war (Kabbah, 2010: 169-170). 
The period following the end of the war coincided with the resurgence of war crimes 
jurisprudence as a robust international response to violators of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL). The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which was a construct neither of the LPA nor 
the APA, was established in Sierra Leone, pursuant to the UN Security Council’s Resolution of 
15thAugust, 2000 (Resolution 1315), to ‘prosecute persons, who bear the greatest responsibility 
for serious violations of IHL and Sierra Leonean law, committed in the territory of Sierra Leone 
since 30th November, 1996’. 
The SCSL thus conducted three distinct trials in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to try the leaders of the 
respective warring factions-RUF, AFRC and CDF - who were convicted (and are now serving their 
sentences in Rwanda) for war crimes and crimes against humanity. A fourth hearing took place 
in The Hague, when the former Liberian President Taylor, was arrested on an eleven (11) count 
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indictment after a three year exile in Nigeria (Penfold, 2012:184). Taylor’s trial was held in The 
Hague (not in Freetown) for reasons of regional security, pursuant to Resolution 1688 of 2006 
(see also Alie, 2007: 251). Taylor was convicted on 26th April, 2012, for aiding and abetting the 
RUF in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the war years in Sierra 
Leone.1 
He appealed his conviction, but the Appeals’ Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber II’s verdict on 
26th September, 2013.2 Taylor is now serving his sentence in the United Kingdom. He is the only 
African head of state, to have been tried and convicted by a war crimes court.3  The call to bring 
war criminals to justice, through independent, impartial and credible judicial mechanisms, with 
intra or extra territorial jurisdictions, at the end of the cold war, cannot be attributed to the 
conscientious efforts of jurists and the international community alone. The media (local and 
international) and CSOs have played an instrumental role in the clamour for war crimes 
jurisprudence and the promotion of post-conflict democratic legitimacy in Africa and beyond 
(Strauss, 2002:185, Sarajevo, 2011: 8-11, Penfold, 2012:187, Hirsch, 2001: 88-90: 96, Futamura, 
2008:26, McQuail, 2000: 343-344, Gberie, 2005: 199). Moreover, in recent past, prosecutors 
have even referred to media reports as evidence of their efforts to try war crimes suspects from 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and most recently from Sierra Leone and Liberia  (Shaw, op. 
cit: 26).  
In Sierra Leone, the local media and CSOs conscientiously raised the awareness in a post-
conflict context to subject human rights transgressors to war crimes trials (see Appendix III38, 
148,305). The local media also monitored, reported and analysed the operations of the SCSL, in 
the interest of perpetrators and victims and for the benefit of CSOs that relied on such analysis 
to make informed decisions about the dynamics and impacts of judicial accountability in post-
conflict Sierra Leone (Jabati, 2013, see Appendix III19, 359). I chose the CDF and Taylor trials 
because they were contentious and they appeared to have polarised the media’s coverage and 
                                                          
1
Prosecutor v Charles G. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, 18th May, 2012 
2
See Appeals Chamber Judgment, of 26th September, 2013. 
3
Though the African Union (AU) is very critical of  the indictments and trials of other sitting heads of state (Presidents Omar al-Bashir and Uhuru 
Kenyatta of Sudan and Kenya, respectively) and ex- leaders (Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast, for example) (Plessis, 2010:13-14, New African, 
August- September, 2012: 12-13, BBC News, 12th October, 2013. 
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CSOs’ perceptions. It is true that radio is the most widespread means of communication in 
Sierra Leone, primarily because of the low level of literacy, but newspapers were chosen for 
three fundamental reasons. 
First, because of the logistical impracticality of obtaining sufficient audio recordings of the CDF 
and Taylor trials, whereas I had unhindered access to newspaper archives in the Resource 
Centre of the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in Sierra Leone. Second, given my limited 
resources, it was far more realistic to do a rigorous coding analysis of print contents than to 
transcribe hours of audio recordings. And third, since the study, inter alia, is interested in the 
attitudes of CSOs, many of whose representatives DO read newspapers, I considered it quite 
relevant to focus this study on the print media as a credible alternative to radio.    
Of the three trials held in Freetown (AFRC, RUF and CDF), it is argued that the CDF trial 
constituted a crucially significant legal and political step for Sierra Leone. Unlike the RUF and 
AFRC trials, which were overwhelmingly sanctioned by the international community and a 
significant proportion of Sierra Leoneans, the CDF trial was viewed with suspicion and mixed 
feelings both in and out of Sierra Leone. Some jurists and journalists were of the opinion, that 
the CDF trial would undermine post-conflict reconciliation and stability in Sierra Leone (see 
Appendix III65, 307). They also argued that the indicted and convicted CDF leaders fought to 
defend the country’s territorial integrity and restore the democratically elected Government 
(SLPP) (Justice Thompson, 2007, Justice Gelaga-King, 2008-CDF Trial Chamber’s Judgment). 
Human rights activists, on the other hand, contended that in pursuit of their political objectives, 
the CDF committed heinous crimes against the people of Sierra Leone for which they should be 
held accountable. They further argued that impunity does not have any place in IHL, which 
equally applies to every party to a conflict; regardless of its reason for fighting (see Appendix 
III147, 231). The Taylor trial was similarly divisive. Some Sierra Leoneans were of the view that 
Taylor had presidential immunities. And as the sitting President of an independent sovereign 
state (Liberia), he should not have been indicted and subjected to war crimes trials by a hybrid 
court that lacked a UN Chapter Seven mandate, but most Sierra Leoneans (media practitioners 
included) believed he was to be held responsible, to a greater or lesser extent, for his role in the 
conflict in the 1990s (Francis, op. cit: 111-112,) (see Appendix III310, 512). 
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Nevertheless, there has also been a view reflected in the media, that the sums of money spent 
on the trials might have been better used on rebuilding a shattered infrastructure and 
compensating the victims of violence and war and promoting post-conflict reconciliation in 
Sierra Leone (Alie, op.cit: 252, see Appendix III290, 472). The media’s discursive treatments of the 
above issues are conceptualised in the chapter dealing with theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks. The data analysis is consonant with accepted models of media analysis. In the 
context of sub-Saharan Africa, where there are few reliable measurements of ‘public opinion’ 
through polling, CSOs are a useful surrogate in testing social attitudes (Macauley, 2012). This 
approach is outlined in more detailed in the methodological frameworks chapter. I have 
narrowed the scope of the enquiry by focusing on the reporting of war crimes trials and asking 
whether, in the two trials chosen, the coverage was ‘a continuation of war by other 
means’(Markovic and Subasic, 2011: 24). In other words, whether many of the ethnic tensions 
and divisions manifested during the decade of conflict, continued to be reflected in the media’s 
coverage of either or both trials. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
This study has two fundamental aims and objectives: 
1. To evaluate selected newspapers coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials to ask whether the 
coverage was ‘a continuation of war by other means’. 
 
2. To interrogate CSOs’ representatives’ responses of the media’s coverage of the two trials, to 
ascertain its role in the promotion of good governance and democratic accountability in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
1.3 Research Questions 
1. How did selected media in Sierra Leone represent the CDF trial? 
2. How was this coverage received by CSOs’ representatives in Sierra Leone? 
3. How did selected media in Sierra Leone represent the Taylor trial? 
4. How was this coverage received by CSOs’ representatives in Sierra Leone? 
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5. What influence has media coverage had on attitudes towards post-conflict justice in Sierra 
Leone? 
1.4 Methodology 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methodological frameworks (see analysis 
between 5.0 and 5.8) has been devised for the study. The methods are adopted to answer the 
research questions in sequential order. Research questions 1and 3, which are cognate with the 
content models of media analysis (see 4.1), are answered consonant with both the qualitative 
and quantitative dimensions of content analysis (see 5.4), qualitative discourse analysis and 
semi-structured interviews (see 5.5). Research questions 2 and 4, which relate to the response 
models of media analysis (see 4.2), are answered in line with the ethnographic surveys (group 
discussions) organised for CSOs’ representatives across Sierra Leone (see 5.6). And research 
question 5, which is also related to the response models of media analysis, is answered with the 
aid of questionnaires administered to respondents, who were randomly selected from the 
twelve districts and the Western Area of Sierra Leone (see 5.7).  
1.5 Significance of the Study 
This work seeks to make a contribution to the shared-body of knowledge on media and war 
crimes jurisprudence. Essentially, the development of war crimes jurisprudence is not 
unconnected with the clamour for the ideals of human rights across the globe and both CSOs 
and the media are crucial in the human rights campaign. In Sierra Leone, the local media 
vociferously reported the proceedings of the SCSL and was used by CSOs to monitor the 
credibility of the legal processes, leading to the indictments, trials, convictions and sentences of 
war criminals. Thus, the dialectics that emerged from the legal processes as represented by the 
local media are worth researching. And the findings of such enquiry will fill a void in the African 
literature on media and war crimes jurisprudence (see 2.1 and 2.2 for a more detailed analysis 
on this issue). The study can also serve as a reference material for future researchers and as a 
source of reference for policy formulation relating to communications media effects research in 
relation to war crimes. It can also serve as a valuable archival material for generations yet 
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unborn to understand (through media coverage) the dynamics of Sierra Leone’s decade long 
conflict, the transitional justice process that emerged from the conflict and how the country’s 
post-conflict recovery efforts were sustained. 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 Though the SCSL conducted four distinct trials, this study restricts itself to only the CDF and 
Taylor trials. The local media indeed communicated the heuristics that evolved from all four 
trials, but the dialectics that emerged from dispatches that are cognate with both the RUF and 
AFRC trials, are thus beyond the scope of this study. Such dialectics may probably be explored 
by future researchers in a bid to advance the frontiers of media and war crimes jurisprudence. 
Although the study is a critical analysis of media coverage of both the CDF and Taylor trials, it 
does not cover both trials in their entirety; for reasons discussed in the study’s methodological 
frameworks (see 5.4). 
 The study rather compartmentalises media coverage of the pre-trial, trial and post-trial phases 
of both trials, focusing on a specific number of months at each of the above stages (see 5.4). 
The landscape of Sierra Leone’s print media is too broad a sample for any communications 
media research, since there are more than eighty registered newspapers in the country (see 
3.1.2).Thus, for reasons thoroughly articulated in the methodological frameworks (see 5.4), this 
study focuses on the coverage of only three of the leading newspapers in the country- For Di 
People, Standard Times and Awoko. 
 The literature for this study is reviewed in so far as it relates to the study’s aims and objectives 
and research questions (see 2.1 and 2.2). In other words, of the innumerable and ground 
breaking publications in communications media effects research, it is only those that are 
relevant to media and war crimes jurisprudence that are put into perspective in this study. The 
study is not about the conflict in Sierra Leone. It has rather contextualised it for a thorough 
comprehension of the circumstances, leading to the institutionalisation of the whole 
transitional justice process, how the media reflected the CDF and Taylor trials, and how it has 
more importantly, shaped attitudes towards post-conflict justice in Sierra Leone. 
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1.7 Thesis Structure 
The study is divided into nine (9) chapters. The first covers the introductory component. The 
second looks into the existing literature on media and war crimes jurisprudence and proposes 
to advance the shared-body of knowledge of same. The third deals with the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks of the media, civil society and transitional justice in general and also 
analyses the theoretical synergy of all three concepts and put them into context in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone. The fourth critically analyses both the content and response models of media 
analysis, consonant with a plethora of issues and events that evolved from the coverage of both 
trials. 
The fifth restricts itself to the combination of the qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
designed for the study. The sixth revolves around the empirical analysis of the findings from the 
coverage of the CDF trial and how CSOs’ representatives perceived the coverage. The seventh 
takes in the empirical analysis of the findings from the coverage of the Taylor trial and how 
CSOs’ representatives perceived the coverage. The eighth concerns itself with the empirical 
analysis of the findings relative to the coverage of the issues on transitional justice 
(prosecutorial and reconciliatory) in Sierra Leone and how the coverage was perceived by Sierra 
Leoneans from a large swathe of opinions. And the ninth extends to the summary, conclusion 
and recommendations by way of comparative analysis of the two trials in line with the models 
of media analysis and methodological frameworks that are replicated in this study. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter covers the background and context of this study. This chapter, inter alia, 
explores the existing literature on media and war crimes jurisprudence to ascertain the shared 
body of knowledge in the discipline. The chapter further argues a case for an emerging thesis 
(see empirical analyses between chapters six and eight) that proposes to advance the frontiers 
of the discipline in Africa. Despite Africa’s gradual strides towards development (see Appendix 
III500, 542, Okigbo, 2000: 64-65, Sachs, 2005:207), ethno-regionalism, corruption, poverty and 
illiteracy, epidemics, tyranny and armed conflicts, remain the stereotypical factors that 
constitute the ‘lenses’ and ‘frames’ that coloured the Western media’s coverage of issues and 
events in the continent (see Appendix III514, 528, Shaw, 2007: 351-371, 2009: 39-47, 2012: 105-
121, Ankomah, 2001). The Western media’s representation of Africa in international relations is 
yet to reflect the true picture of the continent (New Africa, op.cit: 8-14). 
Therefore, the responsibility of the African press towards the rest of the World is to present a 
more balanced perspective of Africa (Nwokeafor, 2000: 89). However, though most countries in 
Africa have embraced democracy and there are indications that in post-conflict African states, 
the media and CSOs, despite their shortcomings, have been monitoring and holding post-
conflict governments accountable to their electors (see Appendix III500, January-March, 2009: 9, 
Macauley, 2012: 47-51, Kargbo, 190-220, Okigbo, op.cit: 64-65). Much is yet to be done by 
Western media analysts and African scholars (through empirical research) to ascertain how the 
media and CSOs have been instrumental in the campaign against impunity and building 
democratic legitimacy in the continent. 
This concern should open up fruitful avenues for policy formulation through research to 
advance the shared-body of knowledge on the media’s role in the promotion of war crimes 
jurisprudence and democratic legitimacy in post-conflict African states. Arguably, the gulf in the 
African media’s literature about the media’s functionality in relation to war crimes trials in 
particular, and post-conflict justice in general, is widened by the facts that the discipline is still 
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evolving and the continent’s intellectual development is fraught with limited avenues for 
publications, paucity of professional researchers, unavailability of financial resources to fund 
ground-breaking studies and the dearth of the requisite logistics for research (Alozie, 2007: 
214). 
However, the media literature (in the Western Hemisphere) is replete with landmark 
publications, which have evaluated the impacts of the media (relative to multidimensional 
issues and events) in Western societies and promulgated conclusions that are, somewhat 
varied, because their methodologies were different and the environments and circumstances 
under which such researches were conducted are as well different (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 
2006: 91). Therefore, the conclusions and recommendations of this study may either support or 
negate some of the existing theories in the media literature; because it has been conducted in a 
remote region in Africa where the media is still grappling with peculiar socio-economic, legal 
and political impediments, which have been rendered negligible in the Western Hemisphere, 
were a large chunk of the media concepts and theories were developed. 
2.1 The Media and War Crimes Jurisprudence 
War crimes jurisprudence is arguably an off-shoot of or an amalgam of the principles and 
precepts of the laws of war (otherwise known as IHL), international human rights law and 
international criminal law. Thus, war crimes jurisprudence is a manifestation of the judicial 
accountability/prosecutorial paradigm of post-conflict (transitional) justice. The principal 
reasons why war crimes trials are set up are well documented in the existing literature on 
international law. They are principally conducted to end impunity by probing into gross human 
rights violations committed during wars, punish those found guilty, bring justice to the victims, 
deter future war crimes, establish the facts to pave the way for reconciliation and uphold the 
rule of law (Hillier, 1999: 282-285, Cassese, 2006: 731-732, Reporting Justice, 2006: 6-9). 
The media, which is increasingly becoming instrumental in the contemporary World, as a result 
of the dynamics of globalisation and Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) 
(Straubhaar and La Rose, 196: xviii, Croteau and Hoynes, 2006:14, Mott and Leeming, 
2000:184), has popularised the ideals of war crimes jurisprudence and thus contributed to the 
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post-conflict justice processes that have evolved in post-conflict societies (BBC Media Action’s 
Communicating Transitional Justice, 2007). The shared-body of knowledge of the media and 
war crimes jurisprudence therefore strikes a chord between the media’s functionality and the 
clamour for credible, impartial, independent and transparent international judicial institutions 
that judiciously dispense international criminal justice without fear or favour, affection or ill-
will, for the promotion of democratic ideals in war torn countries. 
Lang (2005:7) enunciated the inevitability of the media’s functionality in the promotion of war 
crimes jurisprudence in contemporary international law in the following startling conclusion of 
his groundbreaking study: 
While diplomatic efforts have been the traditional alternative to coercive law 
enforcement, the media should not be forgotten in the fight to end impunity. With 
combined contributions, it is hoped that one day it will be universally understood (that) 
the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun 
 Historically, the evolution of the shared-body of knowledge of the media’s functionality in the 
quest for war crimes jurisprudence started with the media’s coverage of the proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Military Tribunal for 
Far East at Tokyo (IMTFE); following the tragic end of World War II (WW II) in 1945. The 
discipline’s literature further evolved with the atrocities and genocides committed in the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; leading to the setting up of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The literature 
has thus continued to grow with the determination and commitment of the international 
community to end impunity through the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
in The Hague; and the inauguration of a plethora of hybrid courts in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, East Timor and Iraq. 
2.1.1 The Media and the Nuremberg Military Tribunal  
The Nuremberg trials were predicated on an indictment issued by the victorious allied nations 
of WW II (The United States, Great Britain, France and Russia) against twenty-four (24) men and 
six (6) organisations, charging them with the systematic murder of millions of people and with 
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conspiring and carrying out WW II (Strauss, op.cit: 185, Dye, 1996: 343, Hirsh, 2003: xiii). The US 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, subsequently indicted, tried and convicted some other low-
ranking war criminals, bringing the Nazi era of terror and war to an end (Kaczorowska, 2003: 
495-499).The Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) critically summarised the media’s 
role in the coverage of the Nuremberg proceedings as follows:  
Had journalists not covered the trials, the public would not have known about what 
unfolded in the Nuremberg courtroom. Without them, the shocking footage of Nazi 
death camps, the dramatic testimony of camp survivors, and the hundreds of thousands 
of documents detailing Nazi Crimes would never have made it into the public’s 
consciousness and a crucial part of the tribunal’s mission would have been left 
unfulfilled (Reporting Justice, op.cit: 8). 
2.1.2 The Media and the Tokyo Military Tribunal  
Meanwhile significant discourses about the Tokyo tribunal cannot be avoided in any academic 
analysis that seeks to establish the synergy between the media’s functionality and the 
promotion of war crimes jurisprudence. However, the invaluable contributions of the said 
tribunal to the development of the discipline are often neglected in the war crimes literature.  
Futamura (2008: 59) argued that the Tokyo trials were conducted to convince the Japanese that 
their leaders misled them into an extremely brutal war that resulted in the deaths of millions of 
Chinese, Philippines and Koreans. And that the militarists, who were the pioneers of the 
Japanese war machine, were to be brought to justice; just as their German accomplices. 
Arguably, as with the Nuremberg tribunal, that would not have been possible without the 
involvement of the media in that exercise. This clearly manifests the significance or the seeming 
inevitability of the media’s role in the temporary triumph of the rule of law and judicial 
accountability over impunity and tyranny after WW II. Thus, although their contents were being 
strictly censored during the course of the trials by the victorious allied powers (ibid: 59), the 
Japanese media favourably covered the opening of the Tokyo tribunal and accordingly reported 
its entire proceedings (ibid: 69). 
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Analytically, some major newspapers serialised the history of the pacific war, bringing out 
relevant facts, supporting the arguments that the militarist Japanese Government had been 
hiding the truth from the nation, about how brutally the Japanese military had fought in China 
and the Philippines, perpetrating war crimes against the allied forces (ibid: 59). And the 
publications that were put out by the Japanese media were mostly based on information from 
the victorious allied powers. Futamura (ibid:59) even contended that the historical account 
which the Japanese media presented about the history of the pacific war, dovetailed with the 
contents of the indictments and the historical background of the conflict as depicted in the 
tribunal’s judgment. 
 Thus, it is clear in framing analysis that when the media access information from very powerful 
sources, the information do come in with their in-built frames, which are calculated to lure 
audiences to absorb the ‘preferred meaning’, which will form the basis for the ‘preferred 
reading’, which the ‘communicating source’ is actually intending the ‘audiences’ to take 
(Straubhaar and La Rose, op.cit: 37, Gandy, 2001: 365). This could arguably account for the 
reasons why the Japanese media favourably covered the Tokyo trials and positively tilted the 
reportage of the proceedings in a way that reflected the position of the victorious allied 
powers; since it was they who supplied most of the requisite information that became the 
source materials for the publications. 
Without alluding to agenda-setting, news selection, framing and priming, as content models of 
media analysis (see 4.1 and 5.1), Futamura (ibid: 69) discussed how the media, in the interest of 
the allied powers, represented some of the main issues that evolved from the Tokyo tribunal 
and judgment in these words: 
The media paid little attention to Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion that all the defendants 
were not guilty, but reported more about the tribunal’s President William Web’s opinion 
that the Emperor also had some responsibility for the war... The media also reported 
that many of the people on the street regarded the trial as generally fair. 
Analytically, even though many of the people on the street may have regarded the trial as 
generally fair, that does not presuppose that the media directly swayed public opinion about 
 14 
 
the whole trial and it outcomes, but it can be seen that through ‘news selection’ and ‘framing’, 
the media directed the public to pay attention to the need for the trial and the implication of 
the Japanese emperor into the circumstances that culminated in the  atrocities perpetrated 
against the allied forces and the people of China and the Philippines (agenda-setting). Equally 
so, the question of media representation of war crimes issues in Sierra Leone is that which 
permeates the first and third research questions of this study (see 1.3). And the second and 
fourth questions (see 1.3) specifically enquire about how CSOs’ representatives received the 
reportage. Can it therefore be argued that the media’s coverage (the interplay between news 
selection and framing) of the CDF and Taylor trials in particular, may have either shaped or 
swayed the opinions of CSOs’ representatives across Sierra Leone? Thus, the empirical findings 
relating to this question will be analysed as the discourse unfolds between chapters six and 
nine. 
2.1.3 Cold War Politics, the Media and War Crimes Jurisprudence 
Notwithstanding the legacies of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, impunity and tyranny 
seemed to have temporarily triumphed over judicial accountability and war crimes 
jurisprudence in different parts of the globe during the cold war decades. And the cold war 
media was pre-occupied with the dynamics of the intellectual climate of that era, which was 
characterised by a political, ideological and military conflict between communists nations, led 
by the USSR, and Western democracies, led by the US (between 1945 and 1990). And the media 
was enlisted to propagandise for both sides of the political divide (White, Little and Smith, 
1997: 9, Dye, op.cit: 344). 
 Whereas the Western media projected the ideals of democratic-capitalism and those of its 
allies, the Eastern media upheld the values and orientations of the socialists’ philosophy (ibid). 
This argument is bolstered by McQuail’s (1983), Herman’s and Chomsky’s (1988) postulations 
that the functionality of the media in any society is largely influenced by the socio-economic, 
cultural, political and ideological contexts in which it operates. The resurgence of war crimes 
jurisprudence in the 1990s is not unconnected with the eruption of bloody armed conflicts in 
ethnically divided countries- the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Democratic 
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Republic of Congo being the notable examples. Ethnicity is a fundamental issue responsible for 
some of the world’s bloodiest conflicts; and it is still a serious problem associated with what 
Carruthers (2000: 198) has described as the ‘New World Disorders’. 
2.1.4 The Media and the ICTY and ICTR 
There is evidence in the shared-body of knowledge that it was the media that first directed the 
attention of the international community to hold war criminals in the former Yugoslavia 
accountable for war crimes (Futamura, op.cit: 26) in an era in which ethno-
regionalism/nationalism was the fundamental factor that propelled most of the World’s 
deadliest conflicts (White, little and Smith, op.cit: 4, Ryan, 1997:  157-174). This argument is 
authenticated by the fact that, Mirko Klarin of the Borba newspaper is credited as the first 
journalist, who in May, 1991 called for a new ‘Nuremberg Court’ to try war criminals during the 
Balkans’ conflict (Futamura, op.cit:26). Moreover, the argument is bolstered by Strauss (op.cit: 
185), in his analysis on the media’s role in the setting up of the ICTY: 
In August 1992, television began to display images of Muslims in Bosnia in newly built 
Serbian concentration camps. Alarmed by this and other evidence of Serbian ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, the United Nations created a War Crimes Tribunal; the first such tribunal 
since Nuremberg. 
On this issue Holbrooke (1999: 20) noted that: 
‘Let us be clear: the reason the West finally, belatedly intervened was heavily related to 
media coverage’. 
Thus, there can be a nexus between media coverage and political/diplomatic reactions by the 
international community to the plights of suffering masses (Hoijer, op.cit: 313-531, Hopkinson, 
op.cit: 11, Owen, op.cit: 308, Wolfsfeld, op.cit:207-208, Ryan, op.cit: 165). Hence, the media’s 
portrayal of the atrocities in the then Yugoslavia and its allusions to the Nuremberg legacy, to 
hold war criminals responsible in the former Yugoslavia contributed to the setting up of the 
ICTY. And the media was as well involved in the coverage of the ICTY proceedings, leading to 
the tribunal’s convictions: 
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‘The International War Crimes Tribunal on Friday sentenced a Bosnian Croat, who 
admitted to taking part in the massacre of 1,200 unarmed Bosnian Muslims last year, to 
10 years in prison.4 
Thus, the principal legacies of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals revolved around ending 
impunity, promoting human rights and dignity and upholding justice, through individual 
criminal responsibility, by criminalising the act of conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, crimes 
against peace, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Donnelly, 2003: 253, 
Cassese, ibid: 720, Kaczorowska, op.cit: 495, Hillier, ibid: 283, Reporting Justice, op.cit:8-10). 
However, the replication of the Nuremburg legacy on the Tokyo tribunal was probably less 
problematic because the Tokyo trial shared so many things in common with the Nuremberg 
tribunal. For instance, both were military tribunals; they both subjected the pioneers of the 
same conflict (WW II) to military justice; and they both took place in an international context. 
However, the horrendous wars that disintegrated the former Yugoslavia into seven distinct 
political entities (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and 
Macedonia), and the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda in particular were not unconnected with 
‘ethnic cleansing’. And both wars took place in a domestic context. 
Thus, the circumstances that led to the setting up of both the ICTY and ICTR were altogether 
different from those that culminated in the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals. Therefore, to what extent has the application of the Nuremberg and Tokyo legacies to 
the two unparalleled circumstances in Europe (the former Yugoslavia) and Africa (Rwanda) 
impacted post-conflict social transformation and reconciliation in the said ethnically divided 
societies?  How has the media represented the main issues that evolved from the ICTY and 
ICTR? What has been the media’s role on attitudes towards post-conflict justice, social 
transformation and reconciliation in the ‘political entities’ that emerged from the former 
Yugoslavia? What has also been the media’s role on attitudes towards post-conflict justice in 
Rwanda? 
                                                          
4
November 29, 1996, The Hague, Netherlands- CNN 
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Thus, there is also evidence in the existing literature that suggests that the media in the former 
Yugoslavia (particularly Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) overwhelmingly 
supported the establishment of the ICTY and devoted more time and space in the coverage of 
the proceedings of the tribunal (Volcic and Dzihana, 2011: 8-13). The ICTY has undoubtedly 
advanced the frontiers of war crimes jurisprudence, but what about the tribunal’s contributions 
to the politics, internal dynamics and peace and reconciliation processes of the ethnically 
divided societies that emerged from the former state? Apart from the facts that the tribunal 
turned out to be expensive and has further deepened the political divide; it has also been 
criticised as a political court that set out to unjustly target the Serbs (Markovic and Subasic, 
2011:108-109). Meanwhile, Merwe and Weinstein (2010: 3) have analysed the post-conflict 
situations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and have argued in line with Nettelfield (ibid) that ‘ethnic 
differences’ have indeed influenced the perceptions of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats on 
different aspects of the ICTY. They have also argued that the media has also continued to play a 
crucial role in influencing post-conflict attitudes in the political entities of the former state. 
 Comparatively, if the media could play such a role in the conflict-afflicted political entities of 
the former Yugoslavia, has the local media in Sierra Leone been also playing a crucial role in 
influencing post-conflict attitudes in Sierra Leone? This is the principal thrust of the fifth 
research question of this study, which will be critically analysed in chapter eight. Essentially, 
two significant issues have emerged from the above analyses that are cognate with this study. 
The first is related to issues of ethno-regionalism and post-conflict justice and reconciliation and 
the second revolves around how ethno-regionalism influenced the media’s coverage of the 
ICTY. 
Both issues thus became the principal thrust for the first substantive study (the Sarajevo 
research) of media and war crimes jurisprudence outside Africa, since the dawn of the new 
millennium. The Sarajevo research and its indisputable contribution to the literature and its 
relevance to this study are incisively analysed in 2.2. However, the media’s role in the 
conflictual and political transformations of Rwanda, leading to the establishment of the ICTR, is 
also clearly documented. Scholars of conflict analysis have tended to focus on the media’s 
conflictual as opposed to its functional perspective in relation to the Rwandan debacle. 
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However, I shall seek to analyse the conflictual perspective of the media in the next chapter, 
dealing with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this study. 
 Meanwhile, the story of the first three years of the 1993 Arusha Accord for Rwanda was 
scarcely covered in the Anglophone press, even though it received regular attention from the 
BBC World Service radio and TV. The French and Belgian media paid more attention to the said 
issue because of their colonial and linguistic ties with Rwanda (Hilsum, 2007: 170). Moreover, 
the circumstances that led to the deaths of over eight hundred thousand (800,000) Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus (the Rwanda genocide), were not given the much needed attention by the 
international media in its intermittent coverage of the Rwandan debacle (Dallaire, 2007: 12, 
Shaw, 2007: 351-371). 
 Nevertheless, whereas the local media undoubtedly played a role in the Rwanda genocide (see 
3.5); the international media was said to have abandoned Rwanda in times of need (ibid), but 
there is also evidence that Western journalists made frantic efforts to cover the genocide, but 
the circumstances that prevailed in Rwanda at the time could not have permitted them to do 
so. 
It was a story we wanted to tell but it was appallingly dangerous...Mark Doyle was in 
Kigali foremost of April and May reporting for the BBC. His reports indicating the 
progress of the RPF advance and the scale of the civilian slaughter by government forces 
were frequently broadcast on the BBC World Service. When another BBC reporter, 
Fergal Keane, was stopped at a checkpoint in late May, the machete- wielding thugs 
manning it said that if they ever saw Doyle they would kill him (Hilsum, op.cit: 172). 
The media played an active role in the call for war crimes trials in Rwanda as it did in the former 
Yugoslavia; it portrayed the repercussions of the genocide and then opened the eyes of the 
international community to the plights of Rwanda (Ammon, 2001: 117-118, Robinson, 2001: 
529). The media also extensively covered the refugee crisis in Goma (Democratic Republic of 
Congo) and simultaneously followed the debates leading to the setting up of the ICTR, its 
proceedings and convictions of war crimes perpetrators and the post-conflict democratic 
processes that emerged in Rwanda (Thompson, 2007: XII). Unlike the literature on media 
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coverage and ethno-regionalism in the former Yugoslav states, which is the basis for the 
shared-body of knowledge in the field; issues about ethno-political considerations in the 
media’s coverage of the war crimes trials of the ICTR are still under-explored. 
 Nevertheless, the ICTR epitomised Africa’s first international criminal tribunal. It indicted and 
convicted even local journalists for war crimes related offences (See ICTR Media Trial Judgment 
in Thompson, op.cit:277-307). Thus, a New York Times editorial heralded the verdicts as ‘rightly 
decided’, ‘welcome’, ‘pos{ing} no threat to journalistic free speech’ and ‘demonstrate{ing} that 
the international community will demand justice for those who committed crimes against all 
humanity’ (Monasebian, 2007: 305). The ICTR also upheld the notion of individual criminal 
responsibility (CDF Trial Judgment, op.cit:72) and simultaneously promoted the doctrine of war 
crimes jurisprudence which: 
‘has had a slow but steady normative impact on international relations by reinforcing a 
norm of accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and the 
principles of universal jurisdiction over such crimes’ (Futamura, op.cit: 2). 
Nevertheless, despite the resounding laurels of the ICTR, the media has also been critical of its 
challenges. Thus, the Christian Science Monitor (Thursday, 5th July, 2007) accused the ICTR of 
strongly polarising Rwandan politics and of largely unaccountable to either the survivors of the 
Rwandan Genocide or anyone else. It is also said to be selective in its choice of cases, expensive 
and disconnected both geographically and conceptually, from the primary stakeholders whom 
it sought to serve (ibid). 
2.2 Advancing the Frontiers of Media and War Crimes Jurisprudence 
It has already been established that the evolution of war crimes jurisprudence is not 
unconnected with the functionality of the media. Thus, the role of the media in the 
dissemination of ‘news’ and ‘views’ about the dynamics of most of the war crimes trials that 
have so far been conducted cannot  be overemphasised. Ethno-regionalism is arguably the 
stereotypical factor that has largely influenced and/or fuelled most of the conflicts in Africa 
(Mehler, 2007: 208, Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, Rothchild, 1992: 105, For Di People, 7th 
February, 2005:7, New Vision, Thursday, 29th August, 2013). Of the plethora of conflicts that 
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brought untold sufferings to Africans and the continent, it was only in Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
that war crimes tribunals were held to punish perpetrators. And it is an indisputable fact that 
both Rwanda and Sierra Leone are ethnically divided countries (Caplan, 2007: 20-37, Hirsch, 
op.cit: 24-25, Penfold, op.cit: 25). For Rwanda it is clear in the existing literature that the 
infamous 1994 genocide was largely precipitated by ethnicity (Caplan, ibid). And the local 
media undoubtedly played an active role in fuelling the genocide that led to the setting up of 
the ICTR (Kabanda, 2007: 62-70, Kimani, 2007: 110-124, Carruthers, op.cit: 50). 
What is not however in the shared-body of knowledge about the Rwandan experience is 
whether the local media’s coverage of the ICTR was characterised by such ethno-political 
considerations that can aptly be described as ‘a continuation of war by other means’ (Markovic 
and Subasic, op.cit: 81). Thus, there is virtually the need for thorough explorations of the extent 
(if at all) to which ethno-political considerations influenced the local media’s coverage of the 
war crimes trials in Rwanda and the attitudes towards the post-conflict justice process. 
However, this study does not specifically deal with the media and the war crimes trials of the 
ICTR held in Arusha, Tanzania. 
 So the proposed explorations on the Rwandan experience cannot be done in this study. 
Probably, other researchers may be tempted to explore this void in the literature about media 
coverage of war crimes in Rwanda in the near future. Unlike Rwanda, the Sierra Leone 
experience is a bit different. Though the country experienced a protracted armed conflict, the 
offence of genocide was never committed. Moreover, the existing literature has not pointed to 
any mono-causal factor of the conflict. What is clear in the shared-body of knowledge is that 
the war in Sierra Leone was caused and ignited by a plethora of internal and external forces- 
bad governance, corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, mercenary corporatism, 
injustice, militarism, disrespect for democratic values, ethno-regionalism etc. (Zack-Williams, 
2012:3-30, Penfold, 2012:5, Berewa, 2011: 105-115, Kargbo, 2011:111-114, Kargbo, 2010:122-
123, Richards 2005, Gberie, 2005: 70-96, Abdullah, 1997& 2004, Rashid 2004, The TRC Report, 
Volume I, 2004:10,  Strauss, 2002: 93, Bundu, 2001:51, Hirsch, 2001:13-71, Francis, 107-120, 
Alie 2000). 
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However, ethno-regionalism is thus a fundamental factor that fuelled and prolonged Sierra 
Leone’s devastating war. This came out clearly in the country’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s Report: 
The link between ethnicity and the conflict lies in the way in which certain factions 
turned ethnicity into an instrument of prejudice and violence against perceived 
opponents or those who did not ‘belong’. People of Northern origin were found to have 
been targeted in the Southern and Eastern regions during the latter part of the war. The 
Kamajors committed disproportionate levels of violations against such ethnic groups as 
the T (h)emne, Koranko, Loko, Limba and Yalunka...(Volume II, 2004: 11). 
Analytically, just as with the Nuremberg, Tokyo, the former Yugoslavia and the Rwanda 
experiences, the media and CSOs were very much involved in the post-conflict justice process 
that evolved in Sierra Leone (see 1.1). However, different media institutions and CSOs in Sierra 
Leone took different positions in the political debates and ideological struggle about the 
relevance of the SCSL in the clamour for post-conflict justice. There were those that supported 
the prosecutions of the then indictees (now convicts) of the various warring factions. There 
were also those who lent credence to the trials of some indictees belonging to specific warring 
factions, but frown at the trials of others. 
 And there were those who never supported any of the four trials, but lent overwhelming 
preference to the reconciliatory approach to post-conflict justice in Sierra Leone. These 
contradictory permutations therefore raise some fundamental and pertinent questions that 
worth a thorough analysis of how the media covered the trials and which impacts it contents 
have had on CSOs’ representatives in Sierra Leone. Did those media institutions and CSOs that 
support the trials of the convicts  genuinely did so in the name of human rights, individual 
criminal responsibility, international justice, democratic legitimacy and the need to end 
impunity in Sierra Leone? Or did they come under the guise of these concepts to encumber 
their prejudices against a set of convicts, whom they wanted to see behind bars forever? If that 
was the case, could their prejudices have been driven by ethno-regional and political 
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considerations, considering how ethno-regionalism has permeated Sierra Leone’s party 
politics? 
 Why did some sections of the media and CSOs lend credence to the trials of some convicts in 
some of the warring factions, but opposed the trials of others? Was that not a manifestation of 
their endorsement of a form of ‘selective justice’ that contravenes the ideals of war crimes 
jurisprudence? Why did some sections of the media and CSOs choose to oppose the setting up 
of the SCSL, but lauded the efficacy of the reconciliatory approach? These questions are 
fundamental to this study and they are clearly interconnected with all the five research 
questions, which are to be answered between chapters six and nine. Interestingly, this study is 
not unconnected with the dialectics of communications media effects research, from which a 
plethora of content and response models of media analysis (see analyses in 4.1, 4.2 and 5.1) has 
evolved to gauge media impacts at both the psychological (micro or individual) and sociological 
(macro or societal) levels. 
 However, despite the plethora of landmark communications research on media impacts 
(Iyengar, 2010: 273-286, Cohen, 1963, McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 173-187, de Vreese, 2005: 
51-60, Gilboa, 2005: 27-40, Walgrave& Van Aelst, 2006: 88-105, Entman, 1993:51-58 & 2007: 
163-173, Scheufele, 2000:297-316, McCombs, 2004 & 2005: 543-557, McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-
Escobar & Rey, 1997: 703-717 etc.), there has been little academic work on the African media’s 
reporting of post-conflict justice issues, including war crimes, and its impact on the wider 
society. Essentially, there are arguably five main studies (two of which have already been 
alluded to above) in the existing literature that are cognate with this study. The first is Lang’s 
(2005) groundbreaking study on the media’s coverage of Charles Taylor’s indictment. The 
second is Lincoln’s (2008) generic study on the media’s reportage of SCSL. The third and fourth 
studies are Shaw’s (2009 and 2012) framing analysis of Sierra Leone’s civil war and that on 
human rights journalism. The fifth is the Sarajevo work (2011) on media analysis of the war 
crimes trials in the former Yugoslavia.  
Thus, to lucidly present a case for this study, I shall juxtapose each of the above studies with my 
research questions, pointing out the convergences and divergences of my study in line with 
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each of the said studies, and then state how I intend to advance the frontiers of the discipline 
with the empirical findings analysed between chapters six and nine. Lang’s work was done after 
David Crane, SCSL’s first Prosecutor, unsealed Taylor’s indictment, when he was still the 
President of Liberia. The principal thrust of his study was to establish the critical role that ‘the 
international media’ played in shaping the events that led to Taylor’s arrest. In his analysis, Lang 
(op.cit: 1) took the position of the critic, regarding the debate about the neutrality of the media 
in the production of ‘news’ relating to issues and events that affect society (see 4.1). He argued 
that: 
The press has not merely served as neutral medium through which information about 
the indictment is expressed to the public, but rather has been used by the Prosecutor, 
Charles Taylor, and others to shift government policies to their purpose. 
Lang (op.cit: 7) without alluding to agenda-setting, news selection, framing and priming, as 
content models of media analysis (see 4.1), justified his position with an analysis of how the 
media paid attention to, and made prominence (agenda-setting) a number of specific issues 
(news selection), which were negatively tilted against Taylor and presented (framing) to the 
international community for Taylor to be viewed as a war criminal (priming), even before he 
was arrested, tried and convicted.  
In explicating this, Lang surveyed the international scene during key moments of the campaign 
to bring Taylor to justice and discussed the contributions the media made towards the SCSL’s 
mission (ibid: 3-7) under the following headings: ‘The Fall of Charles Taylor’ (p.3), ‘Political 
Efforts for Taylor’s Transfer’ (p.3), ‘Mobilising the International Community’ (p.5), ‘The African 
Community’ (p.6) and ‘Conclusion’ (p.7). The trend of thought that is immediately discernible in 
the above sub-headings is that the Western media was accordingly used as a conduit to 
challenge the position which ECOWAS had taken to get Taylor out of Liberia in the name of 
regional peace and security, in exchange for his safety and political asylum in Nigeria. Lang (p.1-
7) also established how the Western media made the Resolutions of both ‘the European Union 
Parliament’ and ‘the United States Congress’ salient in its call to extradite Taylor to the SCSL’, 
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whilst alluding to ‘Taylor’s alleged Al Qaeda connection’. Lang (op.cit: 7) concluded his study by 
stating that: 
The press is an extremely versatile tool that can be used to sway public opinion, 
influence political leaders, and create awareness on a topic. In addition, by evaluating 
the amount of coverage of an issue and the content of the reports, people are able to 
obtain a better understanding of what matters, and how to deal with the press 
accordingly so... While diplomatic efforts have been the traditional alternative to 
coercive law enforcement, the media should not be forgotten in the fight to end 
impunity... 
Meanwhile, it can hardly be disputed that Lang’s work has not contributed to the shared-body 
of knowledge of media and war crimes jurisprudence; as it clearly points to how the 
international (Western) media may have shaped the decision that eventually led to Taylor’s 
extradition to the SCSL. However, his study has some notable limitations. First, Lang only 
studied the international media’s coverage, using a form of content analysis, devoid of either 
framing or discourse analysis. According to Entman (op.cit: 57), any content analysis that is 
unguided by a framing paradigm can produce data that misrepresent the media’s messages 
that most audience members can pick up. Second, the study did not gauge how CSOs’ 
representatives in Sierra Leone for example, received the international media’s coverage of 
Taylor’s indictment. Third, the study did not cover the periods leading to Taylor’s arrest and 
repatriation to Liberia, extradition to the SCSL, trial and eventual conviction and sentence. 
 The media (local and international) arguably paid serious attention to the Taylor trial until it 
was brought to a close with the eventual conviction and sentence of Taylor. Significantly, these 
are all researchable issues to further understand the media’s role in advancing the shared-body 
of knowledge in the discipline. Therefore, notwithstanding the contributions of Lang’s 
groundbreaking study to media and war crimes jurisprudence, there is need for this study as 
well. Research questions two (2) and four(4)  are in tandem with media coverage of the Taylor 
trial, for which there is already a shared-body of knowledge in the existing literature advanced 
by Lang, but what is advanced  inter alia relates to only ‘the international media’. 
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 In other words, Lang conscientiously restricted his study to an analysis of ‘the international 
media’s coverage of the main issues and events that evolved in the international community 
relating to only Taylor’s indictment. However, the said research questions (2 and 4) specifically 
deal with ‘selected local media’ coverage of Taylor’s indictment, its impact on international 
relations, ECOWAS’s role in the whole episode, Western influence, Taylor’s arrest and 
extradition to the SCSL, his trial, eventual conviction and sentence. Meanwhile, it is clear that 
this study is comparatively broader in scope than that of Lang. And whereas Lang 
conscientiously dealt with the ‘international media’, this study focuses on ‘the local media’. 
Further, this study gauges the responses of CSOs’ representatives to the local media’s coverage 
of the Taylor trial, the limb that is conspicuously absent in Lang’s work. Moreover, this study 
adopts a plethora of models of media analysis (see 4.1 and 4.2) and among others, employs 
‘framing’ and ‘discourse analyses’ as clearly define methodological frameworks (see 5.1) to 
accordingly guide its findings to meet the threshold of validity and reliability in communications 
research methodology (Treadwell, 2011: 78-83). Thus, the divergences between Lang’s work 
and this study, regarding research questions 2 and 4, clearly point to some salient researchable 
issues that are not in the existing literature. This can partially account for the need to further 
explore the media’s functionality in promoting the ideals of war crimes jurisprudence and 
building post-conflict democratic legitimacy in Sierra Leone. 
This leads me to the other research which is also germane to this study. And that is Lincoln’s 
work.5 Lincoln (2008: 1) acknowledged the significance of the media in promoting war crimes 
jurisprudence and stressed the role, which the media played in complementing the efforts of 
the Outreach Section in the dissemination of information about the SCSL to audiences. Lincoln 
(ibid: 1) strongly argued that even though the media could play an important role in raising 
awareness about war crimes issues, the SCSL faced a hostile domestic press, which regularly 
pointed to allegations of unfair trials and ill treatments of detainees. She focused her (twenty-
one pages) study on the nature and extent of such coverage and proposed to assess the 
relationship between press reports and attitudes and beliefs to determine its impact relative to 
                                                          
5
Done on behalf of the United States Institute of Peace Programme on the Rule of Law in African Countries Emerging from Violent Conflict and 
the War Crimes Research Group, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London in February, 2000 
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the outreach program. Thus, in relation to the debate about the media’s neutrality in the 
production of news on issues and events that affects society (see 4.1), she also toed the line of 
the critics and posited in her conclusion in page 20 as follows: 
‘As most of these outlets are independently owned there can be a tendency towards 
bias in much of the reporting as well’. 
Lincoln (ibid: 1-8) thoroughly explored the landscape of the media, and referenced her 
arguments about the hostility of the local media’s coverage of the operations of the court with 
information from virtually all the newspapers that were regularly published in Sierra Leone up 
to 2008 (ibid: 11-20). Thus, her study encompassed the local media’s reportage of some of the 
main critical issues that permeated the AFRC, RUF and CDF trials; with intermittent references 
to the arrest and indictment of Taylor. Lincoln’s study is now part of the shared-body of 
knowledge. Further, though her work has its own limitations, it encapsulated some salient 
issues that could serve as pointers to the directions of further research. However, a number of 
issues can be raised with her study that would serve as justifications for my research into war 
crimes issues in Sierra Leone. 
Whilst her study is quite eclectic touching on issues of outreach, legacy and impact of the 
Special Court with specific emphasis of virtually all of Sierra Leone’s newspapers coverage of 
some controversial issues relative to the three trials (AFRC, RUF and CDF), held in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone; my study is specifically designed to evaluate the coverage of selected local 
newspapers of the CDF and Taylor trials relative to CSOs’ representatives’ responses, with the 
aims of finding out how the coverage was done and what impact it may have had on elite post-
conflict opinions in Sierra Leone. In other words, my research seeks to explore whether the 
coverage of the said trials ‘was a continuation of war by other means’ and whether the media 
in the process contributed in shaping elite’s attitudes towards post-conflict justice and 
strengthening good governance and democratic accountability in Sierra Leone (see research 
questions in 1.3). 
Furthermore, the basis for the ‘selection’ of the issues captured in Lincoln’s work and the 
period for which the study was conducted is neither highlighted nor articulated. Neither the 
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sample frame, nor the sample size is either stated or any reason (s) given for the choice of the 
‘numerous newspapers’ chosen for the study. As such, the study does not seem to have a 
clearly outlined methodological frameworks and it is hard to discern from her conclusion, the 
tendency of ‘bias’ (ibid: 20) on the part of the local media in the coverage of the issues and 
events, she dealt with. Also, she could not pinpoint the specific media that were ‘biased’ in 
their reportage. 
 Thus, Entman’s (2007:165-166) conceptual criteria for ‘bias’ is seen in the argument that the 
pattern of news slant must skew persistently ‘across time, ‘message dimensions’ and ‘media 
outlets’ in favour of one side of the political debate, but neither this nor any standard criteria 
for assessing ‘bias’ in media coverage is discernible in her study. Though she highlighted how 
the issues were reported (ibid: 11-20), the reasons for the ‘biased’ coverage were also neither 
highlighted nor articulated. The form of content analysis she adopted is as well devoid of either 
framing or discourse analysis, pointing again to the Entman’s (1993:57) concern about the need 
for a sound and ‘unbiased’ content analysis to be informed by framing.6 
Significantly, any study that seeks to gauge media impact must establish the theoretical nexus 
between the content and response models of media analysis (see 4.1 and 4.2) and how they are 
to be contextualised for purposes of that study; with clearly articulated and appropriately 
chosen methodological frameworks, encompassing the study’s sample frame and size, that lead 
to the empirical analysis and conclusion that should meet the threshold of validity and 
reliability (Treadwell, op.cit: 78-83, McCall, 1998: 311-330, Gravetter and Wallnau, 1999:34). 
Unlike Lincoln’s work, which was not set out consonant with the above empirical research 
procedure, my study is accordingly guided by the said procedure to come up with empirical 
findings that should meet the threshold of validity and reliability. 
Moreover, in assessing the relationship between press coverage and post-conflict attitudes and 
beliefs to determine its impact relative to the outreach program, Lincoln (ibid: 20) had this to 
say: 
                                                          
6
See review of Lang’s work above. 
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It is difficult to gauge the coverage of newspapers and radio reports as listeners and 
readership figures do not exist. Interviews and discussions highlight that many of these 
big issues are still being raised by ordinary Sierra Leoneans, indicating that news 
coverage is influencing public opinion to a degree. 
Again, Lincoln (ibid: 21) raised this other pertinent issue in the last paragraph of her study: 
Nevertheless, although the unreliability of the local press appears to be a challenge to 
the court, it does not appear to have caused significant damage to perceptions outside 
of the Court about its work. The challenge of the Court is sustaining this debate with 
consistent, clear and reliable information to avoid the continuation of rumour becoming 
well established fact. 
Both quotations contain two salient issues that are worth further explorations. First, is the 
difficulty which Lincoln faced in gauging public opinion in Sierra Leone, because of the 
unavailability of any reliable statistics of listeners and readers to test the impact of media 
coverage, but she concluded that media coverage can influence public opinion to a degree. This 
raises the question of how then can ‘media impact’ be reliably gauged in Sierra Leone where no 
credible statistics of listeners and readers exists? Significantly, I have chosen to test ‘media 
impact’ by taking representatives of CSOs as a barometer for ‘part of elite opinion’, which this 
study seeks to gauge.  
Thus, in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, where there are few reliable measurements of 
public opinion through ‘polling’, civil society is a useful surrogate for testing social attitudes 
(Macauley, 2012). This has aided my study to determine how media coverage has influenced 
part of elite’s post-conflict opinions in Sierra Leone. Second, the finding that the ‘unreliability’ 
of the local media’s coverage of the SCSL seemed not to have negatively affected people’s 
perceptions about the court, but has only posed a challenge to the court to use its outreach 
program to set the records straight, is another  issue that should be further explored. This is 
simply because the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has established that an 
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essential feature of a credible transitional justice system is the presence of credible media that 
reports without overt bias (Communicating Transitional Justice, 2007: 10). 
Essentially, a comparative analysis of Lincoln’s finding and that of the ICTJ, can raise the 
question of whether the presence of an unreliable media (that report with overt bias) can still 
play an important role on attitudes towards post-conflict justice and strengthening democratic 
legitimacy in Sierra Leone. Interestingly, this issue is germane to research question five (5) of 
this study (see 1.3). I now turn to the next study, which is Shaw’s (2009: 39) unique work on the 
framing analysis of Sierra Leone’s civil war and its implications for peace Journalism and global 
Justice. In this study, Shaw (ibid: 39) explored the debate based on a multidimensional 
exploratory discourse analysis over the framing of ‘their’ problem and not ‘ours’ in the context 
of the Sierra Leone civil war, between 1996 and 2001.  
He analysed the ‘us’ only and ‘us’ + ‘them’ frames in the context of the ‘empathy/distance’ and 
empathy/critical frames, and stated that the turning of the back of the international community 
(led by Britain) on Sierra Leone, was informed more by historical/empathy distance frames than 
empathy/critical frames in the mainstream Western media discourse. Shaw (ibid: 42-46) 
interviewed four Western journalists,7 who covered the Sierra Leone civil war to strengthen the 
thesis that, historical frames (stereotypical representations) in news discourse can skew the 
way distance wars are perceived, which can have serious implications for international 
humanitarian intervention within a cosmopolitan context.  
Moreover, this is a thesis which Shaw (2007: 351) had advanced on the delayed intervention or 
non-intervention in the humanitarian crises in Ethiopia, Somalia and Rwanda, confirming the 
extent to which historical frames reinforced the elite-dominated news frames of ‘their crisis’ 
and not ‘ours’, and how that stereotypical representation accounted for the delayed or non-
intervention to end the crises in the said countries. Thus, Shaw (op.cit: 46) concluded the study 
with the extent to which the historical empathy/distance frames inhibited the realisation of the 
ideals of peace journalism and global justice in the coverage of the Sierra Leone conflict. As 
seen from the above analysis, Shaw’s work restricted itself to the international media’s 
                                                          
7Alex Duval Smith- the Independent, Sam Kiley- the Times, Anton La Guardia- the Dailey Telegraph and Steve Coll- the Washington Post 
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coverage of Sierra Leone’s decade long civil war and how the nuances in the wording and 
syntax (Scheufele, 2000: 309) adopted in the framing of the issues and events by the Western 
media, negatively impacted Western intervention into the crisis and the clamour for peace in 
Sierra Leone.  
This undoubtedly points to the fact that Shaw’s 2009 work (though predicated upon clearly 
articulated and appropriately chosen theoretical and methodological frameworks), did not 
encompass the media’s role in the coverage of the post-conflict justice mechanisms, which 
were inaugurated to facilitate the socio-economic, legal and political transformation processes, 
that emerged for the promotion of good governance and democratic accountability in post-
conflict Sierra Leone; which is indeed the foundation upon which my study is predicated. 
Essentially, whilst Shaw’s work critically analyses the historical perspective which the 
international media brought to its reporting of the conflict in Sierra Leone and how that 
negatively impacted the quest for humanitarian intervention and global justice within the 
context of human rights, my research however, looks through the ‘other end of the telescope’, 
by examining the impact on society of the media’s reporting of the CDF and Taylor trials. 
Shaw’s conception of human rights journalism (2012 : 25-42) - as distinct from what he 
conceptualised as human wrong journalism - is based on the need to expose ‘human rights 
abuses’; including the violations of political, economic, social and cultural  rights; the need to 
‘protect free speech’ (upon which other human rights are predicated); and the ‘responsibility to 
report’ (a normative journalistic practice - a rights based journalism - based on the respect for 
human dignity, irrespective of colour, nationality, race, gender, geographical dignity and so on). 
Meanwhile, it is the last of the three limbs upon which Shaw’s thesis of journalism of the 
human race and for the human race is predicated. 
At a generic level, however, it can be argued that war crimes trials are  conducted to uphold the 
ideals of human rights and to punish perpetrators for gross human rights violations, including 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, which are the most heinous of crimes in 
international criminal law (Cassese, op.cit: 727-723). Thus, when the media assumes the 
responsibility to report war crimes issues that is in itself a manifestation of all the three limbs of 
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Shaw’s human rights journalism- the need to expose human rights violations, the need to 
protect freedom of expression and other fundamental human rights and the responsibility to 
report such human rights issues. 
 Essentially, therefore, it can be generically argued that my proposed thesis is an extension of 
Shaw’s human rights journalism, which was itself an extension of Allan Thompson’s 
‘responsibility to report’- the new journalistic paradigm, proposed in 2007. Thompson’s 
responsibility to report (the new journalistic paradigm) was proposed after an in depth study of 
the local media’s role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the international media’s neglect to 
report (principally because of the Galtung and Ruge’s ‘geographical proximity’ and ‘cultural 
determinism’ news selection paradigm-see 4.1) the gross human rights violations perpetrated 
against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda, leading to the genocide between April and 
July, 1994. 
Thompson (2007: 433-444), in a bid to challenge the said ‘news selection’ paradigm, studied 
‘the responsibility to protect’ as the profound legal concept that has rendered the notions of 
sovereignty and non-intervention into the internal affairs of independent sovereign states 
negligible in contemporary international law and drew an analogy of the said legal concept with 
the journalists’ responsibility to report any humanitarian issues (crises or conflicts) that affect 
the survival of the human race, irrespective of where they are happening (ibid: 434).  
From the analogy, Thompson proposed ‘the responsibility to report’ as an alternative to the 
Galtung and Ruge’s paradigm and called it ‘a new journalistic paradigm’. Arguably, Shaw’s 
‘human rights journalism’ thesis has principally developed Thompson’s proposition for ‘a new 
journalistic paradigm’ into a coherent theoretical and conceptual framework to guide 
communications media research on human rights and by extension war crimes jurisprudence. 
Thus, I have adopted  both Thompson’s ‘responsibility to report’ (the new journalistic 
paradigm) and Shaw’s human rights journalism’ as one comprehensive content model of media 
analysis (see 4.1) in analysing the media’s coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials. I now turn to 
the Sarajevo work, which critically analyses the media’s coverage of the legacy of conflict in 
another continent (Europe). The study was done by a host of scholars whose contributions to 
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the shared-body of knowledge in the discipline are embedded in the 2011 report of the 
Sarajevo Media Centre (SMC) on media analysis of the war crimes trials in the former 
Yugoslavia’(eds. Dzihana A. and Volcic Z.). 
 The study examined what the authors termed ‘ethno-national ideology’, and its impact on the 
way the media represented social reality in the seven distinct political entities that emerged 
from the former Yugoslavia, using framing (the ‘us’ and ‘them’ frames) and discourse analyses. 
As stated earlier (see 1.1) their conclusion that media coverage was ‘a continuation of war by 
other means’ provides a useful model for my study. The authors argue that: ‘it is crucial to 
explore how the war crimes trials are represented in the media and how the trauma (my italics) 
they represent has been incorporated into the public memory’ (ibid: 10). This is thus a guiding 
sentiment of my study, though I call the ‘ideology’ ‘ethno-regional’, reflecting the distinctive 
paradigm of Sierra Leone. 
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter deals with theoretical frameworks and essentially attempts to define and critically 
examine the concepts of media, civil society and transitional justice (TJ), within the context of 
Sierra Leone’s post-conflict governance. Media, civil society and TJ, are the most important 
concepts that are discernible from the study’s aims and objectives, research questions and 
literature review. Thus, it is important to discern how the said concepts are inextricably linked 
to the study. To accomplish this task, I have divided the chapter into two (2) distinct, but 
interrelated parts. The first part separately defines and deals with some salient issues and 
perspectives of media, civil society and TJ. The TJ section, explores the circumstances that led 
to the establishment of both the SCSL and the TRC, making Sierra Leone the only post-conflict 
country in the World to simultaneously institutionalise both the judicial accountability and 
reconciliatory approaches to TJ in resolving the same conflict. The final part explores how the 
three concepts (media, civil society and TJ) are theoretically interconnected. 
3.1 The Media  
This study seeks to gauge the impact of the local media’s coverage on CSOs’ representatives in Sierra 
Leone’s quest for post-conflict justice and adopts the stimulus-response theorization, which aims for 
‘objectivity’ in social science research (Treadwell, 2011:14, McCall, 1998: 313). Essentially, the relevance 
of the stimulus-response theorisation (Martin, Carlson and Buskist, 2007: 266-268, Powell, Symbaluk 
and MacDonald, 2005: 1-5) and how it has aided the processes leading to how the research questions 
are answered are accordingly explicated in 4.1 dealing with models of media analysis. Meanwhile, 
two other controversial issues which have attracted lots of media theorisation are discernible 
from the analysis of the study’s research questions. The first is linked to how mediated contents 
are produced by the news media (Watson, 2003: 120-145), and the second is germane to how 
mediated contents are consumed in a heterogeneous society (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004: 
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843-861). This second issue is important because Sierra Leone is a multi-ethnic8 post-conflict 
heterogeneous society in which news consumption could either  ‘reinforce’ or ‘challenge’ the 
pre-existing biases of audiences (Baran, 2002:405) largely because of ethno-regional and 
political considerations. Analytically, from the above theorisation of news production and 
consumption, it is discernible that a plethora of theories can thus influence the production and 
consumption of mediated contents (Watson, op.cit: 120). This study has therefore 
‘contextualised’ a number of theories regarding the production and consumption of the 
mediated contents, which the media published in its coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials in 
particular and TJ in general.  
I will start with the theorisations on gate-keeping. The underpinning presupposition of the gate-
keeping theorisation is that the mainstream or conventional media has been the sole gate-
keeper to the information flow in society (Watson, op.cit: 127-129, Straubhaar and LaRose, 
op.cit: 31). However, the advent of the new media has evidentially challenged the validity of 
gate-keeping as a content theory of media analysis, leading to the development of the concept 
of citizen journalism through social media like Twitter, You Tube, Face book to name but three. 
Fundamentally, ICTs’ effect on the new media is simply that they can now aid any person to 
produce news; though such news contents do not go through rigorous journalistic processing, 
and may therefore be deficient of the values of accuracy and balance, fairness and impartiality, 
which are arguably the conventional standards of media ethics shared by most renowned news 
organisations across the globe (Biagi, 2003: 303-308, Smith, 2008: 10). 
This trend of news production in the modern World has made it possible to question whether 
the conventional (mainstream) media is still the sole gate-keeper to the information flow in 
society. Thus, it is now apparent that even media outlets are worried about the potential 
disruptive effects of social media on business models (Newman, ibid: 5-6). What about the 
situation in Africa, in which quite a good number of Africans in rural communities do not have 
access to ICTs, especially computers? Can it therefore be argued that the theory is still useful in 
                                                          
8
 There are seventeen ethnic groups in the country. These groups have been divided into three-language categories – Mende, Mel and others. 
The Mende, Vai/Gallinas, Kono, Loko, Koranko, Soso, Yalunka and Madingo belong to the Mende. The Themne, Bullom/Sherbro, Kissi, Gola, 
and Krim form part of the Mel group. The others are Limba, Fula, Krio and Kru. The two largest communities are the Mende and Themne, 
each accounting for about 31 percent of the population. Krio, the language of the Creoles is the lingua franca whilst English is the official 
language- Alie, 1994: 9   
 35 
 
analysing media contents within the African context? It is contended that in Africa, the validity 
of the gate-keeping concept is yet to be challenged, because the impact of social media on the 
continent’s media landscape is not as influential and pervasive as it is in the developed World. 
However, this contention has been incisively contradicted by Megenta’s work on the impact of 
social media on democracy in Africa (Megenta, op.cit: 4). Thus, it can be argued in the light of 
Megenta’s empirical findings that even in Africa the conventional (mainstream) media cannot 
be said to be the sole gate-keeper to the information flow in society. Megenta’s point is 
validated to a large extent by the meteoric rise in the availability (ownership) of sophisticated 
‘mobile phones’, especially among the youths and young adults, who form a large segment of 
the continent’s population, which makes the sourcing and flow of news materials easily 
accessible. 
 Inferentially, if the conventional media is no longer the sole gate-keeper to the information 
flow in society, how influential is it in shaping elites’ post-conflict opinions and building 
democratic legitimacy in contemporary Sierra Leone? The principal conceptual thrust of this 
question is thoroughly explored in 3.1.2. The other content theory which is essential in 
analysing media contents which turns out to be very useful for this study is news selection 
otherwise known as news values or news worthiness. Theorisations on news selection are 
anchored by the fact that because of time and space, it is virtually impossible for the media to 
publish all the contents that come in for publication on a daily basis.  
Editors are thus obliged to select the contents that resonate with the editorial policies of the 
news outlets for which they work (Baran, op.cit: 393, Dennis and Merrill, 2002: 108-113, 
Watson, Watson, op.cit: 134). And every news outlet has its own agenda to promulgate in the 
ideological struggle of every society (Straubhaar and LaRose, op.cit: 29-30, Volcic and Dzihana, 
2011: 15). Essentially, the theorisations on news selection explicated in 4.1, inter alia, points to 
the fact that in covering the CDF and Taylor trials and the TJ process as a whole, the media was 
practically unable to put out every bit of the contents on the said issues that came in for 
publication. Rather, every media outlet that covered the trials and the country’s TJ system, 
selected its own stories for publication that resonated with its editorial policies, which are tied 
to the agenda it wanted to promulgate and the position it has as well taken in the ideological 
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struggle of the society. Moreover, the more pertinent issues about media coverage of the trials 
and post-conflict justice for which the different models of news selection are employed are 
extensively analysed in 4.1.  
I now turn to theorisations on framing, which are critically explored in both the models of 
media analysis (see 4.1 and 4.2) and methodological frameworks (see 5.1) chapters. Thus, the 
centrality of framing to the theoretical and methodological dimensions of this study cannot be 
overemphasised (see 5.1). One of the ways by which the media shapes ‘public opinions’ is by its 
ability to frame (or rather contextualise) issues and events that interest the public; since the 
public essentially relies on the media for pertinent information to make informed decisions 
(Campaine, Sterling, Guback and Noble Jr., 1982: 1, Khan, 1998: 423-424). Framing thus 
pinpoints the structures underlying the depictions that the public reads, hears and watches 
(Jamieson and Waldman, 2003: xii). 
Thus, the ability of the media in shaping public opinion is apparent, when its coverage 
influences the decisions of audiences on issues and events of national or international 
importance. However, the extent to which media coverage can influence audiences’ decisions 
has given credence to a plethora of response models of media analyses in media effects 
research (see 4. 2). Significantly, the local media was very much interested in the coverage of 
the CDF and Taylor trials and the TJ process as a whole (see 1.1 and 2.2). Consequently, 
different media outlets in Sierra Leone framed the stories which they selected (news selection) 
for publication, pursuant to their editorial policies to shape public opinions in Sierra Leone on 
those issues and events, regarding the said trials and the country’s post-conflict justice process 
as a whole. 
This fact essentially leads one’s theoretical and conceptual arguments to the numerous 
theorisations on agenda-setting (Griffin, 2006: 400, Severin and Tankard Jr., 2001:219-225), 
which are again accordingly dealt with in the models of media analysis (see 4.1) and 
methodological frameworks (see 5.1) chapters. However, agenda setting as a theory, does not 
presuppose that the media can directly sway public opinion, but it is rather based on the 
supposition that the media can, through news selection and framing, direct the public to pay 
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attention to specific issues and events, thereby shaping public opinion (Iyengar, 2011: 276). 
Priming, which is an extension of the agenda-setting theorisation, is the process by which the 
media attend to some issues and not others and thereby alter the standards by which public 
figures are evaluated (Severin and Tankard Jr., op.cit: 226, Bryant and Thompson, 2002: 87-91).  
Can it therefore be theoretically argued that the local media in Sierra Leone did not sway public 
opinions in its coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials and the country’s post-conflict justice 
process, but rather shaped public opinion by directing Sierra Leoneans to focus on those war 
crimes and TJ issues, to which the media paid the greatest attention, prominence and valence? 
The critical and empirical analysis of the media’s coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials and the 
country’s post-conflict justice process, relative to CSOs’ representatives’ responses to the 
coverage, would form the basis for the appropriate empirical answer to the above question 
(see analysis between chapters six and eight).  
 However, there are also a plethora of theories that can incisively guide any communications 
research that gauges media impact on society, but this study contextualises the structured 
interpretative and the post-modernist (see 4.2) models in gauging the responses of CSOs’ 
representatives to the coverage of the trials and the TJ process in Sierra Leone. Though the 
choice of the above models is predicated upon the factual circumstances articulated in 4.1, it 
should be noted that those circumstances are not devoid of Sierra Leone’s demography and 
ethnography. So far, the theoretical and conceptual arguments that are embedded in this 
section have clearly articulated some of the most salient issues that permeate intellectual 
discourses on media impacts, consonant with my research questions. 
However, it is also important to analyse the political and social contexts that impact the 
functionality of the media that is being studied. Essentially, McQuail’s libertarian (free press) 
and social responsibility theories can clearly explicate this. Even though the libertarian press 
functions freely in a democracy; that does not presuppose that it cannot be regulated by law 
(Croteau and Hoynes, 2006: 32, McQuail, op.cit:171, Alder, 2007: 19-40, Welsh and 
Greenwood, 1999: 1-3). This is in tandem with what Mill (Gray, 1996: 1-2), a passionate 
supporter of free speech, meant by saying that ‘my freedom to swing my fist ends where your 
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face begins’ (Warburton, 1999: 131). Significantly, the media in Sierra Leone is arguably 
modeled on the libertarian theory. The country’s media landscape is thus put into perspective 
in this analysis to not only establish how the socio-economic, cultural and political 
environments of Sierra Leone impact media exercises in the country, but to also assess the 
extent to which the media’s functionality dovetailed with the ideals of the libertarian theory. 
3.1.1 Media History in Perspective    
After independence, the print media continued to play the vigorous and questioning role which 
it had done since the very first newspaper in Africa – the Sierra Leone Gazette – was published 
in 1801. But broadcasting (radio and television) was unreservedly meant for propagandising on 
behalf of successive governments (legitimate and illegitimate); as the notions of diversity of 
contents, plurality of ownership, editorial integrity and independence etc. were hardly 
entertained by the management of the then Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), which 
was always being remote-controlled by the Ministry of Information (Radio Pluralism in West 
Africa, 1993:120-122); though it was supposedly established for public service in October,1955 
(Wilkinson, 1972:177, Cole, 1995:11-12). 
 And the significance of broadcast media was even further exploited by coup plotters, who 
often seized state power and used it to reach wider audiences, across the country with their 
undemocratic messages (Broadcasting Policy and Practice in Africa, 2003:1). However, the 
democratic transition of the 1990s and the successful convergence of communications media 
and ICTs, which ushered in the broadband revolution, began the transformation of the media 
landscape of Sierra Leone; just as it did to every other country in the World. Thus, the media of 
contemporary Sierra Leone is diverse, consisting of print, broadcast, computer technologies and 
satellite transmission services. 
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3.1.2 The Print Media 
Just as the colonialists were unsuccessful in muzzling and silencing the independent press in 
Sierra Leone, their successors9 have also not succeeded in doing the same. In fact, even though 
the country’s media history is replete with innumerable instances of post-independence 
governments’ attempts to muzzle and silence the critical press, it remained the forerunner or 
mouthpiece of civil society in projecting their critical views on issues of national and 
international importance; and continued to perform its ‘watch’ and ‘attack’ dog functions 
(Patterson, op.cit: 347), by attempting to hold successive governments accountable to the 
people of Sierra Leone, pursuant to the libertarian theory enunciated in 3.1 (Cole, op.cit: 20-55; 
M’bayoh et.al. 2000:120-123). 
This does not however presuppose that basic media ethics were not being flouted by 
sensational journalists, who had imbibed the ‘lap dog’ philosophy to either propagandise on 
behalf of successive legitimate and illegitimate governments or their financiers (see Appendix 
III503). The most turbulent days for the press came with the seizure of state power on 25th May 
1997, by the AFRC/RUF junta, which hounded and maltreated journalists throughout their 
period of misrule (Gberie, op.cit:110, Gordon, 2004:180). However, the restoration of 
democracy rekindled the ideals of media freedoms in Sierra Leone’s bourgeoning and critical 
print media. And the media thus played an essential role in the restoration of democracy and 
the country’s post-conflict justice and democratic processes (ibid). 
The print media in Sierra Leone has seemingly become a free for all enterprise. Section 25 of 
the 1991 Constitution, unreservedly gives legality to every person to own any medium of 
his/her choice for the dissemination of information, opinions and ideas. Arguably, it is this 
constitutional guarantee and freedom, coupled with the above advantages and a number of 
considerations (including ethno-regional, political and other socio-economic factors) that have 
influenced the rapid growth and expansion of Sierra Leone’s print media. There are now eighty-
one (81) newspapers and magazines which are operational nationwide (IMC’s 2013 Register for 
                                                          
9
Legitimate and illegitimate government functionaries 
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Newspapers and Magazines.). This is indeed indicative of the rapid expansion of Sierra Leone’s 
print media. 
‘A survey (2008) carried out by Foundation Hirondelle on behalf of UNICEF, provided some 
indication of readership interest with 4.7% opting for Concord Times, followed by Awoko with 
4.5%, Awareness Times with 4%, For Di People with 3%, and Standard Times with 2.9%’ (IMC’s 
Report, 2010:9). It is quite intriguing to note that though the country’s illiteracy rate is 
astronomically high (62%- ibid: 9), yet there are so many newspapers and magazines in 
circulation, making it plausible for the educated ‘elites’ to rely on the print media for the free 
flow of information (Broadcasting Policy and Practice, op.cit:1) in Sierra Leone than the 62% 
illiterate population. 
This points to the extent to which the ‘elites’ can influence the dynamics of the production of 
print media contents because they are educated enough to understand and appreciate the 
print media’s role in shaping post-conflict opinions in Sierra Leone. This can as well serve as a 
justification to study print media contents in this era of information technology, when the 
mainstream media is no longer the sole gate-keeper to the information flow in society (see 
analysis in 3.1). Thus, with the increase of internet service providers in Sierra Leone, the recent 
editions (since 2007) of some of the above newspapers are now available in the Worldwide 
Web.  
3.1.3 The Electronic Media    
 Broadcast media which was exclusively the treasure of the state has been democratised. 
Private investors have been allowed to own radio and television stations in Sierra Leone since 
the 1990s (Radio Pluralism in West Africa, op.cit: 122-124). There are now precisely eighty-five 
(85) radio stations, registered as either commercial or community radios, but Radio Mount 
Aureol (owned by the University of Sierra Leone) is the only teaching radio station in the 
country. In fact, radio is the most widespread communications media in Sierra Leone. This is 
simply because radio dispatches can reach wider audiences in their local parlance. And this 
makes it quite realistic for the country’s 62% illiterate population to rely on it for the free flow 
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of information in Sierra Leone; as they (the illiterate Sierra Leoneans) who are in the majority 
can neither read newspapers nor access information through social media. 
Essentially, the transformation of the then SLBS into a corporation (now SLBC), pursuant to Act 
No.1 of 2010, made Sierra Leone the third country in Africa (after South Africa and Ghana) to 
legitimise public service broadcasting in the continent, but the European Union (EU) observers 
of the 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, criticised SLBC for its ‘overtly biased’ radio 
and television coverage in favour of the incumbent All People’s Congress (APC) Government 
that won the elections (EU’s Elections Observers Report - Javier Gutierrez, 2012:5-6). 
Approximately, 16.2% of the population watches television, with a high percentage of such 
viewers having a relatively moderate level of education (IMC’s Annual Report, 2010). Hand in 
hand with conventional television, satellite television is now common in Sierra Leone. There are 
now thirteen (13) television stations and up to three registered Satellite Dish Providers in the 
whole country (IMC’s 2013 Register for Television Stations). 
3.1.4 Media Groupings 
The formation of media groupings by journalists to articulate their interests and grievances in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone is also a commonplace in the country. The Sierra Leone Association of 
Journalists (SLAJ) is the leading media organisation in Sierra Leone. It draws it membership from 
the print and electronic media. In fact, it is now forty-two years (42) old, making it one of Sierra 
Leone’s oldest CSOs in existence since 1971(see Appendix III535, 542). SLAJ is the principal 
defender of free speech, responsible journalism and media freedoms in democratic Sierra 
Leone (see Appendix III). 
The association is also renowned for its campaign against corruption, structural violence and 
injustices in Sierra Leone. There are eight other functional media groupings in Sierra Leone. 
Journalists for Human Rights (JHR), Reporters Union (RU), Women in the Media (WM), 
Association of Journalists on Mining and Extractives (AJME), Sports Writers Association of Sierra 
Leone (SWASAL), Journalists for Attitudinal and Behavioural Change (JABC), Sierra Leone News 
Vendors Association (SLNVA) and Veteran Journalists Union (VJU). Meanwhile, since the 
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libertarian theory does not presuppose ‘absolute press freedom’, there are therefore a plethora 
of laws that restrict the right to freedom of expression and of the press in Sierra Leone, though 
such laws are antithetical to ‘censorship’ or ‘prior restraints’ legislation (Pember, 2003/4: 64-
71). What is of essence to the discourses of the theory is whether such laws that restrict the 
right to freedom of expression and of the press in Sierra Leone are reasonably justifiable for a 
democratic society. McQuail’s (op.cit:171) social responsibility construct however balances the 
said press freedom with the inevitable need for the media to be socially responsible to citizens 
because the media is said to have obligations to the public that amount to a form of public 
stewardship. 
Thus, since the media in a democracy guides the democratic process, it must conscientiously do 
so with a duty to be honest and fair to all and sundry.  Sierra Leone as a state is founded on the 
principles of freedom, justice and democracy. The country’s 1991 Constitution places 
sovereignty in the hands of Sierra Leoneans from whom government through the Constitution 
derives its powers, authorities and legitimacy;10 it also empowers the media (section 11) to hold 
the government accountable and transparent to Sierra Leoneans. Thus, the media can 
conscientiously perform these functions when it upholds the ideals of the social responsibility 
theory. The fundamental principles of Sierra Leone’s media ethics, which are now constituent 
part of the country’s media laws, are to a large extent predicated on the social responsibility 
theory.11 
3.1.5 The Functional and Conflict Perspectives of the Media 
The functional and conflict perspectives of social institutions are two essential paradigms that 
explain the role which the media can indeed play in post-conflict societies (Schaefer, 2003:159, 
Howard, 2003:1-3). The functional perspective explores the constructive role which the media 
can play in a post-conflict context; it subsumes the public service model, the concept of peace 
journalism, and Shaw’s and Thompson’s responsibility to report (the new journalistic paradigm) 
and human rights journalism respectively (see 3.4). The public service model thus enunciates 
                                                          
10
Section 5 (1) & (2) of the Constitution 
11
See the Media Code of Practice (MCP) (2000) and Section 38 of Act No.12 of 2000 as Amended in 2006 and 2007. 
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the diverse role which the media can play in serving the public’s interest (Croteau and Hoynes, 
op.cit:22, Dennis and Merrill, op.cit: 48). This perspective of the media’s role in society serves 
as a coherent theoretical and conceptual framework to critically analyse how the media 
communicated the ideals of TJ and whether it played any central role in promoting good 
governance and democratic accountability in Sierra Leone. 
The conflictual perspective explores the role which the media can play in fomenting renewed 
conflict in a post-conflict context. This perspective of the media’s role in society subsumes the 
mass manipulative or propaganda and the commodification of news paradigms (see 3.4). The 
conflictual perspective provides an appropriate theoretical and conceptual framework to 
analyse the media’s conflictual and controversial role in post-conflict Sierra Leone to establish 
whether the numerous ‘training sessions’, which have been conducted for journalists on media 
‘ethics’ and the ideals of ‘peace journalism’, since the end of Sierra Leone’s civil war in 2002, 
have had the desired consequences on the media’s coverage of pertinent issues and events in 
the socio-economic, political and legal transformations of Sierra Leone. 
3.2 Civil Society 
Habermas’s seminal work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), has been 
very central to contemporary discourses of the concept of civil society (Croteau and Hoynes, 
op.cit:22). The public sphere is a reflection of a national space that provides a forum for public 
debate (Habermas, 2002: 92). ‘Access to the space is free, and freedoms of assembly, 
association and expression are guaranteed’ by law (McQuail, 2005: 181).  Habermas’s 
conception of the public sphere mirrors the role which the media can play in a democracy by 
helping to cultivate a social space for ongoing political debates (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991, 
Makumbe, 1998: 312). The public sphere also reflects the notion of civil society; a concept 
which has become appealing to the contemporary state, political parties and even ethnic and 
religious groups across Africa (Kargbo, 2011:194). 
Since this study essentially gauges CSOs’ representatives’ perceptions of media coverage of war 
crimes trials in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict democratic context, it is important to critically 
explore civil society as a concept and its relationship with that of citizenship. The critical 
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exploration of civil society in this context, encompasses issues relative to what the concept is, 
whether it is a Eurocentric concept that is of any value to Africa; how it can both be used to 
foster democratic legitimacy and to undermine the stability of a functional democracy that is in 
transition. According to Wolfe (1997: 9) civil society is made up of ‘those forms of communal 
and associational life which are organised neither by the self-interest of the market nor by the 
coercive potential of the state’. 
 Elshtain (1997: 14) sees civil society as ‘the many forms of community and association that dot 
the landscape of democratic culture-families, churches, neighbourhood groups, trade unions, 
self-help movements, volunteer activities of all sort’. The trend of thought that is discernible in 
Wolfe’s and Elshtain’s conceptions is that civil society is neither state owned nor is it affiliated 
with the market economy. Civil society is thus theoretically conceptualised as a sphere of social 
interaction distinct from the state and its economy (characterised by voluntary associations, 
civic publics and communications media) in which citizens can participate in a wide range of 
fundamental political, social and economic affairs (Marris and Thornham, 2000:92, Campbell 
and Lewis, 1999:1, Kargbo, 2011:193, Salamon, Anheier et.al., 1999:3, Cohen, 1999, Axtmann, 
2001:5).  
In a sub-Saharan African context, civil society could include professionalised NGOs working in 
areas closely related to democratisation, interests groups such as trade unions and employers’ 
associations, church-based associations etc. (Randall, 2007: 92, Makumbe, op.cit: 305). Thus, 
CSOs are mostly classified according to their purpose. They can be protective and interest-
based associations, promotional groups, issue-oriented organisations, civic organisations and 
cultural and development associations. There are now hundreds of thousands of CSOs across 
Africa. And the new media has broadened the public sphere, making it absolutely possible for 
them to effectively participate in national and international discourses and simultaneously 
monitor the operations of their governments to enhance democratic accountability. They can 
draw up petitions, organise public meetings and debates, advertise in the media and even hold 
public demonstrations on issues of common concern. They can also lobby the legislature and 
executive arms of government (Kargbo, op.cit: 201-205). 
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Conceptually, civil society is inextricably linked to the concept of citizenship. Citizenship 
presupposes the position or status of people within a state who are accorded complete socio-
economic, civic and political rights. This is often contrasted with the status of non-citizens or 
aliens in such a society whose rights are limited (Venn, 1986: 62-63). This does not mean that 
the fundamental rights of non-citizens or aliens are neither recognised nor protected. Citizens’ 
socio-economic, civic and political rights, duties and obligations are accordingly protected by 
law (Burns, Peltason, Cronin and Magleby, 2000: 128).12 Of the plethora of obligations of the 
citizens of Sierra Leone, the duties to cultivate a sense of patriotism and nationalism so that 
loyalty to the state surpasses sectional, ethnic, tribal or other loyalties; make positive and 
useful contributions to the advancement, progress and well-being of the society and participate 
in and defend all the democratic processes of the state;13 are some of the fundamental 
concepts upon which the foundation of civil society in Sierra Leone is built. 
CSOs are formed to uphold the above and other socio-political objectives that are cognate with 
good governance, democratic accountability, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid and basic 
services provision (Randall, op.cit: 92, Elone, 2010:3, Constatinos, 2001: 2). And 
communications media have been the most widespread and effective mechanisms which CSOs 
have been using in Sierra Leone to hold the government and its functionaries accountable to 
citizens (see 3.3.1). This democratic practice is theoretically bolstered by Murdock (1992: 17-41) 
in his analysis on the nexus between the constitution of citizenship and communications media. 
He argues that citizens must have access to information to understand the parameters of their 
civic rights and duties to make informed decision that involve public political choices, proffer 
criticisms and offer recommendations thereto. 
Even though citizens are members of society, they do not automatically constitute civil society 
by themselves. To constitute civil society, they must voluntarily affiliate themselves with non-
profit making associations that have institutional and structural presence and such associations 
must be institutionally separated from the state and they must be fundamentally in control of 
their own affairs (Salamon, Anheieret.al, op.cit:3-4). Essentially, for CSOs to be robust and be 
                                                          
12
See chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Sierra Leone’s 1991 Constitution 
13
See section 13 of Sierra Leone’s 1991 Constitution. 
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able to exert considerable influence in the governance process, they must be credible, 
autonomous and neutral/non-partisan in the body-politic and in their discursive treatments and 
analysis of the political dynamics of the state. Meanwhile, the post-conflict justice and 
democratic transition processes that emerged in Sierra Leone have thus given an impetus to 
their role in the governance process. Their importance is captured in the LPA and they have had 
representatives in virtually all the post-conflict democratic institutions and structures which 
were a creation of the LPA and those that were inaugurated even after the enactment of the 
LPA. 
Thus, there are now thousands of CSOs across Sierra Leone and some of the most notable ones 
include SLAJ, the Sierra Leone Bar Association (SLBA), and Campaign for Good Governance 
(CGG), Coalition for Civil Society (CCS), Coalition for Justice and Accountability (COJA), Forum 
for Democratic Initiatives (FORDI), Society for Democratic Initiatives (SDI), Journalists for 
Attitudinal and Behavioural Change (JABC) etc. The critical question that should be posed at this 
stage is how credible, autonomous and neutral/non-partisan are the said CSOs in Sierra Leone’s 
body-politic? Have their presence added any values to Sierra Leone’s nascent democracy? Or 
have they been undermining the post-conflict democratic institutions and governance 
processes in Sierra Leone?  
Answers to these questions will unfold as the analysis progresses. However, in contemporary 
democratic states in Africa, the formation of CSOs to monitor the dynamics of their body-politic 
is now a commonplace. And this development is seen in the fact that mass political 
participation, which is a fundamental ideal of democracy, was largely undermined during the 
era of colonialism, one-party dictatorship and militarism in Africa (Gordon, op.cit: 182-187, 
Kargbo, op.cit: 198-200, Makumbe, op.cit: 306- 307). At a global scale, states that adhered to 
communist ideologies also suffocated the development of and the ideals of civil society 
(Makumbe, op.cit: 307-308). However, the resurgence of the concept of civil society 
internationally is not unconnected with the triumph of democracy over tyranny and terror, 
manifested in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the clamour for 
democracy in Eastern Europe (Elone, op.cit: 2, Salamon, Anheieret.al. 1999: 4-5, Derbyshire and 
Derbyshire, op.cit:232-238, Goldstein, 2001: 45, Sharansky, 2006: 6-8). The revolutionary quest 
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for democracy in Eastern Europe in particular gave an impetus and enviable status to the 
people’s power in the World; as it even affected the communist system of China, leading to the 
massacre of hundreds of protesters in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 1989 (Goldstein, ibid: 45). 
In Sierra Leone, colonialism was hostile to the operations of CSOs. This undemocratic tendency 
was imbibed at independence, making it very difficult for CSOs to project their varied interests 
on national issues (Gordon, op.cit:183, Kargbo, op.cit:198-199). The legally manipulated 
transformation of Sierra Leone’s multi-party democracy into a one-party system exacerbated 
the political and legal restraints, which had hitherto been imposed on the functionality of CSOs 
in the country (Kandeh, 2004: 177). Thus, the 1978 Constitution legitimised tyranny and 
subjected even CSOs’ constitutional rights to freedom of conscience, expression, association 
and assembly to those of the recognised party (APC).14 
Analytically, the Sierra Leone Labour Congress (SLLC), National Union of Students (NUSS) and 
SLAJ, were amongst the CSOs that suffered immensely at the hands of the APC that governed 
Sierra Leone between 1978 and 1992 (Kargbo, op.cit: 200). In fact, Sierra Leone’s socio-political 
literature is replete with so many instances of the APC’s crack down on CSOs operations in the 
country (Kandeh, op.cit: 177, Bangura, 2004: 27-29, Abdullah, 2004: 45-49). This trend 
continued into the era of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) junta, when the media, 
a constituent part of and a participant in Sierra Leone’s public sphere, became vociferous in 
exposing the insatiable thirst of the junta’s lust for ill-gotten wealth (see Appendix III532, 524, 547). 
The NPRC junta had overthrown the one-party APC dictatorship in a bloodless coup on the 29th 
April, 1992, with the hope of giving voice to the voiceless, civil society and the media, that 
overwhelmingly supported the coup that brought the APC’s twenty-four (24) years of misrule to 
an end in Sierra Leone (Rashid, 2004: 83-86).  
The political transition of Sierra Leone from one-party dictatorship and militarism to 
democracy, began with the re-construction and registration of political parties whose existence 
had been legally forbidden by the 1978 Constitution, the reinvigoration of civil society, which 
was being suffocated during the long era of one-party dictatorship and militarism (1978-1996), 
                                                          
14
See Chapter II of the 1978 Constitution. 
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the media’s campaign for democratic good governance and the clamour of the people of Sierra 
Leone for democracy, leading to the conduct of the 1996 Presidential and Parliament elections. 
These developments in the political landscape of Sierra Leone were not unconnected with the 
quest for democratisation that had spread from Eastern Europe to Africa and beyond. The rise 
in the wave of people’s power in Eastern Europe, gave credence to the assertion that the 
concept of civil society is firmly rooted in Europe’s socio-political and historical development; 
and that it is alien to Africa. And the wave of the people’s power predicated upon civil society 
activism in Eastern Europe has to a large extent influenced the formation of CSOs in Africa 
based on the Eastern European model (Salamon, Anheier, et. al. op.cit: 4, Okigbo, op.cit: 63). 
However, in as much as it cannot be denied that the revival of civil society activism in Africa is 
not unconnected with the resurgence of the concept of civil society in the late 1980s in Europe; 
it can be robustly argued in the light of Okigbo’s conceptual analysis that the concept of civil 
society is akin to Africa’s rich resources in communal relations, community communication, 
nongovernmental traditional organisations and personal interest in public welfare. Thus, civil 
society is as old in Africa as the earliest human settlement (Okigbo, ibid: 64). This argument is 
continued in the trend of thought of Kargbo’s (op.cit: 198-200) conceptualisation of civil society 
in pre-colonial Africa and post-colonial Sierra Leone. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 
concept of civil society is alien to Africa. 
 Africa has indeed had a rich civic society and culture (Chazan, Mortimer, et. al., 1999: 74-79) 
which had formed the basis of the plethora of ethnic, religious and traditional organisations and 
institutions that had been protecting the public’s welfare and African ideals prior to the advent 
of colonialism. And it was those traditional institutions that inter alia laid the basis for the civic 
inclinations against colonialism in particularly British West Africa (BWA); hence civil society had 
been the leading vanguard against imperialism in West Africa (Okigbo, op.cit: 78). The British 
colonial policy of association, created a governance structure that undermined the proper 
functionality of CSOs in West Africa (Kargbo, op.cit: 198, Makumbe, op.cit: 306).  
This led to the need for West Africans to use the ‘print media’ to articulate their varied interests 
through proto-nationalistic civic organisations like the Aborigines Rights Protection Society 
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(ARPS), the West African Students Union (WASU) and the West African Youths League (WAYL) 
(Gordon, op.cit: 182-183, Nwokeafor, 2000: 186-187). Essentially, nationalists’ ‘newspapers’ 
played an important role in awakening racial, socio-economic and political consciousness; and 
simultaneously championed the campaign for political freedom and independence in BWA 
(Ekwelie, 1978: 209-226, Coleman, 1958). The said civic organisations did not therefore clamour 
for political power for themselves, but rather peacefully agitated for the protection of the 
interests of citizens in the body-politic of BWA. They believed that West Africans needed 
political independence because they were capable of governing themselves.  
The resurgence of civil society in this era of democratisation is a manifestation of mass political 
participation on the part of the entire citizenry of democratic states in Africa. Thus, CSOs offer 
opportunities to citizens to monitor and influence the democratic process of the state (Elone, 
op.cit:8). They can as well check the excesses of government, provide civic education for 
citizens, clarify uncertainties and dispel misconceptions in the body-politic, disseminate 
invaluable information about the governance process and establish a link between the citizens 
and the government (Macauley, op.cit: 48-49, Kargbo, op.cit: 105-115, Berewa, op.cit: 209-
213). In fact, it was the CSOs in Sierra Leone, with support from the international community 
and the media that pressured the NPRC junta into inaugurating the democratisation process, 
since it was clear that the junta was not prepared to relinquish power.  
CSOs, through the media, called for two national consultative conferences (Bintumani I and II); 
organised demonstrations against the despotic operations of the NPRC junta; and stood up 
against its ferocious attempts to disrupt and nullify the Parliamentary and Presidential elections 
of 26th February and March 15th 1996 (Hirsch, op.cit: 80-82, Kandeh, op.cit: 143). Even when 
the elected Government (SLPP) was overthrown shortly after the elections, CSOs were 
instrumental in agitating for the restoration of the elected Government, which eventually 
happened in 1998. CSOs also became concerned about the direction of the peace process. 
Whilst the ordinary citizens clamoured for ‘peace at all cost’, which hitherto turned out be 
counter-productive for TJ in Sierra Leone, CSOs at the end of a national consultative 
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conference,15 opposed the quest for ‘peace at all cost’ on the ground that it would amount to 
‘no peace at all’ (Penfold, op.cit:140).  
They came out with a position paper on the issue from which the media constructed its news 
and views from different angles. CSOs were also in union with the international community in 
condemning particularly the ‘amnesty’ and ‘power-sharing’ provisions in the LPA (Penfold, 
op.cit: 149, Berewa, op.cit: 140). They were also the first to lend credence to Parliament’s call 
for war crimes trials in Sierra Leone (Kabbah, op.cit: 185-189, Berewa, op.cit: 142). And they 
overwhelmingly joined forces with Parliament to demonstrate against the RUF’s recalcitrance 
towards the initial implementation of the LPA, leading to the signing of the APA (Hirsch, 
op.cit:87-89). However, CSOs can as well undermine the functionality of a democratic system. 
This postulation is coterminous with Berman’s (1997: 562) position of the negative role, which a 
robust civil society can play in undermining the stability of any democracy. Thus, a strong civil 
society can exacerbate rather than alleviate political problems. By bringing together dissatisfied 
individuals and groups, civil society may actually deepen societal cleavages and serve as a 
catalyst for the strengthening of oppositional movements that can weaken a government 
(Okigbo, op.cit: 75). Meanwhile, the critical views which Kargbo (op.cit: 212-218), Berman 
(op.cit: 561-562) and Okigbo (op.cit: 75) have expressed about how the formation of CSOs can 
be counter-productive for the overwhelming interest of the entire citizenry and the overall 
stability of a democratic system are important for any study that thoroughly explores the 
significance of the concept of civil society to any functional democracy. 
This in fact raises questions about the independence and neutrality of CSOs in the clamour for 
political power in Africa. How committed are CSOs in holding governments and the political 
class accountable to the entire citizenry? What are their levels of credibility and responsibility 
to the political sovereign? How do they really generate their finances? Do they really project 
the interests of citizens or the international NGOs that fund them? Have they been 
meaningfully contributing to the TJ processes that have so far emerged in post-conflict societies 
                                                          
15
Organised by the National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy (NCHRD) between the 7thand 9th of April, 1999, at the Sierra Leone 
Bank Complex, Kingtom 
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in Africa or do they constitute a potential threat to the peace processes of post-conflict 
countries undergoing democratic transitions in the continent? 
Analytically, the operations of CSOs in Africa are crippled by a number of debacles that have 
undoubtedly affected their neutrality in the body-politic in general and their functionality in 
particular, making their relevance seriously controversial in multi-ethnic post-conflict 
democracies in Africa. Ethno-regionalism arguably remains a fundamental problem that 
permeates CSOs operations in most African countries (Constatinos, op.cit: 7, Makumbe, op.cit: 
311-313, Diamond, 1997: 24-25). This argument is itself bolstered by the centrality of ethno-
regionalism in African politics; (Randall, op.cit: 88-92, Hayward and Kandeh, 1987:47, Bogaards, 
2007: 178, Abdallah, 2004: 5) which is arguably the most influential conceptual phenomenon 
that propels the ‘Us and Them’ dichotomy, which the political elites are exploiting in their quest 
for political power.  
This constitutes a weakness in the operations of CSOs in Africa. In Sierra Leone, there are CSOs 
that have overtly joined forces with other political groups and some sections of the media to 
support the existing status quo (Berewa, op.cit: 211, see Appendix III514). Thus, can their 
organisations really be called CSOs in the right sense of the word? What about their neutrality 
in Sierra Leone’s body-politic and how committed are they in holding the APC Government 
accountable to Sierra Leoneans?  Even the background of the membership of some CSOs can 
tell which side of the political divide to which they belong. For example the JABC is of Northern 
origin and its members are known for propagandising on behalf of the APC Government. Even 
SLAJ has been overtly opposing the JABC for openly compromising its independence and 
neutrality in the political debate. 
 The JABC has however come under the guise of McQuail’s development theory to justify its 
position that the media should be seen as a partner in the promotion of Sierra Leone’s socio-
economic and political developments (see 3.1.6). Does this give any indication about whether 
CSOs in Sierra Leone are only projecting the ideals of their funders or the needs and aspirations 
of the entire citizenry? Even though CSOs are apolitical in theory, their affiliations with political 
parties in practice speak volumes of their involvement in party politics in Africa (Berewa, op.cit: 
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211). CSOs that are affiliated with either the ‘Us or Them’ ideology can use communications 
media to project their socio-political ideals (see 4.1). 
This reflects Bennett’s (1990:103-125, Silverman, 2012: 5) indexing theory (politicians telling 
the media what to write about) enunciated in 4.1, but obscures the position that CSOs can as 
well use communications media ‘to cultivate a sense of patriotism and nationalism so that 
loyalty to the state surpasses sectional, ethnic or other loyalties’.16 The nationalistic civic 
nongovernmental organisations that challenged and dismantled colonialism in West African 
were neither ethnically nor regionally divided. They were unified and placed the West African 
states’ loyalties above sectional, regional, ethnic and primordial sentiments.  
This was clearly fundamental to their success, but the strong affiliation of contemporary CSOs 
with government functionaries and opposition political parties in Africa (Okigbo, op.cit: 78) 
does not only affect their neutrality in the body-body politic, it also negatively affects their 
fundamental functions of holding the government (through communications media) 
accountable to the entire citizenry. This incisively points to how the operations of CSOs in 
contemporary Africa veer off the theoretical and conceptual framework of civil society, which is 
clearly akin to what obtained in West Africa prior to political independence. Some CSOs in 
Sierra Leone are even accused of being stooges of the political status quo. And those who 
choose to bring out the ills and criminality of existing regimes are dubbed agents of power 
thirsty opposition parties on the basis of tribal/regional sentiments (see Appendix III538, 537). 
Corruption and financial mismanagement are other debilitating forces that are militating 
against the efficiency of CSOs in Africa. Kargbo (op.cit: 212) had this to say on this point: ‘There 
is widespread corruption within CSOs, characterised by lack of internal democracy, 
accountability and transparency’. However, it can still be argued that despite their weaknesses, 
CSOs are very important in the socio-economic and political transformations of post-conflict 
societies and the process of building democratic legitimacy in Africa. They can fully utilise the 
powers of modern communications media to perform the said functions. 
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See section 13 of Sierra Leone’s 1991 Constitution. 
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In a post-conflict context, CSOs can foster the campaign for peace and reconciliation. They can 
as well be the forerunners for human rights and campaigners against impunity. In situations 
where war crimes trials are conducted, they can robustly involve in outreach activities to inform 
and adequately educate the entire citizenry about the dynamics of war crimes jurisprudence 
and the rule of law (Making Justice Count, 2012:31-32). They can even monitor such trials and 
expose any ills and shortcomings, which they think can inhibit the proper dispensation of post-
conflict justice. Essentially, even the dynamics of the weak post-conflict governance institutions 
and structures can be scrutinised and monitored by CSOs to enhance good governance and 
democratic accountability (Kargbo, op.cit: 120).  
In Sierra Leone, CSOs were actively involved in the entire post-conflict justice and reconciliation 
process. They were also seriously engaged in the processes resulting in the establishment of 
Sierra Leone’s post-conflict justice institutions.17 They worked closely with the Outreach Section 
of the SCSL to inform and educate their members and the entire citizenry about the need for 
war crimes trials in Sierra Leone.18 And devised and ran programs on the court’s operations 
during the pre-trial, trial and post-trial phases and eventually monitored the proceedings of the 
court to ensure fair trials (ibid). Essentially, some CSOs have been very instrumental in bringing 
the post-conflict justice challenges that are still affecting Sierra Leone’s recovery efforts to the 
attention of the international community and the APC Government (see Appendix III538, 534). 
3.3 Transitional (Post-Conflict) Justice 
TJ is a concept that permeates the mainstream discourses of every post-conflict society. 
Essentially, TJ is a relatively new concept in international law, but its principal objects (the 
unflinching quest for both the recognition and respect for human rights and dignity and the 
need to end impunity and foster post-conflict reconciliation) have been serious issues of 
intellectual considerations for scholars of different ages. And both the media and CSOs have 
been playing a pivotal role in promoting the need to uphold the ideals of TJ in a post-conflict 
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The Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMR.RD),The National Commission 
for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR),The National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
(NCRRR),The National Electoral Commission (NEC),The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) 
etc. 
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Making Justice Count, op.cit:29 
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context (Communicating TJ, 2007, Reporting Justice, 2006, TJ Reporting Audit, Vol. 1 &2, 2008). 
The media and CSOs have also been sustaining critical debates about the efficacy of the 
different TJ paradigms, which have been institutionalised to resolve armed conflicts in different 
parts of Africa. 
TJ encompasses the socio-economic, legal and political frameworks that a state can 
institutionalise to redress the violations of a prior regime and thus prevent the re-occurrence of 
such violations (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002: 572 Waldorf, 2009:22, Magarrell and Wesley, 
2008: 131, Clerk, 2009: 191-205). This presupposes that the concept requires more than just 
the creation of accountability for past abuses; it also demands the civic and social 
transformations needed to ensure that human right abuses are not repeated in the future 
(Evanston, 2004, Huyse, 2008: 2). This conceptualisation absorbs Schirch’s (2002:210-212 cited 
in Shaw, op.cit, 2012:11-34) ‘just peace’ and Galtung’s positive peace’ (1996: 32, cited ibid) 
frameworks. The former prioritises conflict prevention over conflict resolution and addresses 
the needs of both victims and perpetrators in a conflictual situation. 
 As such, it resonates with the latter that looks at peace beyond the absence of war, but 
critically analyses how the genuine quest for justice, can address the challenges, which physical, 
cultural and structural violence, can occasion for society. Inferentially, the prosecutorial (or 
judicial accountability) and non-prosecutorial (or reconciliatory) approaches to post-conflict 
justice, which are now features of African geo-politics (Cruvellier, 2004) are clearly discernible 
from the foregoing. Jurisprudentially, the clamour for the respect of human dignity and sanctity 
of life in the name of human rights has always been the concern of the social contractarians (a 
group of natural law scholars), who saw human beings as ends in themselves; and hence 
developed and popularised the natural rights theory (Freeman, 2001: 111-113, Cahn, 2002:461-
463, Donnelly,2003: 7-17).  
Moreover, the fight against impunity regarding man’s inhumanity to man , which is another 
fundamental object of TJ, has been the concern of every organised human settlement that 
seeks to protect the rights of its inhabitants against unwarranted infringements by law breakers 
(Wrights man, Greene, Nietzel, Fortune, 2002:9). Modern states have always been 
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institutionalising penal codes, through their criminal justice systems, to end impunity and give 
credence to the notion of justice. Rawls and Nozick established the nexus between justice and 
right (Freeman, op.cit: 532-569, Hart, 1994: 157-160) but it was Dworkin (2000: 1-7) that 
factored the concept of right into the conceptual framework of justice (Freeman, ibid: 540). 
Essentially, the jurisprudence of punishing war criminals dovetails with some fundamental 
theories of sentencing in criminology- retribution, deterrence and protection of society 
(Herring, 2005: 40, Roshier, 1996: 31-32). 
And it is evident that the convictions secured by the IMT, IMTFE, ICTY, ICTR and ICC, were 
meant to send a clear message to war criminals that they can no longer commit heinous crimes 
against their own people and go unpunished. The then UNO’s Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, 
was quite clear on this. ‘...no ruler, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights 
with impunity’ (Kaczorowska, op.cit: 493). But how can this be reconciled with the 
reconciliatory approach to TJ, which is somewhat broader in scope than the prosecution of war 
criminals in war torn countries? Which of the paradigms (judicial accountability or 
reconciliatory) has proven to be more effective in African conflict analysis and resolution? Why 
is it that African states are more appreciative of the reconciliatory approach to conflict 
resolutions than the prosecution of war criminals or leaders, who repudiate the fundamental 
ideals of democracy with impunity and thus indulge in gross human rights violations? Has 
impunity been judiciously addressed (in Africa) in the face of the dynamics of war crimes 
jurisprudence? 
Essentially, the controversial issues that surround the above questions are discourses that have 
attracted lots of media coverage in Africa. The first question mentioned above relates to two 
distinctly different dialectics. The first asserts that the reconciliatory approach to conflict 
analysis and resolution is broader in scope than the judicial accountability approach. The 
second seeks to clarify whether there is any synergy between prosecuting war criminals/human 
rights violators, while simultaneously fostering the tenets of post-conflict reconciliation in war 
torn countries. Significantly, it can be argued that the reconciliatory approach encompasses a 
plethora of models, which have been developed in the quest for post-conflict justice in Eastern 
Europe, Asia, South America and Africa. 
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Such models encapsulate institutionalising truths and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), 
inaugurating programs of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-
combatants, strengthening institutional reforms (in particularly the justice and security sectors), 
implementing reparation schemes for war victims, enforcing memorialisation programs, 
enacting gender parity legislation, promoting an independent media that reports without overt 
biases etc. (Communicating TJ, op.cit: 1-42, Waldorf, op.cit: 22). Thus, whereas the judicial 
accountability paradigm specifically emphasises the prosecutions of war criminals and human 
rights violators by courts of competent jurisdictions; the reconciliatory paradigm on the other 
hand encompasses all the above models, which affect a broader spectrum of a post-conflict 
society, than the prosecution and conviction of ‘a few selected war criminals’ for human rights 
abuses. 
 The paradigm’s development is predicated on the pertinent contributions of scholars in the 
social sciences and humanities to the evolution of TJ (Merwe and Weinstein, 2010: 2), which 
was hitherto essentially a jurisprudential construct. The second dialectic, which seeks to 
establish whether there is any synergy between prosecuting war criminals and simultaneously 
pursuing reconciliation, is quite crucial to significant media discourses about different societies 
in transition in Africa. Meanwhile, proponents of the judicial accountability paradigm maintain 
that there cannot be true, genuine and lasting peace and reconciliation (the main argument of 
the reconciliation proponents) without justice. 
Hence punishing perpetrators of heinous crimes in conflict-afflicted societies will end impunity, 
break the cycle of violence and usher in sustainable peace and reconciliation (Kargbo, 2011: 
123-125, Gberie, op.cit:158-159). This has been the cardinal argument of even jurists, human 
rights activists and journalists, who have continued to present the case for the ICC against 
African leaders, who thrive in impunity and thus stop at nothing to satisfy their unmitigated 
selfishness and rapacity, through patrimonial politics (see Appendix III509, 518,). The other 
question which is raised above about the clamour for TJ in Africa is: ‘Which of the paradigms 
(judicial accountability or reconciliatory) has been widely accepted in the continent and the 
extent (if at all) to which either or both paradigms has or have impacted Sierra Leone’s quest 
for post-conflict justice’? 
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 It appears that the reconciliatory paradigm (with its concomitant models mentioned above) is 
that which has held sway in Africa. And TRCs are the most institutionalised of such models in 
the continent. This is seen in the Ethiopian, Chadian and South African, Ugandan, Burundian, 
Rwandan and Liberian experiences. Of the countries mentioned above, the peculiarity of the 
Liberian experience is worth noting here. The country’s Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord 
(which was enacted into law in 2005) called for the inauguration of a robust TRC that 
recommended the prosecution of over a hundred perpetrators of war crimes and the lustration 
of about fifty more persons for lending credence and support to the operations of the various 
warring factions during the Liberian civil war, but neither the alleged war criminals nor their 
accomplices have either been prosecuted or lustrated (Steinberg, op.cit:52). 
 Even though proponents of the prosecutions of war criminals (in Liberia and beyond) have 
continued to argue that the peace process in Liberia is still fragile, because most of the key 
players and war lords of the country’s civil war are still in active national politics (Ellis, 2007:1-
29, see Appendix III506); those of the reconciliatory approach, are incessant on the country’s 
relative peace, coupled with its post-conflict reconciliation and recovery efforts (Hayner, 2007); 
as complete manifestations of the successes of the reconciliatory paradigm and its concomitant 
models in a country that experienced one of the most devastating conflicts in Africa in the 
1990s (Steinberg, op.cit: 50-52,). They have continued to argue that peace is a fundamental 
pre-requisite for development (see Appendix III520); and that is what Liberia is striving towards 
(Vinck, Pham, Kreutzer, 2011: 2, Sleh, Toe and Weah, 2008). And it now appears that African 
leaders are very much supportive of the said approach (see Appendix III500). However, the case 
of Sierra Leone is unique; it is the only post-conflict country in the World to simultaneously 
institutionalise both the judicial accountability and reconciliatory approaches to TJ. 
3.3.1 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC): Implications for Transitional Justice and War Crimes Jurisprudence in Sierra Leone 
Whilst the SCSL reflected the judicial accountability approach, the TRC and the host of other 
institutions, which were inaugurated to strengthen Sierra Leone’s weak democracy and 
consolidate its hard earned peace and reconciliation, are a reflection of the reconciliatory 
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approach. Though the institutionalisation of both paradigms (the TRC and the SCSL) was 
welcomed by some Sierra Leoneans and the international community (Making Justice Count, 
op.cit:1-2, Alie, op.cit: 251), their parallel operationalisation posed very serious challenges to 
Sierra Leone’s quest for post-conflict justice. This has thus opened up fruitful avenues to 
question the rationale for simultaneously institutionalising both paradigms in the clamour for TJ 
in Africa and beyond. And these are contentious issues that have provoked serious media 
attention and coverage in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
Here, I will discuss the compositions and jurisdictions of both institutions and raise some 
‘salient issues’ about their parallel operationalisation that attracted lots of media coverage. 
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the SCSL was inaugurated, pursuant to an agreement between the 
UNO and the Sierra Leone Government, as a hybrid court, whose orders have only been given 
effect to on the basis of international cooperation. Article 1(1) of the statute empowered the 
SCSL to ‘prosecute persons, who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of IHL 
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30th November, 1996. 
Article 2 (1) espoused the composition of the SCSL and the appointment of judges. The court’s 
hybridism was rooted only in legal principle, pursuant to Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Statute, 
which espoused its ‘jurisdiction’, ‘appointment of a Sierra Leonean Deputy Prosecutor’ and 
‘Sierra Leonean laws’, under which the court’s indictees (now convicts) should have been tried. 
Nevertheless, none of the convicts was tried under Sierra Leone’s criminal law. And the Deputy 
Prosecutor was never a Sierra Leonean for the greater period of the court’s existence; it was 
only after the court had almost completed the AFRC, RUF and CDF trials that Joseph F. Kamara 
(a Sierra Leonean jurist) was given the appointment. In fact, the SCSL’s most sensitive positions 
were held by foreign nationals and this also raised questions about the hybridism of the court 
and the quantum of financial resources repatriated abroad from the activities of foreign 
nationals in the running of the court. The above issues became discourses that eventually 
attracted serious media coverage. 
However, different media outlets argued that had the Registry recruited Sierra Leoneans, who 
were equally qualified to perform those functions performed by foreign nationals, the court’s 
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hybridism would have been more conspicuous and useful to Sierra Leoneans and their post-
conflict recovery efforts; leading to even post-conflict economic development (see Appendix 
III200, 286). Again, the court’s ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘competence’ never went beyond 30th November, 
1996, but war crimes had been committed in Sierra Leone since the beginning of the war in 
1991. This ‘jurisdictional limitation’ was arguably calculated to give legitimacy to the blanket 
amnesty provision (Article XIV) in the Abidjan Peace Accord, which was never taken to 
Parliament for ratification, nor implemented to end the carnage in the country. 
 So of what legal significance was the ‘jurisdictional limitation’ to the prosecution of 
perpetrators for war crimes in Sierra Leone? Why should those war crimes suspects (who 
allegedly committed heinous crimes, before 30th November, 1996), be exculpated from war 
crimes charges? Does this issue of ‘selective justice’ genuinely resonate with the need to end 
impunity in post-conflict Sierra Leone? These were some of the questions which were raised by 
the media in connection with the SCSL’s ‘jurisdictional limitations’. Again, the phrase in Article 1 
(1), ‘...to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of IHL 
and Sierra Leonean law...’ has been a ‘prosecutorial discretion’ and a ‘jurisdictional limitation’ 
on the functionality of the SCSL that is still being questioned in some legal and political circles; 
leading to controversial debates that have also been sustained by the media (see Appendix 
III200, 294). 
However, of the four trials conducted, the prosecutors only indicted and prosecuted just 
‘twelve’ (12) persons, nine (9) of whom (including Charles Taylor) were eventually convicted of 
either war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of IHL; or for aiding and 
abetting the commission of the said offences in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2002. Even 
though the convictions secured, were geared towards ending impunity in Sierra Leone, a 
number of important questions were raised by the media and CSOs to ascertain how impunity 
was really addressed by the SCSL. Did the trials of just ‘twelve’ (12) persons for war crimes, 
sufficiently address the problem of impunity in post-conflict Sierra Leone, which is still prone to 
violence? What about the other ‘top’ and ‘middle level’ commanders, who were not brought to 
justice? 
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 Can they be prosecuted under Sierra Leone’s criminal law, given the ‘blanket amnesty’ 
provision in the LPA, which sanctioned impunity in post-conflict Sierra Leone? What impact has 
the functionality of the SCSL had on the country’s judicial system and the rule of law, when the 
court only indicted and prosecuted selected war criminals, involved just a handful of Sierra 
Leonean jurists in its operations, and even partially negated its jurisdiction in Article 1 (1) by 
failing to indict and prosecute the selected war criminals under Sierra Leone’s criminal law? 
These and similar questions continue to occupy the minds of Sierra Leoneans both near and far 
who proffer differing answers in a quest to addressing the paramount issue of ending impunity 
and holding to account those who bore the greatest responsibility for war crimes in Sierra 
Leone. The issue of so-called ‘insider witnesses’, and the operation by the SCSL of a witness 
protection scheme, also occupied the media and civil society. How this can be reconciled with 
the genuine fight against impunity, it was asked?  
 In a post-conflict country like Sierra Leone, it was argued, where poverty is rife, some 
witnesses, out of ill-will or for economic reasons (see Appendix III294) came forward and 
testified, particularly against the CDF leaders, who were convicted because the court wanted to 
satisfy the international community’s urge to convict (see Appendix III200, 303). The indictment 
and prosecution of the CDF leaders, particularly Chief Hinga Norman, raised so many pertinent 
questions of note in the media about the legacy of the SCSL. One arguable notable question 
was that which Penfold raised in 2012.19 The question is: ‘who else will come forward to fight 
for the cause of peace and democracy in the future if they face the threat of being treated as a 
war criminal?’ This question was also passionately raised by Charles F. Margai, lead counsel for 
the CDF leaders in his plea in mitigation after the convictions of Moinina Fofana and Alieu 
Kondowai. And this was eventually picked by the media and made prominent in its coverage.  
What even appeared to be more paradoxical was the fact that at the time when the CDF 
leaders were being tried, the Americans got the Government of Sierra Leone to sign a bilateral 
treaty which was eventually ratified by the Sierra Leone Parliament, contrary to CSOs’ stance, 
preventing Sierra Leone from turning in any indicted US citizens to the ICC for war crimes trials 
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See page 190 of his ‘Atrocities, Diamonds and Diplomacy: The inside Story of the Conflict in Sierra Leone’. 
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(ibid: 189). This raises the question of how genuine was the USA (the country that provided 
more than half of the budgeted $250 million for the operations of the SCSL) in ending impunity, 
whilst it simultaneously pressured the Government of Sierra Leone into sanctioning impunity, 
when it came to the prosecution of US citizens for war crimes. These were also other important 
issues that caught the media’s attention. Furthermore, the time, cost and resources which it 
took the SCSL to try just nine (9) war crimes convicts manifested a serious weakness of the 
judicial accountability approach to TJ. Here is an example of how the media reflected the issue: 
‘Most disenchanted Sierra Leoneans it would appear, tend to relegate the importance of 
the issue of human rights, justice and reconciliation, which the court seeks to address, 
by criticising it as too expensive and creating more tension and security threat rather 
than administering justice and addressing the question of impunity. Many are of the 
view that the money being spent on running the court should have served a better 
purpose instead such as providing shelter, medical health centres, schools and other 
assistance to amputees and the war victims.’ (see Appendix III200) 
However, the SCSL had clearly defined ‘punitive’ and ‘distributive’ jurisdiction; whilst the TRC 
had its own ‘restorative’ and ‘healing’ jurisdiction. The simultaneous functionality of both 
institutions occasioned confusion and conflict in their spheres of operations. The SCSL 
prevented the TRC from holding public hearings with the then indictees (now convicts), who 
were already in detention. This was tantamount to repudiating the statutory jurisdiction of the 
TRC, as it was obliged by law to hold public hearings and elicit requisite information from 
persons, who were involved in the armed conflict to create an impartial historical record of the 
conflict.20 The exclusion of Chief Norman’s testimony from the TRC Report in particular, left an 
irreparable void in the TRC’s literature. The TRC and CSOs and the media were of the view that 
the court’s decision did not sufficiently take into account the respective roles of the two 
institutions, which were clearly defined by law.21 In fact, there were ‘middle level commanders’, 
who deliberately refused to testify before the TRC for fear that their testimonies, were to be 
used to prosecute them. 
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See Article 6 (1). 
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TRC Report, Vol. II, op.cit:109. 
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3.4 The Media, Civil Society and Transitional Justice: The Theoretical Synergy Analysed 
An analysis of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of TJ in 3.3 above shows that post-
conflict justice is not restricted to the institutionalisation of judicial accountability mechanisms 
for past abuses. The concept also encompasses the civic and social transformation needed to 
ensure that abuses are not repeated in the future (Evanston, 2004). Arguably, that expectation 
partly relies on a free, independent and socially responsible media and an active civil society, 
which can robustly monitor the working of the entire TJ process. In Sierra Leone for instance, 
FORDI used the media to communicate TJ to civil society and played an essential role in 
facilitating the peace and reconciliation process between 1999 and 2004. 
 FORDI also held a joint consultative seminar with Awoko, Democrat and For Di People 
newspapers in 1999 on CSOs’ role in upholding the ideals of post-conflict justice and 
democracy. SDI has been vocal in the quest for media freedom, access to information and the 
repeal of Sierra Leone’s law on sedition and criminal libel. It is being supported by SLAJ in its 
lobbying to promote democratic initiatives in Sierra Leone. CCS has been participating in radio 
and phone-in programs across Sierra Leone on issues of national cohesion and TJ. With 
branches all over the country, its participation in national debates has been influenced by 
media operations in virtually every district.  
COJA sent representatives to observe the Taylor trial at The Hague and they reported back to its 
members and the wider civil society through the media. The media, with the support of civil 
society and other governance institutions (particularly the judiciary and legislature), serve as a 
bastion of participatory democracy; in building better citizenry and a fuller democracy 
(Schudson, op.cit: 204). Thus, a free and independent media and an active civil society are two 
fundamentally essential ingredients of a robust democracy (Haynes, op.cit: 22- 23, Schudson, 
op.cit: 204, Kargbo, 2010: 121, Kargbo, 2011: 70-79). But how do the media socially construct 
realities? Should realities be socially constructed or reported as they are? How ‘fair’ is the 
media in the ‘social construction of realities’? 
 These are pertinent questions that will be explored as the analysis unfolds in 4.1. However, the 
‘salience’ which the media attaches to its coverage of post-conflict issues, depends on the 
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position which it takes in the political debate and ideological struggle of whether impunity must 
be ended by prosecuting war criminals or to push for reconciliation. The media can mitigate 
conflicts in post-conflict societies when it upholds the ideals of the functional perspective 
within the context of the public service model. Lynch and McGoldrick’s (2005: 5) conception of 
‘peace journalism’, which is predicated on the Galtung (1992: 141) paradigm, offers the 
‘conceptual and practical tools’ which journalists can utilise to accordingly perform their ‘public 
service’ functions. 
 According to Shaw (2008: 41) it is a journalism that helps reporters and editors alike to make 
informed choices of what stories deserve reporting and how the reporting itself is done that 
provide the society at large with opportunities to consider and value non-violent responses to 
conflict. Moreover, Thompson’s (2007: 433-444) ‘responsibility to report’ and Shaw’s (2012: 36-
42) ‘human rights journalism’ (see 4.1) are other models that arguably explain how the media 
can mitigate conflicts and sustain the ideals of democratic good governance within the 
functional perspective. 
Thus, within this context, while developing robust peace building initiatives and sustaining the 
fight against impunity in war torn countries, the media can function as a conduit for post-
conflict justice, reconciliation and democratic legitimacy (Thompson, 2007:349, Reporting 
Justice, op.cit: 2). Meanwhile, the campaign against impunity (explicated in 3.3) in the modern 
World was robustly rekindled by the media when it adopted the ‘Holocaust’ and ‘Nuremberg’ 
frames in its coverage of the horrifying atrocities committed by particularly Serbian rebels in 
the former Yugoslavia (Futamura, op.cit: 25, Gilboa, 2005: 28, McQuail, 2000: 343-345),leading 
to the establishment of the ICTY. The media can also fuel conflicts in post-conflict societies, 
when journalists put out hate-filled and divisive contents that are inimical to societal cohesion 
and stability. When this happens in a multi-ethnic post-conflict society (like Sierra Leone) 
another devastating conflict may ensue, further wrecking that society (Randall and Pulano, 
2008: 2).  
The literature on the impact of ‘hate’ speech on conflict and war crimes though fairly limited, 
has opened up fruitful avenues for further multi-disciplinary academic explorations, although, 
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apart from the Julius Streicher case, most of the documented examples on the subject, took 
place during the 1990s. Hate media played a part in exacerbating the ethnic cleansing that 
plunged the former Yugoslavia into horrendous civil wars (Strauss, op.cit: 179-188, McQuail, 
op.cit: 343-344, Volcic and Dzihana, op.cit: 8). Essentially, the Belgrade Prosecutor’s Office has 
confirmed that war crimes trials are forth coming for journalists, who incited the commission of 
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia22.  
The media’s conflictual role in the 2007 Kenyan electoral crisis, leading to the deaths of 
between 1,200 and 1,500 people and the displacement of 660,000 people is another case in 
point (Somerville, 2010:1-2). The ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ frames of the Genocide in 
Rwanda were quickly employed by Western and Kenyan journalists in their reportage of the 
whole episode (ibid). The ICTR’s Media Trial, convicted Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco 
Bagayagwiza of the Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collins’ (RTLM) and Hassan Ngeze of the 
Kangura newspaper for the offences of genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, 
crimes against humanity etc. (ICTR’s Media Trial Judgment in Thompson, op.cit: 277-307). 
 The Belgian born Italian citizen, Georges Henry Joseph Ruggiu, was also sentenced to twelve 
(12) years imprison for inciting genocide. This was the most chilling call to mayhem he 
broadcast ‘you (Tutsi) cockroaches must know you are made of flesh... we will kill you’ (Rourke, 
2007:289). However, the lessons of the genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent convictions of 
journalists for promoting ethnic conflict, has heightened the need to monitor and evaluate the 
operations of the media in war torn countries to prevent it being exploited in the service of 
ethnic and religious propaganda (Thompson, op.cit: 435). This instrumental approach 
emphasises training and capacity building of journalists in conflict and post-conflict zones 
(Price, Noll and De Luce, 2002:2). And a number of leading Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) such as ICTJ, Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society (IMPCS), Search For Common 
Ground (SFCG), BBC Media Action (BBCMA) etc., have devised and run media development 
projects in that direction. However, very little academic research has been done to evaluate the 
                                                          
22
http://www.setmes.com/2012/01/10 
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impacts of such training programs on media performances in conflict and post-conflict zones, 
including Sierra Leone. 
 The media in Sierra Leone, despite the numerous training sessions which have been organised 
for journalists since the dawn of the country’s post-conflict justice process, has not shed its 
partisan tendencies, driven by tribal, regional and financial considerations. Politics and Press in 
Africa (eds. Tamba M’bayoh R. Onwumechili, C., and Nwafo, R.2000:124) catalogues how 
pressmen in Sierra Leone have undermined the integrity of the print media by blatantly or 
subtly violating professional codes of ethics. The violations were grouped as follows: 
1. Serious disregard for truth and fairness and unnecessary sensationalisation, which 
include padding of stories. 
2. Using the press for personal vendettas (including editorialising in news reports). 
3. Seeking favours, gifts and other kinds of gratification in order to publish or stop the 
publishing of a story. 
4. Taking sides, or appearing to do so, with the various competing interest groups. 
 The IMC’s Reports between 2008 and 2012 authenticated the extent to which the above 
scathing and damming comments and findings about the press have continued to negatively 
impact the lives of Sierra Leoneans. The 2010 Report (page 9) for example, affirmed that 90% of 
the complaints lodged against journalists, were specifically made against newspapers’ editors 
and reporters, on issues of the publication of false news, defamation (libel), inaccurate reports 
etc. The media in Sierra Leone has thus been attacked as highly partisan (biased) and 
unreliable, (Lincoln 2008: 14, Gutierrez, 2012:5-6) unprofessional and incapable of upholding 
ethical standards (IMC’s Annual Reports 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011; Zack-Williams 
op.cit:75).  
This problem of unprofessionalism characterised by utter disregard for the country’s 
communications media ethics is largely influenced by the mass manipulative/propaganda and 
commodification of news models, which are the propelling forces of the conflictual perspective 
of the media that has the tendency to ignite a much more debilitating conflict in post-conflict 
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Sierra Leone. The media’s conflictual role in Sierra Leone is clearly seen in its coverage of the 
country’s patrimonial politics (shrouded in ethno-regionalism). The dominance of the ‘Northern 
Hegemony’ in every sphere of Sierra Leone’s governance institutions and structures, is 
becoming increasingly glaring and worrisome for the ‘South-Eastern Elites’, who have been 
constantly complaining about how they have been discriminated against and marginalised in 
the allocation of the State’s natural and structural resources on the basis of  ethno-regional and 
political affiliations (see Appendix III512, 530,531).  
This North (APC)-South (SLPP) divide is so glaring that it has permeated every sphere of Sierra 
Leone.23 The Southerners have continued to argue that the rate, at which Northerners are 
overwhelmingly appointed to very serious positions of trust across the country, is 
comparatively radically unparallel to how Southerners are considered for even lesser 
appointments. This concern of the ‘Southern elites’ is of equal significance to experts and 
analysts of conflict prevention and resolution. The subsisting literature on the causes of the war 
in Sierra Leone shows how the formation and dominance of the Northern biased ‘Limba 
Hegemony’ (The Akutay) in Sierra Leone’s one party politics was viewed with serious political 
suspicion and how the need to dismantle that hegemony through revolutionary politics became 
problematic for Sierra Leone (Hirsch,op.cit:24-25). Ideally, no one region, ethnic group, faction 
or district, should dominate the dynamics of the post-conflict politics, institutions and 
structures of Sierra Leone. That in itself constitutes a recipe for another equally devastating 
conflict, since it has already widened the North-South divide and bred a burning and serious 
resentment that can accelerate national disintegration. Interestingly, the media has become 
embroiled in this ideological struggle that has the propensity to ignite and fuel another conflict 
in Sierra Leone. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Nathaniel King’s National Commission for Democracy Report on ‘Citizens’ Perceptions of Sierra Leone’s Ethno-political and Diversity 
Management’, 2013: iv-viii, 8- The study sought citizens’ perceptions of the state of nationhood in relation to ethnicity in Sierra Leone; 
ascertained the reasons for an entrenched political divided as tended to be repeatedly demonstrated in voting patterns during general and 
presidential elections; examined how other countries in the sub-region and other African countries manage diversity; and, premised on the 
findings, made recommendations, which inform the country’s constitutional review process. 
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Chapter Four 
Models of Media Analysis 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will critically analyse and establish the significance of the models of media 
analysis, which have been deployed to answer all of my five research questions. In media 
effects research, theories of news production and consumption, strike a chord between the 
content and response approaches to media analysis, (Watson, op.cit: 3-4) developed from the 
stimulus-response theory in the behavioural sciences (Davey, 2004:16, Cross, 2001:150). The 
content approach examines media content as a stimulus and the response approach considers 
how media content is responded to at the sociological (macro/societal) and psychological 
(micro/behavioural) levels (Bryant and Thompson, 2002-18; Severin and Tankard, op.cit:262-
277; Watson, ibid). Thus, in this study, theories of news production are contextualised as 
content models of media analysis and those of news consumption are dubbed response models 
of media analysis. 
 Research questions 1 and 3 (see 1.3 above) are germane to the content models of media 
analysis explicated in 4.1 below. And research questions 2, 4 and 5 (see 1.3 above) are cognate 
with the response models discussed in 4.2 below. Essentially, the content and response models 
are discussed in line with certain fundamental observations and complexities germane with my 
research questions. Hence the issues triggered in this and the next chapter will form the basis 
for the analysis between chapters six (6) and eight (8). Moreover, a plethora of questions are 
posed immediately after every model is discussed and connected to the study. Such questions 
are raised with the aim of establishing how each model guides the enquiry into the 
observations and complexities that formed the basis of this study.  
4.1 Content Models of Media Analysis 
 This section restricts itself to only the content side of the content-response prism of media 
analysis to determine how the ‘selected media’ represented the dialectics and complexities that 
emerged from the CDF and Taylor trials. Thus, research has shown that news is the most 
controversial thematic construct in media analysis (Altschull, 1990: 19- 24, Stephens, 1997:1). 
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This controversy is theoretically informed by two heuristics. Journalists on the one hand 
contend that news aims at providing objective facts to the public to enable them to make 
informed decisions on a variety of issues (Alozie, 2007:217). 
 Hence, by its content and its framing, news is a discourse which purports to present issues and 
events as they are, and to accordingly analyse them, in a way that is devoid of journalists’ 
idiosyncrasies (Owen, Spencer & Thomas, 2010; Dennis & Merrill, 2002: 111; Watson, 
op.cit:120). Critics, on the other hand, contend that news does not objectively present and 
analyse issues and events fairly, but it is clothed in journalists’ socio-cultural, economic and 
political preferences and prejudices (Fowler, 1991: 1-3, Altschull, op.cit: 23, Watson, 2003: 120-
141, Severin & Tankard, 2000: 101-102, Smith, 2008:34- 41, 47-53, Entman, 2007:165). The 
critics’ position on this contentious issue is analysed in the following arguments: 
1. ‘News production is a discourse anchored by the ideology of news producers or those who 
employ them, particularly if we are talking about the press. However, no news production is 
independent of the values that shape and drive the players at all levels’ (Watson, ibid: 130). 
 
2. ‘The media are clearly not neutral agents. Any media entity holds a position in the 
ideological and political structure of a given society that will determine the approach 
according to which events are processed. The media do not passively describe or record 
news events, but actively reconstruct them, mostly on the basis of their own ideological 
affiliations’ (Volcic and Dzihana, op.cit:15). 
 
3. ‘News is not a natural phenomenon emerging straight from ‘reality’, but a product. It is 
produced by an industry, shaped by the bureaucratic and economic structure of that 
industry, by the relations between the media and other industries, most importantly, by the 
relations with the government and other political organisations. From a broader 
perspective, it reflects, and in return shapes the prevailing values of a society in a particular 
historical context’ (Fowler, op.cit: 222).  
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Thus, the ‘reality’ which audiences perceived, when exposed to media content, is a reality that 
is ‘socially constructed’ (Burger and Luckmann, 1966, Littlejohn, 1992:190) by journalists to 
influence audiences’ perceptions about issues and events that permeate the intellectual climate 
of the day; that is the dominant discourses of mainstream society (Fowler, ibid: 1-3, Altschull, 
1990: 23, Bryant and Thompson, 2002: 92-93, Severin& Tankard, op.cit: 93, Entman, ibid: 165). 
This presupposes that the news (the constructed reality) which is eventually produced for 
societal consumption is undoubtedly influenced by the construction processes (including the 
language in which it is clothed), which it goes through before it is disseminated (McQuail, 2002: 
274, Jamieson & Waldman, 2003: xiii, Haralambos & Holborn, 2004: 841, Mautner, 2008:33).  
The process begins with news gathering and selection (McQuail ibid: 277-284, Watson op.cit:  
120, Dennis and Merrill op.cit: 113; Pridmore, 2000:16). Thus, the Galtung and Ruge’s (1965: 
64-91) criteria of news values, Stuart Hall’s double articulation (Hall 1973, Hall, 2002: 271, West 
and Turner, 2004: 36), Allan Bell’s attribution (Bell 1991, Watson, op.cit: 122), Allan Thompson’s 
responsibility to report and Shaw’s  human rights journalism (Thompson, op.cit:433-444, Shaw, 
2012: 11-42) are the news selection models, which are considered invaluable in explicating the 
significance of the news selection paradigm to this study. Galtung and Ruge (op.cit: 64-91), inter 
alia, acknowledged the importance of ‘cultural determinism’ and ‘geographical proximity’ 
(hereinafter referred to as geo-cultural values/ considerations), and ‘elite persons’, in their 
landmark analysis of news values. 
 Their model points to the sharp parallels that can be drawn between the ‘geo-cultural values’ 
of a society and the extent to which such values can influence the selection processes in news 
production. Their model also looks at how ‘elitist’ and ‘influential persons’, can easily make 
news. The responsibility to report (the new journalistic paradigm), mirrors Allan Thompson’s 
(op.cit:433-444) clarion call for journalists the World over, to prioritise the reportage of 
particularly humanitarian issues and events, irrespective of where they may have happened. 
This is what Shaw (2012) has conceptualised as human rights journalism. The said models, 
which essentially guide Journalistic practice, dovetailed with three heuristics that are 
discernible in this study. 
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First, assuming without conceding at this stage, that the trials of the CDF leaders and Taylor, 
met  Galtung and Ruge’s (geo-cultural) threshold for news selection by the local media, could 
that have consequently compelled the selected media, to carry stories of the two trials, with 
the degree of salience, which they may have attached to them? This question can also point to 
the determination of whether the ‘values’, which underpinned the decisions made by 
journalists of the selected media in covering the trials, were ‘socially constructed’ or ‘natural’. 
In other words, did journalists of the selected media adopt ‘geo-cultural’ considerations from 
Sierra Leone in forming their judgments about ‘what’ they chose to report and the ‘salience’ 
they attached to the issues reported about the CDF leaders and Taylor ? 
 Assuming that journalists indeed adopted ‘cultural criteria’ from within Sierra Leone in their 
reportage of the trials, did many of the tensions and ethnic divisions manifested during the 
decade of conflict continued to be reflected in the coverage?  In other words, can the reportage 
of the two trials be said to be ‘a continuation of war by other means’? (Markovic and Subasic, 
2011: 81).  Is there empirical evidence from the coverage of  the CDF trial in particular, that  the 
CDF leaders were either described as ‘national heroes’, ‘liberators’ and ‘restorers of peace and 
democracy’, or were they dubbed ‘war criminals’, ‘butchers/hooligans’, ‘cannibals’ and ‘blood 
thirsty power ethnicists’?  Again, assuming that the selected media paid more attention to the 
CDF than the  Taylor trial, could that have been influenced by ‘cultural determinism’ or 
‘geographical proximity’ or some other considerations that do not fall within the Galtung and 
Ruge’s model?       
The second relevance of the Galtung and Ruge model to the study may further clarify another 
issue which is relevant to the Taylor trial in particular. A serious contention that permeated 
Sierra Leone’s intellectual climate, prior to, during and after the indictment and conviction of 
Taylor, was that he was the mastermind of the RUF rebellion.  And that his affiliation with the 
RUF was a fundamental factor that prolonged the war. This trend of thought is discernible in 
the findings of virtually all the scholars, who have written extensively on Sierra Leone’s quest 
for post-conflict justice (Berewa, op.cit: 110; Francis, op.cit: 111; Hirsch, op.cit: 15; Zack-
Williams, op.cit: 21; Kabbah, 105; Gberie, op.cit: 53-60; Penfold, op.cit: 5). Furthermore, 
journalists who covered the Taylor trial presented him as guilty of the offences even before his 
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trial came to an end (see Appendix III12, 31, 250, 311). Significantly, in analysing news reports of 
evidence in the trial the model helps to discern whether the general belief amongst scholars 
and CSOs in Sierra Leone that Taylor was the mastermind of the conflict was reflected in the 
coverage, though that was not established by the Trial Chamber II. 
Third, the issue of why the global/ international media failed to pay much attention to the 
coverage of the CDF trial, in particular and the operations of the SCSL in general (Lang,op.cit:2), 
may be bolstered by Galtung and Ruge’s ‘geo-cultural’ considerations, but contested by 
Thompson’s responsibility to report (new journalistic paradigm) and Shaw’s human rights 
journalism. This conception however raises several pertinent questions of note. Namely, can 
global/international media outlets (as a result of their strength in financial, technical, 
professional and human resources), comparatively ‘select’ and ‘dispatch’ well sourced, 
balanced and highly credible and reliable contents about the dynamics of war crimes trials, 
better  than the local media?  
Should it be contended, that the issues of war crimes trials, as mirrored by the global/ 
international media, are those which are being heard in countries that share the same ‘geo-
cultural’ features, with the states and regions in which the above media outlets are 
incorporated? If this is so, can it then be argued that the war crimes trial of the CDF leaders and 
their eventual convictions, did not meet the threshold for ‘news selection’ to merit thorough 
coverage by the global/international media? Were the CDF and Taylor trials not of any 
significance to war crimes jurisprudence and human rights journalism? Why did the Western 
media only intermittently report the AFRC, RUF and CDF trials, but became very much 
interested in the coverage of Taylor’s indictment, arrest and trial, only after the European 
Union Parliament and the U.S House of Representatives passed their Resolutions, calling for his 
extradition to the SCSL? 
 How can the so-called ‘geo-cultural’ considerations for news selection be reconciled with the 
‘new journalistic paradigm’ (i.e. Thompson’s responsibility to report and Shaw’s human rights 
journalism)? Hence, the ‘geo-cultural’ considerations may guide any informed judgment about 
why global/international media outlets, like the BBC, VOA, RFI, Washington Post etc., paid more 
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attention to the war crimes trials of the ICTY, as opposed to those of the SCSL (Lang.op.cit:2). 
Thompson’s ‘new journalistic paradigm’ and Shaw’s human rights journalism could however 
serve as critical parameters to question the news selection process of the above reputable 
media structures. According to Shaw (op.cit:5), the national identity of journalists lulls them 
into prioritising ‘our news’ and relegating ‘theirs’ to the backwater. This has thus had serious 
implications for peace journalism and global justice.  
Nevertheless, the conceptual phenomenon of ‘elite persons’ as a criterion for news selection in 
the Galtung and Ruge model, has been developed and replicated in Allan Bell’s attribution 
model, which is also useful to this study. Bell’s theoretical construct is based on the idea that 
issues and events that involved ‘elite persons’ can attract greater media coverage than those 
that involved ordinary people; hence ‘the elites not only are the news, but they make it’ (Bell, 
1991, cited also in Watson). Thus, Chief Norman was the most ‘elitist’ Sierra Leonean, who was 
indicted. He was a prominent member of the SLPP and a wittingly influential political figure 
(Berewa, op.cit:180-182; Penfold, op.cit: 174-188; Hirsch, op.cit:53; Kabbah, op.cit: 329-331). 
He enjoyed overwhelming support from the South-East and even aspired to ascend to the 
leadership of the SLPP, even when he could not extricate himself from the tentacles of the SCSL 
(see Appendix III383, 385). 
And it appeared that his ‘elitism’ captured the headlines, front-pages and editorials of 
newspapers in Sierra Leone for the entire period for which the CDF trial subsisted.24 Chief 
Norman wrote many letters to the international community, the UN, the SLPP and the South-
Easterners on issues relative to the alleged corruption in the SCSL (see Appendix III378), his 
maltreatment in detention (see Appendix III289), his request to attend the 2005 National 
Convention of the SLPP (see Appendix III440) and his clarion call on the South-Easterners to shun 
President Kabbah and his Vice, Solomon Berewa, who according to him, was imposed on the 
SLPP as the former’s successor (see Appendix III371); a view which Berewa debunked 
(op.cit:181). Chief Norman’s letters were widely published and analysed in the print and 
electronic media and they attracted CSOs comments, leading to the shaping of public opinion 
                                                          
24
See the numerous references in the publications of the ‘selected media’ on the frames and sub frames that involved Chief Norman in chapter 
six. 
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on the issues raised. His initial arrest and detention in Bonthe Island (see Appendix III143, 145, 301), 
and sudden death in Senegal (see Appendix III101, 103), were contentious issues that also hit the 
headlines and front-pages of newspapers in Sierra Leone. 
 Thus, Bell’s attribution model can partially explain why the CDF trial attracted overwhelming 
media attention within Sierra Leone, and why the pieces of evidence adduced during the 
proceedings, were not reported as they unfolded, but would have been vociferously 
commented upon in the ‘news’ and ‘views’, which the selected media put out during the trial. 
The model can as well explain why the Liberian media may have paid the greatest attention to 
the Taylor trial, as opposed to the other three trials (AFRC, RUF and CDF) because Taylor was an 
indisputable ‘elite person’ when he was indicted, arrested and flown to Sierra Leone for trial. 
This would have influenced the news selection process of the Liberian media in the coverage of 
the Taylor trial, as opposed to the CDF trial, for instance. 
This research examines the relationship between ‘elites’ opinions in Sierra Leone and media 
reporting. That is, how the views of the ‘elites’ in Sierra Leone influenced media coverage of the 
trials and how media reporting in turn impacted CSOs representatives’ perceptions about the 
trials. Theoretically and conceptually, the public at large, the ‘elites’ and the media are very 
much influential in the opinion process, even though they operate at different levels. It is 
natural for some waves of opinion to first come from the ‘elites’ and then get to the entire 
citizenry through the media. Conversely, other waves of opinion will come from the public at 
large, but can be shaped by the ‘elites’ and the media, as a result of dramatic events and 
occurrences, that can produce wide and emotional responses that demand immediate actions 
(Mitchell, 1979:70-71, Schudson, 1996:204). 
Contextually, the indictment, detention, subsequent trial and sudden death of Norman, and 
Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria; eventual arrest, trial and conviction, immediately triggered some 
critical opinions, which were continually sustained by the ‘elites’ and the media until and after 
the former was buried and the latter goaled for fifty (50) years. Again, Bell’s attribution model 
(1991), an extension of the Galtung and Ruge’s paradigm, is central here. Whereas Galtung and 
Ruge (op.cit: 64-91) discussed the significance of ‘elite persons’ as one of the essential criteria 
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of news selection in their analysis of news worthiness (Owen, Spencer & Thomas, op.cit: 3, 
Holborn &Haralambos, op.cit:842); Bell’s postulation emphasised the inevitability of the elites’ 
role in the production of news. This position on the elites’ centrality in news making is 
discernible in the dynamics of power, culture, communication and propaganda.   
The ‘elites’ of a society are at the helm of everything. They are in the centre of the struggle for 
power, which is a microcosm of the dynamics of any culture (Giddens et.al. 2005: 20, Volcic and 
Dzihana op.cit:13). Thus, the nexus between culture and power is well documented in the 
existing literature (ibid: 13, Martin- Barbero, 1993:63).  And the centrality of communication in 
the study of culture cannot be overemphasised. Invariably, communications media contents 
can thus be used to maintain the quest for power by propagating the ideals of the prevailing 
ideologies in society. Meanwhile, ‘elites’ opinions on national issues in Sierra Leone are 
arguably tainted with overt ethno- regional and political biases (see Appendix III). This 
contention is rooted in the fact that Sierra Leone is a multi-ethnic post-conflict country that is 
divided on tribal and regional lines. That is why the country’s body politic is fraught with tribal 
and regional divides (Hirsch, op.cit: 24-25, Penfold, op.cit: 25). In fact, ethnicity is a socio-
cultural problem that is intertwined with African politics (Chazan, Mortimer et.al, 1992: 106-
116). 
 In Sierra Leone, most of the people in the South-East are affiliated to the SLPP; whilst majority 
of those in the North-West are considered supporters of the APC (Kandeh, 1992:81-99; Hirsch; 
ibid; Penfold, ibid; see Appendix III508, 526, 542; see also the 2002, 2007 and 2012 Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections Results). And it now appears that ethno-political and regional tensions 
have crept into the operations of every functional institution and structure in Sierra Leone, 
including the media (see Appendix III508, 526, 542). Invariably, ‘elite persons’ whose opinions are 
shaped by ethno-political prejudices, embedded in discourses, often pass-on such biased 
discourses to news producers as news. This strong argument is substantiated by the following 
publications made on diverse dates between 2003 and 2013: 
1. ‘Ahead of Convention... Limba Rebellion in APC Planned’ (Front-page headline; 
Independent Observer, Wednesday, May 1, 2013) 
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2. ‘Political Divide May Cripple APC... As Limbas Plan Rebellion’ (Special Commentary, 
Independent Observer, Wednesday, May 1, 2013)  
3. ‘Mendes Are Stupid’- Koachie (Front-page headline; Unity Newspaper, Monday, June 25, 
2012) 
4. ‘Norman belongs to ‘Torpoi’ Family’(‘Torpoi’ is a vocabulary in Mende, denoting the palm 
tree, which is the symbol of the SLPP) (For Di People, Wednesday, April 2, 2003) 
5. ‘Sitting in his Bonthe Island Prison Cell, Hinga Norman, former war lord of the disbanded 
ethnic Kamajor militia army will have enough time pondering about the war he created in 
Sierra Leone on becoming Deputy Defence Minister’ (For Di People, Friday, April 11,2003) 
6. ‘Kamajor Doctor Harass Themne Tribal Head’ (front-page headline). ‘He said that some 
Kamajors had threatened to kill him during the 1998 interregnum as he was branded as a 
junta collaborator’ (For Di People,Thursday, September 16,  2004) 
7. ‘Kambia Disowns Kabbah!’ ‘Nor Tha A Kom Kor’ (headline) (This Themne headline is 
interpreted to mean that the Northern people of Kambia district did not accept President 
Kabbah because he was not born in Kambia) (For Di People, Friday, September 17, 2003) 
8. ‘...the Kamajors captured six men whom he identified as palm wine tappers belonging to 
the Limba tribe. These people he said, the Kamajors accused of collaborating with the 
juntas.Three of them were killed by firing while the others were hacked to death with 
machetes’ (For Di People, Monday, September 13, 2004) 
9. ‘Regionalism: Kamajors Killed 150 Northerners’-Witness tells Special Court(For Di People, 
Tuesday, February 15, 2005) 
10. ‘We were forced to mine’ (headline). ‘...TF2048 testified about how the Limbas, 
Themnes,and Lokos were targeted for killing by the Kamajors in Tongo’ (Awoko, February 
24, 2005) 
11. ‘Limbas marginalised in favour of Themnes ... for APC positions in the North’ (front-page 
headlines, Independent Observer, Thursday, May 2, 2013) 
12. ‘...he had seen no group of people as stupid as the Mendes’ (Politico Newspaper, May 7-
8,2013) 
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The above examples point to how ethno-regional/political considerations can impact the 
coverage of issues and events by the media in Sierra Leone. Bell’s attribution model can also 
bolster the Galtung and Ruge model, to answer the question of whether the CDF trial was ‘a 
continuation of war by other means’. The question is necessitated by the fact that the CDF trial 
polarised civil society on ethno-regional/political lines (Kamara, 2013). Both models should be 
considered quite useful to determine whether the conflicting perspectives that polarised civil 
society about the need to try or not to try the CDF leaders, largely driven by ethno-
regional/political biases, was reflected in the media’s representation of the trial.  
Stuart Hall’s‘double articulation’ model (Hall 1973, Watson, op.cit:122) establishes the synergy 
between formal and ideological news values. The former, according to Hall, mirrors the news 
producers’ perceptions on issues to the intellectual climate of the day; which, in the case of 
Sierra Leone, is principally characterised by ethno-regional/political discourses. This model 
should again test the extent to which (if at all) journalists’ perceptions and coverage of the trials 
were shaped by the ethno-regional/political climate of the day and hence validating or 
invalidating whether the news selection paradigm and its concomitant models, espoused in this 
analysis, have indeed had any effects on the contents of what was produced for societal 
consumption. 
The fundamental question that arises at this stage is that if the coverage was tainted with 
ethno-regional/political biases, how can such biases be detected in the media’s discursive 
treatment of the issues that emerged from the trials? This question leads to the consideration 
of framing as a theory and how it can impact the content of news production (Jamieson and 
Waldman, op.cit: xiii). Thus, framing’s theoretical and methodological dimensions and its 
relevance to this study, is thoroughly explored in the next chapter.  However, ethno-
regional/political biases are intertwined with the prevailing political ideologies in Sierra Leone. 
And ideologies in media discourses as ‘candidates’ for news selection are conspicuous in Hall’s 
double articulation model discussed above.  
The synergy between ideology and news selection, justifies the significance of discourse 
analyses as a theoretically and methodologically sound model for this study. Discourse analysis 
should be helpful, both in identifying the ‘semantic aura’ (Mautner, 2008:48, Fairclough, 2002: 
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308-311, Richardson, 2007) of newspaper texts and for use in deconstructing the semi-
structured interviews with journalists, always bearing in mind that ‘analysis has to take into 
account ...the institutional frames of a specific context or situation’ (Wodak, 2008:2). The other 
concept of news production which can impact the content of news is agenda-setting, which also 
has its theoretical and methodological implications that will be explored in my methodological 
frameworks chapter, enhancing the model’s usefulness to the study. 
While the agenda- setting model mirrors the ‘salience of specific issues and events’, to direct 
the public to pay attention to them (in this case the dispatches about the evidence of the CDF 
and Taylor trials, which the selected media reported to capture the attention of CSOs’ 
representatives); framing deals with the ‘presentation of such issues and events’, to direct the 
public to perceive them, through lenses coloured by the perceptions of the journalists, who 
reported the trials (de Vreese, 2005:51-53, McCombs, 2005:544; Jamieson and Waldman, 
op.cit:  xiii; Iyengar, 2010:276). The relevance of the agenda-setting model is seen in the fact 
that it can direct identification of the main issues that emerged from the trials as made ‘salient’ 
by the selected media. Entman (op.cit:53) defines ‘salience’ as ‘making a piece of information 
more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences. An increase in ‘salience’ enhances 
the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process 
it, and store it in memory’. 
 Kiousis’ (2004:71-87) conceptualisation of ‘media salience’ which is based on the trilogy of 
attention (the number of news stories devoted to a particular topic), prominence (page 
placement, size of headline, amount of time or space, appearance in the lead etc.) and valence 
(the amount of conflict in a story, its overall positive or negative tone etc.) opens up a fruitful 
avenue for a thorough analysis of the pattern of coverage of the trials, giving an indication of 
what may have influenced the coverage of the trials as framed by the selected media.  
Thus, the said trilogy can serve as a potent framing device in revealing the ‘media agenda’ 
through which the coverage of the trials can be referenced. The above analysis clearly shows 
the content models of media analysis that are central to this study, and the extent to which 
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they have been contextualised to link research questions 1 and 3 to  the appropriate 
methodological framework (content analysis) that can be used to lucidly answer them. 
4.2 Response Models of Media Analysis 
Whereas research questions 1 and 3 seek to explore how the selected media represented the 
CDF and Taylor trials, research questions 2, 4 and 5 specifically focus on how CSOs’ 
representatives perceived the coverage. This presupposes that research questions 2, 4 and 5 
can be intellectually answered when they are linked to the appropriate existing response 
theories and methods of media analysis. Thus, this analysis entirely focuses on the response 
side of the content-response prism. Just as there are a plethora of content models, so there are 
numerous response models of media analysis; hence a researcher’s choice of models largely or 
entirely depends on the specificities of his/her research questions. 
The framing paradigm is intertwined with the question of how framing influences thinking-a 
question that is central to the study of the response models. Entman (op.cit:53) has asserted 
that the frames in a communication text do not necessarily guarantee their influence in 
audiences’ thinking. However, de Vreese (op.cit:52) analysed framing’s effects on audiences 
from the standpoints of the individual and the society: the individual consequences could alter 
attitudes about an issue based on exposure to certain frames. And the societal consequences 
could shape social level processes such as political socialisation, decision-making and collective 
actions. This trend of thought is continued in Scheufele’s (op.cit:305-308) framing’s typology, 
which is based on an analysis of frames at the macroscopic or sociological level (i.e. framing’s 
overwhelming effects on society at large) and at the microscopic or psychological level (i.e. 
framing’s effects on the individual’s attitudes and behaviour). Thus, ‘the accepted verdict in 
academic circles until quite recently was that media influence over public opinion amounted to 
minimal consequences’ (Iyengar, 2010:273). 
This raises the question about whether media frames can indeed have the theoretical 
implications for audiences, which de Vreese and Scheufele have identified. However, the 
advent of the new media and the development of the notions of ‘audiences fragmentation’ and 
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‘selective-exposure’, have given credence to the conclusion that media messages can merely 
reinforce prior predispositions (Iyengar,ibid:286). This theoretical construct has therefore 
formed the basis for establishing whether in consuming the news, CSOs’ representatives opted 
for publications that suit their pre-existing ‘biases’ or those that challenge them. 
Even though Entman (op.cit:51-54) posited that framing has a common effect on large portions 
of audiences, according to de Vreese (op. cit: 60), the shared-body of knowledge in the framing 
literature, has largely evaluated media frames without any thorough assessment of their 
implications for audiences. This assertion points to a grey area in the framing literature that is 
intertwined with this research which, inter alia, examines the implications of media framing of 
war crimes trials for audiences in Sierra Leone (see research questions 2, 4 and 5) and hence 
contributing towards filling the void, about the analysis of framing’s implications for the 
audiences (Sierra Leoneans), who followed the media’s coverage of both trials. 
 It is indisputably true that this research hinges on the shared-body of knowledge of the state of 
media effects research in the age of the new media. Since its commencement in the early 
twentieth century, different paradigms have been invoked to explain the state of media effects 
research (Griffin, 2006:395-406). Invariably, the existing response paradigms were developed to 
establish how media content can actually impact the individual and society. 
In this era of post-modernism, in which media content is polysemic (Haralambos and Holborn, 
op.cit: 182) and audiences can interpret such content differently (on the basis of their ethno-
regional/political biases for instance), it becomes very important to establish whether the 
media succeeded in getting CSOs’ representatives to ‘only’ and ‘principally’ focus on those 
issues, which the media ‘selected’ (news selection) and made ‘salient’ (agenda-setting), during 
the coverage of the trials. In other words, alluding to even the structured interpretative 
paradigm (Ibid: 185, Lull, 1980: 179-209, Lindlof, 1988: 81-107, Littlejohn, op.cit:232-234 & 
350), there is an interest in discovering whether the ‘frames’ adopted by the media, influenced 
the ‘preferred reading’ of media texts by CSOs’ representatives. 
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Chapter Five 
Methodological Frameworks 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I deal with the methodological frameworks (a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods) that have been chosen for the study. Research questions 1 and 3 (see 1.3 
above) are to be answered by analysing the contents of the ‘selected media’ on the CDF and 
Taylor trials, for the period for which this study is designed, with the aid of the content models 
of media analysis explicated in 4.1 above. So content analysis is the very first communications 
research tool, which is considered appropriate for this study. The content analysis is informed 
by framing and discourse analyses and a series of semi-structured interviews, with the 
journalists, who actually covered both trials. 
Unlike the content analysis, which has its qualitative and quantitative dimensions (Berelson, 
2002:200-9; McIntyre, 2002:87) (see 6.1 and 6.2 and 7.1 and 7.2 below), the discourse analysis 
and semi-structured interviews, are the pure qualitative communications research tools 
(Mautner, 2008:38-48; Treadwell, 2011: 164-166; Breakwell, Hammond et.al. 2004:239) that 
aided the study leading to the answers to research questions 1 and 3 (see chapters six and 
seven).  As such, all three research methods (content and discourse analyses and semi-
structured interviews), constitute the second, third and fourth communications research tools, 
which are exclusively designed to answer research questions 1 and 3 (see 1.3 above). Research 
questions 2, 4 and 5 are to be answered by analysing the impacts (effects), if any, which media 
coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials, has had on the perceptions and attitudes of CSOs’ 
representatives in post-conflict Sierra Leone, with the aid of the response models of media 
analysis discussed in 4.2 above.  
The perceptions and attitudes of CSOs’ representatives in post-conflict Sierra Leone are gauged 
by ethnographic surveys (group discussions) and the distribution of self-administered 
questionnaires in all four (4) regions of Sierra Leone. Invariably, whereas group discussions are 
a qualitative research tool in communications media (Treadwell, op.cit:167), the distribution of 
the self-administered questionnaires, reflect a component of quantitative analysis (Breakwell, 
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Hammond et. al., op.cit:239). The issues relating to the conduct of the group discussions in all 
the regions of Sierra Leone are established in 5.6 below. And the logistics relating to the 
administration/dissemination of the questionnaires are discussed in 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 below.     
5.1 Framing and Discourse Analyses: Theoretical & Methodological Implications 
The significance of framing and discourse analyses to this study has already been pointed out in 
4.1 above. Their theoretical and methodological frameworks are indeed the basis for this 
study’s analysis (see chapters six, seven and eight). There are a number of theoretical and 
methodological issues about framing and discourse analyses, which one needs to examine here, 
and point to how they have aided the study. Framing, or second-level agenda-setting 
(McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, and Rey, 1997: 131-166; McCombs, 2005: 546), is a central 
concept in communications media effects research, which is still plagued with notable 
controversies (Scheufele, 2000:298). First, there is the rationale to distinguish between the 
theoretical and methodological dimensions of framing. This will help to clarify issues in this 
study that are relevant to framing as a theory, and as a communications research tool; and how 
it would lead to the findings in relation to research questions 1 and 3 (see 1.3 above). 
Theoretically, framing, inter alia, establishes the nexus between media content and response 
theories, and thus mirrors how the media can shape public opinion (de Vreese, op.cit:51). 
Methodologically, framing discerns and interprets the ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ conveyed in 
media contents (Alozie, op.cit: 217; Pan and Kosicki, 2003:57). Thus, the synergy between the 
content and response prism in communications media analysis (see 4.1 and 4.2) evolves from 
the basic assumption that media content is a ‘discourse’ containing a ‘preferred meaning’ 
(Straubhaar & LaRose, 1996:37), which is calculated to bring about a ‘preferred reading’ 
(Gandy, 2001:365) into the minds of audiences. Essentially, an understanding of the interplay 
between the content and response prism in media analysis can unravel the ‘preferred 
meanings’, which the media encoded in its discursive treatments of the heuristics and 
complexities that emerged from the CDF and Taylor trials; and simultaneously guide the 
process of gauging the ‘preferred readings’, which CSOs representatives perceived from the 
coverage. Hence a number of questions germane to the principal thrust of this study can be 
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raised at this stage. What were the ‘preferred meanings’ embedded in the contents, which the 
‘selected media’ published on the CDF and Taylor trials for the period for which this study is 
designed? Did CSOs representatives interpret (read) the said contents in line with the 
‘preferred meanings’ which the ‘selected media’ embedded in their frames? These are 
pertinent questions that will be addressed as the content and discourse analyses unfold in 
chapters six, seven and eight. 
And if there were ‘overt’ or ‘covert’ ethno-regional/political biases in the coverage of the CDF 
and Taylor trials, for example, they can be ‘unearthed’ when a thorough content analysis is 
undertaken with the aid of framing bolstered by discourse analysis and semi-structured 
interviews with the journalists, who covered the said trials. Entman (ibid:52) famously 
conceptualised framing as ‘to select some items of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described’. Entman’s theorisation also dovetailed with what de Vreese (op.cit:52-53) has 
theorised as the ‘broad’, as opposed to the ‘narrow’ theorisation or the ‘reversed information 
phenomenon approach’, which is largely attributed to the seminal work of Kahneman and 
Tversky (Entman,op.cit:54). 
Scheufele (op.cit:309) on the other hand, emphasised the ‘narrow’ theorisation and contended 
that ‘framing influences how audience members think about issues, not by making aspects of 
the issues salient, but by invoking interpretative schemas that influence the interpretation of 
incoming information. In other words, framing is predicated on the assumption that subtle 
changes in the words of the description of a situation might affect how audience members 
interpret that situation. Even though some other theoretical arguments support the use of 
Scheufele’s ‘narrow’ theorisation in framing research (a mere extension of the Kahneman and 
Tversky’s construct), this study adopts the ‘broad’ theorisation because the issues and 
complexities that emerged during the CDF and Taylor trials, cannot be reduced to two identical 
scenarios, based on the ‘wordings of questions’, as Kahneman and Tversky did (Entman, 
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op.cit:54). This raises the second issue about framing theoretical and methodological 
dimensions that is very important to this study.  
The third and fourth issues that are rooted in Entman’s ‘broad’ theorisation, and 
simultaneously relevant to this study, are the two most essential features of framing: ‘selection’ 
and ‘salience’. ‘Selection’ as a characteristic of framing is not unconnected with the ‘news 
selection’ paradigm discussed in 3.1 and 4.1 above. Also, ‘salience’ is the underpinning notion 
of ‘first-level agenda-setting’ (McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, and Rey, op.cit: 131-166; 
McCombs, op.cit: 546) explicated in the same 3.1 and 4.1 above. The interconnectivity between 
‘selection’ and ‘salience’ as framing fundamental attributes is arguably seen in the fact that, 
though journalists purport to be independent and objective in their coverage of issues and 
events, they can shape their outcomes by choosing what to report (news selection) and 
consciously or unconsciously attaching utmost importance (salience, first- level agenda- setting) 
to the selected items as reported (see 3.1 and 4. 1 above).  
This is explained by the simple fact that, the emphasis that is put on certain stories or some 
aspects of some other stories (and the extent to which others are marginalised), coupled with 
the manner in which they are presented, justifies the argument that they are ‘primed’ (Bryant 
and Thompson, op.cit: 77& 82; Entman, 2007: 164-165; Severin and Tankard,op.cit:85 & 88)  in 
such a way as to elicit particular responses from audiences (in this case to shape post-conflict 
opinions in democratic Sierra Leone). Thus, did the ‘selected media’ select (news selection) and 
make salient (agenda-setting) issues and events that promote war crimes jurisprudence at any 
stage or throughout the CDF and Taylor trials? Did they select and make salient issues and 
events relating to the prosecutorial over the non-prosecutorial approach to TJ (vice versa) in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone? Did they select and make salient issues and events that reflect their 
‘ethno-regional/political biases’ in their reportage of the said trials? These questions will be 
addressed, on the basis of empirical findings, in the analysis in chapters six, seven and eight. 
 Essentially, de Vreese’s taxonomy (op.cit:54-55) of ‘issue-specific’ and ‘generic frames’ and his 
‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ methodological frameworks (ibid: 53-54) for frames identifications in 
media dispatches, are also adopted for purposes of this study. Hence, they constitute the fifth 
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and sixth issues about framing theoretical and methodological dimensions that aided this study. 
Thus, frames that are particularly relevant to specific issues and events are characterised as 
‘issue-specific frames’; and those that resonate with different topics across time and space are 
dubbed ‘generic frames’. The ‘inductive approach’ frowns at analysing media dispatches with a 
priori defined frames in mind. The frames could emerge from the material during the course of 
analysis, but the ‘deductive methodological framework’ investigates frames that are defined 
and operationalised prior to the investigation (de Vreese, op.cit:53-54). The following 
paragraph thus contains the reason for the adoption of the ‘generic frames’ taxonomy as 
opposed to that of the ‘issue-specific’ frames. 
The seemingly universal efforts to propagate (through the international and intra-national 
media) the legal ideals of ‘individual criminal responsibility’ and ‘universal jurisdiction’ in 
relation to the conduct of war crimes trials are calculated to end impunity and uphold the rule 
of law on a global scale. These ‘generic issues’ in the contemporary World are not restricted to 
the Sierra Leonean context. Therefore, adopting the ‘issue-specific frames taxonomy’ in 
analysing media coverage of the proceedings of an international tribunal, whose dynamics 
transcend the cultural specificities of Sierra Leone will surely be guilty of a naive media 
miscalculation, and war crimes jurisprudence for that matter; hence the need for the adoption 
of the ‘generic frames typology’ in this study. 
Iyengar’s ‘broad’ theorisation of frames into ‘episodic’ (1991: 136-137, 2011:273-289) (the 
presentation of issues and events as they are, without any background information about the 
reason for their occurrences, how they can be addressed and how responsibilities for such 
occurrences can be accordingly attributed) and ‘thematic’ (the presentation of issues and 
events in a clear contextual manner), can aid the clarity of the discourses and analyses on 
‘generic frames’. This can also be clearly seen in the succeeding paragraph.  Apparently, the 
media’s external environment and the internal dynamics of news organisations, almost always 
make it implausible for them to thoroughly contextualise their reportage, giving it the 
background, depth and requisite information, which audiences can rely on in forming their 
opinions and judgments about issues of national and international importance. 
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Thus, it appears that the brand of sensational journalism (one that hardly upholds ethical 
standards), being practised in Sierra Leone has made it somewhat difficult for journalists to 
embark on thorough ‘thematic’ reporting. It appears that their coverage of national and even 
international issues and events is characterised by ‘episodic’ reportage. If this is so, did it reflect 
in their coverage of particularly the CDF and Taylor trials? Answer(s) to such a pertinent 
question will be addressed in the analysis in chapters six, seven and eight.  Regarding the 
methodological approaches for ‘frames identification’ (the sixth issue), both the ‘inductive’ and 
‘deductive’ methods have been adopted for this study. However, the use of the latter is 
predicated on the weaknesses of the former. That is, the former is intellectually scorned as it 
relies on too small a sample and the difficulty of it being replicated across time and space, but 
the latter can clearly be replicated in cross-cultural studies (de Vreese, ibid: 53-55). 
The ‘inductive approach’ was adopted to do the initial dipstick study which was an analysis of 
the coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials, undertaken between 2011 and 2012, without any a 
priori defined frames in mind, for the purposes of my RS4 Transfer Report. Notwithstanding its 
shortcomings, it has provided a solid foundation and evidence for the use of the ‘deductive 
approach’, which is the methodological base of this study.  After the dipstick analysis, I 
identified and developed a number of frames, which constituted the frameworks through which 
the agenda of the ‘selected media’ in relation to the trials can be referenced. The frames were 
developed in consonance with Cappella and Jamieson’s (1997:47& 89) criteria of media frames- 
‘a news frame must have identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics; it should be 
commonly observable in journalistic practice; it must be possible to distinguish the frame 
reliably from other frames; and it must have representational validity’. 
 A number of conceptual devices have been developed to guide researchers in discerning 
frames when working with either the ‘inductive’ or ‘deductive’ approaches. McQuail (op.cit: 
343-344) considers ‘the use of certain words or phrases, contextual references, pictures or 
films, and sources’. Entman (op.cit: 52) alludes to ‘the presence or absence of certain key 
words, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide 
thematically reinforcing clusters of facts and judgments’. Tankard (2001:101) emphasises the 
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importance of ‘headlines, subheads, photos, photos caption, leads, source selection, quotes 
selection, pull quotes, logos, statistics and charts , including statements and paragraphs’. Thus, I 
adopted the said conceptual framing devices in both the initial ‘dipstick study’ and the 
‘substantive analysis’ (see chapters six, seven and eight), when identifying and developing the 
frames that emerged from the content analysis. 
Perhaps the most controversial question that is central in the framing literature, which is quite 
useful to this research (the seventh issue), revolves around the very factors that mostly 
influence the framing attitudes of journalists. This question supposedly strikes a chord among 
the ‘news selection’ models discussed in 4.1 above. Meanwhile, relying on Allan and Zelizer 
(2004), Herman and Chomsky (1988), Carruthurs (2000, 2004), McLaughlin (2002) and Keeble 
(2009), Shaw (2009:39) affirms that ‘national identity’, ‘political economy’ and ‘cultural 
subjectivities’, are the main factors that largely influence the framing attitudes of journalists in 
their reportage of conflicts and draws  sharp parallels between ‘framing’ and ‘cultural biases’; 
validating particularly the Galtung and Ruge, Bell and Hall’s models of news worthiness 
mentioned in 4.1 above. 
Entman’s characterization (2007 op.cit:163-166)  of framing, agenda- setting and priming, 
under the integrating conception of ‘bias’, as a methodological framework, inter alia, justifies 
the validity of ‘bias’ as a conceptual tool for future research and also answers the question 
about the factors that mostly influence the framing attitudes of journalists in covering issues 
and events. His conceptual criteria for ‘bias’ are seen in the argument that: 
...the pattern of news slant must skew persistently across time, message dimensions, 
and media outlets in favour of one side of the political debate. Therefore, content 
analysis should be informed by explicit theory linking patterns of framing in the media 
text to predictable priming and agenda setting effects on audiences; hence when 
unmoored by such underlying theory, measures and conclusions of media bias are 
suspect (Entman, ibid:163). 
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 Several important questions of note would emerge from this study that could be answered 
with the aid of the said methodological framework. For example, did the patterns of ‘news 
slant’ of the ‘selected media’ in covering the trials (CDF and Taylor) ‘skew persistently’ in favour 
of the defendants or the prosecution for the period for which this study is designed? Can traces 
of ‘ethno-regional/political biases’ be discerned in the ‘news slant’ of any or all of the ‘selected 
media’ that covered the trials? Did that also reflect in the ‘message dimensions’ (editorials, 
commentaries, articles and highly opinionated pieces) of any of the ‘selected media’ during 
both or either of the trials?  
My discourse analysis can augment the study of the framing of the  two trials, by pointing to 
how the ‘language’ (as used in the identifiable frames analysed in chapters six, seven and eight) 
was instrumental in constructing mainstream discourses about the trials, as  projected by the 
‘selected media’ and to challenge such discourses through deconstruction (Mautner, ibid: 
33).This can be done by identifying patterns in the choice of words as embedded in the 
numerous publications of the ‘selected media’ for the period for which the research is 
designed. Words can have ‘unequivocally negative (or positive) semantic load’, depending on 
how they are used in sentences (Mautner, ibid: 38). ‘Figures’ (numbers) are also important in 
discourse analysis because of the ‘rhetorical effects’ which they can have in the interpretation 
of the contents within the frames (ibid: 38-39). Thus, these are all important discourse 
indicators that aided the deconstruction of the meanings embedded in the texts. 
5.2 The Sample Frame and Size for the Content Analysis 
The three newspapers chosen for this – For Di People, Standard Times and Awoko – (sample 
size) have been chosen from Sierra Leone’s print media landscape (sample frame) for three 
main reasons, namely: (1) they are the highest circulation papers in Sierra Leone, (2) they have 
the most influence on ‘informed opinion’, (Foundation Hirondelle, 2008; IMC’s 2010 Report) 
and (3) between them, it appears that they devoted the most coverage to the trials.25 
 
                                                          
25
Interview with Peter Anderson, SCSL Information Officer on the 26th July 2011. 
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5.3 The Selected Media 
This section briefly examines the ideologies of the selected media. This background information 
may guide the analysis on whether the ethno-regional and political orientations and inclinations 
of the owners of the papers and/or their reporters (see 4.1 for the critics’ analysis of news), are 
reflected in the coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials. I will hereafter deal with the papers in the 
order of years of commencement of publication. 
5.3.1 For Di People (FDP) 
FDP was inaugurated in 1984 during the one-party oligarchy of the APC. The paper sustained 
highly critical debates on national issues and dissenting views against the APC, until it was 
deposed by the NPRC. The paper’s proprietor and editor, Paul Kamara, was a staunch critic of 
the NPRC junta, but the junta subsequently made him a Minister of Lands, before it 
relinquished power in 1996. During the new democratic dispensation, the paper described itself 
as a true defender of multi-party democracy, justice and human rights (see the paper’s motto). 
And it was one of the leading pro-democracy newspapers that opposed the AFRC junta when it 
seized power from the SLPP in 1997.  
The paper’s uncompromising stance against militarism and its unrelenting quest for democracy 
fetched its editor three international accolades in journalism and human rights between 1997 
and 2002; to wit, the International Press Directory Freedom of the Press Golden Award (1997), 
the International Editor of the Year Award (1998) and the Northcote Parkinson Fund for Civil 
Courage Award (2002)26. The paper became critical of the SLPP under the Kabbah 
administration. It published some unsubstantiated stories that were highly critical of the SLPP 
and some of its high-profile functionaries. The following publications could account for this: 
1. ’Kabbah Drags Salone Mandela before Media Court’ (Wednesday 5th May, 2004) 
2. ‘Kabbah Strikes Paul Kamara’ (Wednesday 12th May, 2004) 
3. ‘Kabbah and the 1967 Cocoa Deal’ (1st,6th,7th, 8th, 9th October, 2003) 
4. ‘Between Constitutionality and a Convict President (ibid) 
                                                          
26
Interview with Paul Kamara, Thursday, December 13, 2012 
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5. ‘Kabbah is deceitful and unappreciative of those who fought for his restoration’ (Tuesday 
18th March, 2003). 
Paul Kamara was indicted and jailed, pursuant to sections 26 and 27 of the Public Order Act, 
No.46 of 1965, for knowingly and maliciously publishing defamatory articles, calling former 
President Kabbah, a  ‘true convict’ and a ‘government functionary who was unfit to hold public 
office, because of his notoriously corrupt tendencies’ (For Di People, ibid). He spent six months 
in jail and was released when the Court of Appeal quashed his conviction. The Court of Appeal 
held that the Trial Judge (Justice A.B. Rashid) misdirected himself and erred in law and facts in 
reaching at the conclusion that led to his conviction (see Court of Appeals judgment in the case 
of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah v Paul Kamara). He was later convicted of the same offences when he 
libeled the Honourable Justice Tolla Thompson of Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court, calling him ‘a 
corrupt’ (FDP, Wednesday, 26th May, 2004) and ‘biased judge’ (FDP, Wednesday, 26th May, 
2004), ‘who had squandered thousands of U.S dollars, meant for football development in Sierra 
Leone’ (see the case of Justice Tolla Thompson v Paul Kamara). 
He served his sentence and his physical possessions were also confiscated and sold to meet the 
cost and damages, which the Court awarded Justice Tolla Thompson, under the Defamation 
Act, No.32 of 1961, which deals with the civil aspect of defamation (see the short title of the 
statute). Paul Kamara (a Northerner and Themne) alongside other Northern journalists 
(Mohammed Gibril Sesay, Abu Bakarr Turay, Su Thoronka, Oumar Farouk Sesay and Ibrahim 
Sorie Sesay), consistently covered the CDF and Charles Taylor trials. Jia Kangbai (a Southerner) 
and Tatafway Tumoe (an Easterner) were also Kamara’s staff writers that paid greater attention 
to particularly the CDF trial. Even though Kamara is now a minister, he still controls the paper’s 
editorial policy.  
5.3.2 Standard Times (ST) 
ST hit the newsstands on June 6, 1994. Its Managing Editor and Proprietor, Philip Neville, is 
winner of the International Journalist Award in 1999, a Westerner and a Creole, and owner of 
the Media One Centre, but the paper’s longest serving editors, Ibrahim Karim-Sie and Augustine 
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Beecher (now deceased), are South-Easterners. Also, most of the paper’s journalists 
(Theophilus Gbenda, Mohamed Abu aka Amadi Abadi, Joseph Fomolo, Mohamed Issa, Abdul 
Kposowa and Kamour Ndullu) that extensively covered the CDF trial were South-Easterners. The 
paper began its operations during the dark days of the NPRC. The paper’s motto is ‘Forward 
with Times’. ST was one of the first newspapers to demonstrate its uncompromising stance 
against the AFRC/RUF junta. ST became a target when the junta invaded Freetown on January 
6, 1999. The paper’s News Editor, Paul Abu Mansaray, alongside his four children, were brutally 
murdered in a church. 
Mustapha Sesay, a Senior Staff Writer and one time SLAJ Secretary- General, had his left eye 
gouged out. Philip Neville’s house and vehicles were set ablaze and Karim-Sie’s daughter was 
kidnapped and was never seen again27. Notwithstanding the paper’s irreparable loss and 
misfortunes during the war years, it served as a conduit for the agitation of a peaceful 
negotiated settlement of the conflict. Even after the signing of the LPA, the paper monitored 
the operations of both the TRC and the SCSL, and commented on the pieces of evidence, which 
emerged from the trials. Virtually all the South-Eastern journalists (mentioned above) left the 
paper shortly before the conduct of the 2007 elections. The paper’s pre-2007 elections 
publications and those that came out between the inter-electoral periods of 2007 and 2012 
seemed to have contained nuances that skewed towards the APC. 
5.3.3 Awoko 
Awoko hit the newsstands in August, 1998, shortly after the restoration of the SLPP. It prides 
itself on the philosophy of ‘service to the people’; a philosophy that simultaneously defends the 
ideals of democracy and mirrors government’s attention to the wishes and aspirations of the 
people of Sierra Leone28. The paper started-off its operations as a partnership that had Kelvin 
Lewis {former Radio France International (RFI) and Voice of America (VOA) correspondent} as 
Editor and Lead Partner, Joseph Rahall as Financial Manager and Co-partner, and David Tam-
Bayor as Assistant Editor and Co-partner (Interview, ibid). 
                                                          
27
 Interview with Philip Neville, 7
th
 August, 2013 
28
 Interview with Kelvin Lewis, Wednesday, December 12, 2012 
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The paper went through a lean phase, but its turning point came with its coverage of the 
execution of twenty-four (24) AFRC junta soldiers, on 24th October, 1998, convicted of treason 
against the SLPP Government. Since then, Awoko has been one of the leading newspapers in 
the country (see 5.2).  It has won many IMC’s awards for professional and fair reportage 
(Interview, ibid). Awoko was also instrumental in sustaining the debates about the transitional 
justice issues that permeated the intellectual climate of post-conflict Sierra Leone; devoting 
considerable time, space, and resources in the coverage of all the trials of the SCSL.  Both Kelvin 
Lewis and Betty Milton (a staff writer) were consistent in covering the proceedings of the SCSL.  
5.4 Approaching the Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a multidimensional-sociological research method that critically evaluates 
human communication to unravel its manifest meaning (McIntyre, op.cit:87, Berelson, 
op.cit:201). The method’s flexibility is evident in the fact that it can be adopted in studies of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. Hence, as mentioned in 5.1 above, this study invokes 
content analysis as a tool of qualitative and quantitative research. Generically, the content 
models of media analysis discussed in 4.1 above (though qualitative) are a form of content 
analysis models, because they are principally invoked in the study of media contents 
(Treadwell, op.cit:177) that are intertwined with two war crimes trials. 
 However, in communications research, ‘content analysis implies a quantitative approach and 
series of specific steps aimed at ensuring systematic sampling, coding and counting of media 
content’ (Treadwell, ibid:177). The content analysis spans over five years, making it somewhat 
difficult to present the entire picture of media coverage of the trials. Relying on the 
generalisation that communication research observations are inevitably ‘selective’ and 
‘incomplete’ (Treadwell, op.cit:7), I have thought it imperative to devise a random sampling 
method focusing on media coverage of the pre-trial, trial and post-trial phases of the CDF 
leaders and President Taylor. 
 I have selected at least nine months period of the reportage of the ‘selected media’ during 
each phase and subjected them to a thorough content analysis (qualitative and quantitative), 
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establishing the frames employed, the discourse used and the pattern of coverage of the 
proceedings of the SCSL, to answer the questions how ‘the selected media’ represented the 
CDF and Taylor trials. The timeframe of this study conforms to Mautner’s prescription for 
analysing a court trial by using time as a criterion for identifying and describing ‘discursive 
representations’ (Mautner, op.cit:37). Essentially, the frames employed and the discourses 
used by the above newspapers in reporting the trials should give an indication of whether there 
were visible convergences and/or divergences in their coverage.   
 Invariably, the framing and discourse analysis are entirely qualitative. However, quantitatively, 
media coverage of the trials have been classified (coded) into ‘news’, ‘views’, and ‘unclassified 
stories’. ‘News’ presupposes the journalists’ position of what news is as explicated in 4.1 above. 
‘Views’ are grouped as editorials, opinions, commentaries and articles on the issues that 
emerged from the trials. ‘Unclassified stories’ can neither be factored into the news taxonomy 
nor can they be said to be views in their entirety; hence they are neither news nor views. This 
classification should reveal the extent (if at all) to which journalists attempted to separate their 
‘views’ from ‘news’ of the trials, and the degree to which they strove to uphold the idealised 
norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’.  
This dialectic is important and central to this study, because the media in Sierra Leone has been 
attacked as highly partisan (biased) and unreliable (M’bayoh et.al 2000: 124, Lincoln 2008: 14, 
Gutierrez, 2012:5-6), unprofessional and incapable of upholding ethical standards (IMC’s 
Annual Reports 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011; Zack-Williams op.cit:75). Thus, the analysis 
should attempt to prove or disprove the media’s critics’ (referenced above) allegations that 
media coverage of national issues in Sierra Leone is largely, or purely, characterised by ethno- 
regional/political partiality. To identify the frames employed and the discourses used in the 
numerous publications of the ‘selected media’ for the period under investigation, I examined 
every page of the three newspapers and singled-out all the stories on the CDF and Taylor trials, 
discarding those that fall out of the timeframe and phases of the study, and subjecting those 
relevant to critical evaluation and analysis. Since qualitative analysis calls for sequential and 
multiple readings of texts (Alozie, op.cit:215), I devised an approach of quadruple readings of 
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the selected publications.  The first two readings were quite generic and calculated to discern 
the main issues in the stories, whilst making descriptive notes on their contents. The third 
reading was more focused and attentive. I identified a number of thematic issues that formed 
the frameworks of the fourth and final reading, which was based on a critical analysis of the 
‘discernible messages’ embedded in the publications, pointing to how the ‘selected media’ 
represented the CDF and Taylor trials; the golden thread that runs through research questions 1 
and 3.  
Bearing in mind that the procedures of any content analysis research should be explicit, precise, 
and replicable to enable  other researchers  verify the results of the findings, I adopt 
Treadwell’s (op.cit:179-180) seven steps of a typical content analysis: 
1. Develop research questions about communications contents (research questions 1 and 3). 
 
2. Define the content to be analysed (‘News’, ‘Views’ and ‘Unclassified stories’). 
 
3. Sample the universe of the contents (the total reportage of the ‘selected media’ for the 
period for which the research is designed). 
 
4.  Select units for coding (the units for coding are referenced as ‘N’, ‘V’ and ‘US’, 
representing ‘News’, ‘Views’, and ‘Unclassified Stories’, respectively). 
 
5. Develop a coding scheme (the coding scheme is developed by representing the coded 
units alongside the timeframes of the study in tabular and graphical forms). 
6.  Assign each occurrence of a unit in the sample to a code in the coding scheme (the 
frequency of each of the coded units (‘N’, ‘V’ and ‘US’) in the sample as factored into the 
tables and graphs). 
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7. Count the occurrences of the coded units and report their frequencies (the total 
frequencies of the coded units in the corresponding timeframe of the reportage, as 
depicted in the figures in chapters six and seven). 
5.5 The Structure and Contents of the Semi-Structured Interviews  
In 5.1 above, the theoretical underpinnings of the factors that mostly influenced the framing 
attitudes of journalists were discussed. Arguably, those factors cannot be incontestably 
established by even the most critical content analysis of the CDF and Taylor trials. Thus, textual 
interpretations (content and discourse analyses for example) can hardly exactly establish the 
factors that may have influenced the framings of any issues and events. 
‘...an analyst’s interpretation of a text is only one probable understanding from a critic’s 
subjective position, no matter how multiperspective, and may not necessarily be the 
assessment the audience prefers or the one offered by others’(Alozie, op. cit:215) 
 On this issue, it can be contended that the factors that influenced the framings of the trials can 
best be discovered when the findings from the content/discourse analyses are triangulated 
with those of the semi-structured interviews conducted with the owners, editors and 
journalists of the ‘selected media’ (Boyd, 1991), who actually covered the trials. This will give a 
clear picture of how the ‘selected media’ represented the CDF and Taylor trials; and what the 
journalists who covered the trials said, really influenced their framings of the issues and events, 
that characterised their reportage for the period being studied. 
 Some of the journalists of the ‘selected media’ that covered the CDF trial in particular 
(between 2003 and 2008) are no longer working in the print media. Some have died (the then 
News Editor of Standard Times, Augustine Beecher, being the notable one). And others have 
travelled out of Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, eight (8) journalists: Paul 
Kamara (Proprietor and Editor-in-Chief), SU Thoronka (War Crimes Correspondent) and Ibrahim 
Sesay (News Editor) of For Di People; Ibrahim Karim-Sei (Editor-in-Chief), Theophilus Gbenda 
(War Crimes Correspondent), and Mohammed Abu - a.k.a Amadi Abadi (Senior Staff Writer) of 
Standard Times; Kelvin Lewis (Editor-in-Chief) and Betty Milton (War Crimes Reporter) of 
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Awoko; between 2013 and 2014 consented to the semi-structured interviews conducted in 
Freetown. Thus, in keeping with recognised academic research ethics (Treadwell, op.cit: 39-40), 
I had the informed consent of all the participants in both the interviews and the group 
discussions (see 5.6). As a Sierra Leonean who has lived in the country his entire life and a 
Themne from the North (Port Loko), of course I have my own personal experiences of the civil 
war. But I have approached this research in the spirit of independent academic inquiry and 
striven for ‘objectivity’ at all times.  
5.6. Ethnographic Surveys: The Group Discussions 
Essentially, the content analysis is not being invoked to gauge media impact of the trials on 
CSOs representatives; it rather aims at analysing how the ‘selected media’ represented both 
trials. However, the ‘message’ which they (CSOs representatives) took from the coverage 
depended on how they perceived the trials as represented/reported by the ‘selected media’; 
hence the need for the conduct of the series of group discussions with CSOs’ representatives 
across Sierra Leone. Thus, the thematic issues and questions that formed the basis for the 
‘group discussions’ are those that emerged from both the qualitative and quantitative 
components of the content analysis. Therefore, the appropriate methodological frameworks 
which have been adopted to intellectually discern research questions 2, 4 and 5 are a series of 
group discussions conducted across Sierra Leone, bolstered by the distribution of self-
administered questionnaires in every region of the country.   
Four group discussions were organised for CSOs representatives in the North, South, East  and 
the Western Area of the Republic of Sierra Leone, between January and February, 2012, on 
their perceptions of media coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials in particular; and what 
influence has media coverage had on attitudes towards post-conflict justice in Sierra Leone in 
general. The discussions were held in Kenema, Bo, Makeni (the Provincial Headquarters) and 
Freetown. The discussants who (included youths, women, development workers, health NGOs 
etc.) represented all twelve Districts in Sierra Leone and the Western Area, were selected after 
consultations with the President of the Coalition for Civil Society and Human Rights Activists in 
Sierra Leone, Mr. Charles Mambu. Each group consisted of either ten (10) or eleven (11) CSOs’ 
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representatives and they were asked to respond to a set of twelve (12) questions (listed in the 
appendix v). 
5.7 The Content and Structure of the Questionnaires 
Even though the group discussions were conducted with research question 5 (see 1.3 above) in 
mind, it became crystal clear that it would not be empirically expedient to generalise from too 
small a sample; hence the need to further administer questionnaires to gauge the influence 
which media coverage has had on attitudes towards post-conflict justice in Sierra Leone. A 
simple questionnaire containing twenty-two (22) unambiguous questions; with provisions for 
age, sex, occupational and regional distributions (see appendix iv) was drawn up and pre-tested 
to forty (40) respondents in the Western Area, before being administered across the country.  
The response rate to the pre-tested questionnaires was good. One was able to receive thirty-
one (31) of the forty (40) copies issued out. The responses elicited were satisfactory, and it is 
evidently clear that the respondents understood the issues about TJ that were raised in the 
questionnaires, for which their genuine and unbiased opinions were solicited. And the need to 
readjust the contents of the questionnaire did not arise. This strong conviction finally 
precipitated the need to develop a manageable and representational sample size, reflecting the 
Western Area and the Provinces, for purposes of this study. 
 
5.8 The Sample Frame and Sample Size 
This study principally focuses on what effects media coverage had on CSOs’ representatives’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards post-conflict justice in Sierra Leone. A manageable and 
representational sample size of four hundred (400) inhabitants from the Western Area and the 
Provinces is designed for this study. One hundred (100) questionnaires were administered in 
each of the Provinces mentioned in 5.6 above. The remaining one hundred (100) were reserved 
for administration in the Western Area. This gives the research a national focus, devoid of 
regional prejudices, as the same number of questionnaires (100) was administered in every 
region of Sierra Leone, irrespective of the size and population, or number of Districts and 
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Chiefdoms of any region in Sierra Leone. The research’s national posture should challenge 
notions of regional imbalance in either the administration of the questionnaires, or the conduct 
of the group discussions. And the administration of four hundred (400) questionnaires 
nationally to elicit the views of Sierra Leoneans on the subject of this study can reasonably 
challenge notions of drawing conclusions and making generalisations from too small a sample.  
5.9 The Data Collection Procedures  
Constrained by time and limited financial resources, I could not recruit any paid research 
assistant to administer the questionnaires throughout Sierra Leone. I personally facilitated the 
process of distributing the self-administered questionnaires to all the targeted respondents 
(with some meaningful assistance from some colleagues) across the country. Unlike the group 
discussions, which only targeted representatives from registered CSOs that constitute the 
Coalition for Civil Society and Human Rights Activists in Sierra Leone, the questionnaires were 
randomly distributed to journalists, lawyers, students, NGO workers, teachers, health workers, 
civil/public servants, commercial workers etc. across Sierra Leone. 
The distribution of the questionnaires took place in the four regions between 22nd May and 
June 9th, 2013. Seventy-eight out of 100 questionnaires were completed in the Western Area. In 
the South (Bo), the response rate was lower – 50 out of 100 completed. In the North (Makeni), 
81 out of 100 questionnaires were completed and returned. And, finally, in the Eastern region 
(Kenema), we collected sixty-five (65) copies of the one hundred questionnaires we had 
distributed. The responses were triangulated with the interview and focus group material 
presented in chapters six and seven to establish whether or not there were convergences or 
divergences in the views of the ‘elites’ and those of the ‘grass-roots’ about the media’s impacts 
on the TJ process in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
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Chapter Six 
Data Presentation and Analysis of the CDF Trial 
6.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I analysed the study’s methodological frameworks. In this chapter, I 
shall critically evaluate the findings from the media’s coverage of the CDF trial, in the order in 
which the research questions are answered. The first part of this chapter covers the 
background to the content analysis. The content analysis, which is theoretically and 
methodologically informed by framing, is bolstered by discourse analysis. Meanwhile, whereas 
the first part of the content analysis, deals with the qualitative dimension; the second part 
mirrors the quantitative aspect. 
The findings from the semi-structured interviews with journalists and those of the content and 
discourse analyses reflect ‘how the selected media represented the CDF trial’ (see research 
question 1). Further, the second part of the chapter, entails the findings from the group 
discussions (conducted throughout Sierra Leone) to gauge CSOs’ representatives’ perceptions 
about media coverage of the trial’ (see research question 2). Moreover, the third part, 
constitutes the triangulated results of the content and discourse analyses and interviews (the 
content dimension) and those of the group discussions (the response dimension) to come up 
with new empirical judgments about the media’s impacts on  elites’ opinions, regarding post-
conflict justice in Sierra Leone.  
6.1 Background to the Content Analysis  
The CDF which constituted different ethno-regional militias was never put on trial.29 Rather, it 
was only three of its high profiled members from the Kamajors society (Chief Norman, Alieu 
Kondowai and Moinina Fofana), who were indicted on eight (8) counts of crimes against 
humanity, war crimes30 and other serious violations of IHL; pursuant to Article 6 (1) and 
alternatively, Article 6 (3) of the Statute.31 The specific offences for which they were indicted 
                                                          
29
See the Prosecutor v AlieuKondowai and Moinina Fofana-Case No.SCSL-04-14; hereinafter refer to as the CDF Trial Chamber Judgment, 2007. 
30
That is violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. 
31
Thus, whereas Article 6 (1) deals with the crime of individual criminal responsibility of the indictees as aiders and abettors, planners and 
instigators in a joint criminal enterprise; Article 6 (3) covers the offence of superior and command responsibility in a joint criminal enterprise. 
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were unlawful killings, violence to life, health or physical or mental wellbeing of persons,32 
pillage, acts of terrorism, collective punishments and conscripting children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or groups (Ibid: 1-11). 
The trio (Norman, Fofana and Kondowai) were said to be the Trinity of the CDF (op.cit:108-111; 
Albert J. Nallo, 11 March 2005:23-24, Transcript). Norman,33who was the National Coordinator, 
was ‘god the father’. Fofana34 doubled as ‘god the son’ and Director of War, and Kondowai35 
served as ‘god the holy spirit’ (Albert Nallo, bid: 24). Norman was taken into custody on March 
10, 2003, at an isolated prison in Bonthe Island, where he made his plea of not guilty, on March 
15, 2003. Fofana and Kondowai also pleaded not guilty on July 1, 2003, and were also held in 
custody at the same location (Creamer, 2008:2). Their trial which commenced on June 3, 2004 
36 and ended on November 30, 2006, spanned up to eight (8) sessions covering 162 days (Annex 
F: CDF Trial Chamber Judgment, 2007:F7).  
Between June 3, 2004 and July 14, 2005, seventy-three (73) witnesses testified for the 
prosecution, but forty-four (44) witnesses, including Peter Penfold,37 Paul Richards,38 and Dr. 
Albert Joe Demby,39 testified for the defence between January 20, 2006 and October 18, 2006 
(Ibid: F7). Unlike Fofana and Kondowai, who never testified in their own defence, Norman who 
did, fell ill after the trial, and died in a military hospital in Dakar, before judgment was 
pronounced. The Trial Chamber I then dropped all the charges against him (see Appendix 
III101).40 Fofana and Kondowai were convicted on July 20, 2007 by a majority decision of Justices 
Benjamin Mutanga Itoe and Pierre Boutet. Fofana was convicted of violence to life, health and 
physical or mental wellbeing of persons (count 2), cruel treatment (count 4), pillage (count 5), 
and collective punishment (count 7); and vindicated of murder (count 1), inhuman acts (count 
3), acts of terrorism (count 6) and conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years 
                                                          
32
Including looting and burning. 
33
The first accused. 
34
The second accused. 
35
The third accused. 
36
After Norman had been in detention for over a year; and Fofana and Kondowai for almost a year 
37
The then British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone 
38
A General in the British Army 
39
Sierra Leone’s former Vice President. 
40
CDF Trial Chamber Judgment, ibid: 1. 
 100 
 
into armed forces or groups or using them to actively participate in hostilities (count 8). 
Kondowai was also convicted and exonerated of the same offences for which Fofana was found 
guilty and those for which he was vindicated; save for count eight,41 which increased his 
conviction by one count. The Judges ordered that their sentences were to be served 
concurrently (Ibid: 290). In effect, Fofana was going to be in prison for six (6) years and 
Kondowai was to serve for eight (8) years (Ibid: 290-292), but the Appeals Chambers increased 
their punishments to fifteen (15) and twenty (20) years respectively, and such punishments are 
being served concurrently, commencing on the day both men were taken into custody. 
6.2 Content Analysis: The Qualitative Dimension 
The papers’ coverage of the pre-trial, trial and post-trial phases, are divided into five frames, 
through which their agenda can be referenced (see 5.1), along with a number of sub-frames. 
The five generic frames that evolved from the papers’ coverage are:  
1. The Rebel War and its Controversies 
2. President Kabbah’s Role in the Conflict 
3. Territorial Integrity/Sovereignty and the Defence of Democracy/ the SLPP Government 
4. The Resurgence of War Crimes Jurisprudence versus Political Expediency 
5. The Reconciliation- Prosecution Debate 
I shall sequentially deal with the frames and the discourses in which they are packaged as they 
are presented above. For ease of referencing, I shall henceforth adopt the acronyms FDP and ST 
for ‘For Di People’ and ‘Standard Times’, respectively, but ‘Awoko’ shall be fully referenced in 
its own name. 
6.2.1 The Rebel War and Its Controversies 
The papers reflected the country’s rebel war and its consequences for national cohesion and 
development (see Appendix III30, 146, 153, 317). The recurring themes in the coverage are: ‘The 
Rebel war’, ‘The CDF (Kamajors) Phenomenon’, ‘The Kamajors-Army Debacle’, and ‘The North-
South Divide. Thus, it appears that the papers presented the recurring themes with clear 
nuances, reflecting their news selection, framing, agenda-setting and priming orientations and 
                                                          
41
Conscripting children under the age of 15 into armed forces or group 
 101 
 
inclinations (see 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1). I will now proceed to analyse the controversial issues that 
characterised each of the sub-frames to establish whether there were visible convergences and 
divergences in the coverage (see 5.4). 
The Rebel War 
 The papers reflected different issues that caused and fuelled the war, but they clearly 
emphasised the erosion of democratic ideals in the country’s body-politic as the war’s principal 
causal factor (see Appendix III32, 146, 290). However, whilst FDP and Awoko made the issues of 
corruption and poor governance salient (see Appendix III33, 152, 186); ST made the issues of gross 
human rights violations and external intervention quite prominent (see Appendix III310, 348). ST 
(see Appendix III282, 309,) further attributed the causes of the war to the one-party dictatorship 
of the APC between 1968 and 1992.42 However, the papers reflected how the RUF’s rebellion 
hindered Sierra Leone’s socio-economic and political developments. They also captured 
President Taylor’s involvement in the war; his affiliation with the RUF; the RUF’s connection 
with Libya’s Colonel Muammah Al Quaddafi; and the pampering it received from Blaise 
Campoure of Burkina Faso (see Appendix III32, 146, 290). Even the involvement of ‘mercenary 
outfits’ and other ‘criminal enterprises’ in the war; leading to illicit mining and exportations of 
Sierra Leone’s diamonds to Liberia and other places  (see Appendix III195, 196); and how the war 
heightened the politics of ethno-regionalism, were also made salient in the coverage (see 
Appendix III42, 43, 147, 156). 
 The papers further captured the NPRC’s intervention into Sierra Leone’s politics; its misguided 
strategy of recruiting illiterates and thugs into the national army; and the emergence of ‘ethno-
regional militias’ in defence of their respective regions (see Appendix III146, 203). The 
‘controversial’ 1996 Parliamentary and Presidential elections that brought back the SLPP to 
power, after twenty-four years (24) in the political wilderness; and how the RUF, NPRC junta 
and the army, berated the conduct of the elections, also came out vividly in the other recurring 
themes of the coverage (see Appendix III186, 189). Even though the papers’ initial analyses of the 
war and the discourses that informed the political debate arguably chimed with the intellectual 
                                                          
42
Under the leadership of Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh 
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climate of Sierra Leone, there were other salient issues, which they did not contextualise. This is 
in line with the framing paradigm, which emphasises not only that which is reported, but that 
which ought to have been reported (Entman, op.cit: 52-54, 164). 
ST for example, represented that between 1968 and 1992, Sierra Leone’s one-party dictatorship 
was highly dominated by the Northern APC oligarchy (see Appendix III282, 309), but it did not 
mention that the NPRC junta, which toppled the APC, was dominated by South-Eastern junior 
military officers and SLPP stalwarts (see Appendix III168). Again, FDP (see Appendix III168, 255) 
enunciated the nexus between the NPRC and the SLPP, pointing to the role which Ahmed Tejan 
Kabbah (President) and Solomon Berewa (Vice President) played in the NPRC’s Advisory 
Council, but neither ST nor Awoko commented on these issues. Further, it was only FDP (ibid) 
that highlighted the fact that the NPRC junta seemingly predicated its despotic rule on bringing 
the war to an end and restoring democracy to Sierra Leone. The paper thus criticised the NPRC 
for failing on all its objectives, but neither ST nor Awoko reported this. However, it appears that 
FDP’s analysis on these issues reflected what is in the existing literature (Bundu, op.cit:59, 
Gberie, op.cit:70-72; Hirsch, op.cit:35; Musah and Fayemi, op.cit:86; Francis, op.cit:109-110; 
Zack-Williams, op.cit:22, Berewa, op.cit: 116). 
Some of the issues germane to this sub-frame that were only mentioned, but not well 
articulated by any of the papers, are the facts that the NPRC, in an attempt to halt the rebel 
advances, increased the strength of the national army from about 8,000 to 14,000 by recruiting 
‘children’ and even ‘criminals’ (Musah and Fayemi, 2000:86; Gberie, op.cit:76-77); a strategy 
that undermined state security; leading to the ‘so-bels’ (soldiers turned rebels) phenomenon. 
However, there were convergences in the papers’ dispatches on the ‘so-bels’ phenomenon (see 
Appendix III9, 10, 156, 157, 306). The papers recounted the ‘collusion’ between the RUF and some 
sections of the army in making the country ungovernable. Both ST and Awoko (ibid) reflected 
the affairs of ‘the criminal enterprise’ of the army and the RUF that took active parts in the 
killings and mutilations of civilians, illicit mining and smuggling of the country’s alluvial 
diamonds. FDP (see Appendix III156) also mentioned how the emergence of the ‘so-bels’ 
phenomenon and its criminality, led to the continuity of the war at the expense of national 
development and state security. 
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The CDF (Kamajors) Phenomenon 
 The papers narrated the fact that the emergence of ethno-regional militias became inevitable 
when the army could neither prosecute the war, nor defend the lives and property of Sierra 
Leoneans (see Appendix III56-58, 65, 67). It appears that the papers constructed different narratives 
on the operations of the Kamajors, with intermittent references to the activities of the other 
ethno-regional militias. The papers did not do in-depth analysis of the role which the other 
militias played in the war. They did not also look at whether the other militias violated the laws 
of war. Neither did they critically analyse the reasons why their leaders were not indicted, nor 
did they look at their legacies on Sierra Leone’s national security. 
Hence, the coverage relating to the other ‘ethno-regional militias’ within the CDF seems to be 
‘episodic’ rather than ‘thematic’ (Iyengar, op.cit: 273-289). Thus, in analysing this sub-frame, 
the operations of the other militias are contextualised to present a holistic picture of the CDF’s 
role in the conflict. The Korankos and Madingos (both minority ethnic groups from the North) 
were the first to form their militia known as the Tamaboros (Bundu, op.cit:55), who operated 
around the Koinadugu and Bombali axis in defence of their people against the onslaught of the 
RUF and ‘so-bels’. But their existence ended with the deaths of their leaders (Marie Keita and 
Daemba Samura) in the 1990s (Gberie, 2005:83). The Mendes (the majority ethnic group from 
the South-East) formed the Kamajors society, but the Kamajors came to be involved in national 
security, when the SLPP came to power in 1996 (Abdullah and Mauna, 1998:185; Kabbah, 
op.cit:57; Hirsch, op.cit:52; Gberie, op.cit:83; Bundu, op.cit:55; Penfold, op.cit:14). The Konos (a 
minority ethnic group from the East) also formed the Donsos Movement. And the Themnes (the 
majority ethnic group from the North), started the Kapras and Gbethis Movements (Bundu, 
op.cit:55). 
The papers saw ‘mysticism’ as a common practice of all the ‘ethno-regional militias’ (see 
Appendix III56-58, 65, 67, 208, 232). Thus, the narrative which the papers (see Appendix III11, 208, 301) 
constructed is that the formation of the militias emerged as a spontaneous response to the 
exigencies of the war, but some scholars denied this.  They have emphasised that the militias 
whose existence had been suppressed by the colonialists were only revived to meet the 
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exigencies of the war (Abdallah and Mauna, 1998:185; Musah and Fayemi, op.cit:80). 
Meanwhile, the papers attributed the formation of the Kamajors society to the tireless efforts 
of the late Dr. Alpha Lavalie, the society’s first Chairman and scholar of Fourah Bay College, 
University of Sierra Leone. Chief Norman only became the society’s leader after Dr. Lavalie’s 
death (CDF Trial Chamber judgment, op.cit:80; see also Appendix III53, 178, 297). The word 
Kamajors in Mende literally denotes hunters, who possess natural and supernatural powers of 
the forest and can procure meats for their local community and simultaneously protect their 
environments (see Appendix III56-58, 65, 67). 
The papers reflected how the army and the NPRC junta initially embraced the Kamajors, who 
served as vigilantes to them. The Kamajors, who understood the terrain, beefed up the army’s 
manpower. And some of them were even trained by the army (CDF Trial Chamber Judgment, 
op.cit: 17; see also Appendix III56, 72, 84). Thus, the pre-1997 ‘organisational structure’ of the 
society was different from its post-1997 ‘hierarchical structure’. Neither the so-called ‘Trinity’ 
nor the ‘War Council’ existed prior to 1997 (see Appendix III57, 58). The Kamajors in their 
respective chiefdoms were assigned by their paramount chiefs to the soldiers. They went 
through mysterious initiation ceremonies that allegedly immunised them against bullet 
wounds(see Appendix III54). 
This was an issue that raised serious controversies in Sierra Leone. However, divergences in the 
papers’ analyses are seen in the controversies of the ‘Kamajors’ invincibility’ and ‘immunity’ 
against bullet wounds’. FDP (see Appendix III203, 232) constructed the critical narrative that it is 
unscientific for any human being to be invincible or be immunised against bullet wounds. The 
paper thus dismissed the narrative about the Kamajors’ mystical powers as a sham, but neither 
ST nor Awoko could either question or criticise this. Both papers only represented the issue as it 
was adduced in the testimonies of the defence’s witnesses (see Appendix III67-69, 401). Dr. Demby 
and Dr. Sama Banya (SLPP stalwarts and experts in medical science), testified in defence of the 
CDF leaders that the issues of ‘Kamajors’ invincibility’ and ‘immunisation against bullet 
wounds’, were true and could not be explained by science (Ibid). 
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The Kamajors’ philosophy was rooted in the social psychology of persuasion (Baron, Byrne and 
Branscombe, 2007:111); through which the movement was supposed to have upheld the ideals 
of the laws of war (Kaczorowska, op.cit:454-470, Shaw, 2003: 1054-1079, Hillier, 1999: 272-
285). They were not supposed to ‘kill women’ and ‘unarmed civilians’. They were also 
prohibited from ‘eating snakes’ or ‘having sexual affairs’ (willingly or forcibly) with women 
whilst in combat (see Appendix III45, 60, 63, 218, 358). The Kamajors who did not adhere to the rules 
were said to have lost their immunity to bullets and were killed in combat (see Appendix III44, 60, 
63, 69). Meanwhile, quite a good number of credible witnesses testified about the heinous 
crimes, which the Kamajors committed against the ‘vulnerable civilians’, whom they were 
supposed to protect (see Appendix III35, 98, 201, 207). Even though very astute attempts were made 
by the defence to rebut such testimonies, the court did not accept such rebuttals (see Appendix 
III56, 61-63, 66, 396,397). FDP thus gave prominence to the atrocities committed by the Kamajors (see 
6.3.3 for the references). ST and Awoko (see Appendix III65, 69, 73-75) however paid attention to 
the testimonies of the defence witnesses.  
The Kamajors - Army Debacle 
Chief Norman’s appointment as Deputy Defence Minister in President Kabbah’s maiden Cabinet 
was received with mixed feelings. The Pro-SLPP stalwarts believed that Norman (who was a 
Captain in the army) knew how to deal with soldiers, whose loyalty to the SLPP was 
questionable (see Appendix III301, 307). Conversely, soldiers who were disillusioned with the 
appointment raised the issue of conflict of interests because Norman was the Kamajors’ 
Chieftain and Deputy Defence Minister (see Appendix III237, 255, 257). The soldiers emphasised the 
perceptions that Norman was ‘tribal’ and had been ‘a coupist’ since 1967 and that the army 
would not be comfortable working with him (see Appendix III151, 203). The Kamajors then began 
having skirmishes with the army. 
The former alleged that they were only pursuing the RUF and ‘so-bels’, who harassed and killed 
their peoples (see Appendix III364).  The latter however alleged that their men were being 
constantly attacked and killed by the Kamajors. These recriminations reached their climax, 
when Major Johnny Paul Koroma, allegedly massacred Kamajors at Sierra Rutile in Moyamba 
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district (see Appendix III152, 156). Major Koroma was arrested and incarcerated, pending 
investigations (FDP, ibid). There were allegations that Norman was marginalising the army by 
giving preferential treatments to the Kamajors, whom he perceived to be more loyal to the 
SLPP than the army (see Appendix III156-158, 161). This was how FDP exactly reflected the above 
allegations: 
...‘Norman’s ethnic Kamajor army behaved towards the soldiers with impunity. Whilst 
this war was on going, the Pademba Road prison was rising at an alarming rate. What 
made the whole issue a matter of concern, the new inmates were soldiers thrown into 
the maximum prison because of accusations of fighting Kamajors. Meanwhile, no 
Kamajor was arrested following these skirmishes...The Kamajors started getting more 
bold, making checkpoints and searching for soldiers whom they killed...Following the 
handover power ceremony to President Kabbah, the SLPP started targeting the military 
establishment as a potential enemy...We need to step back and look at our situation not 
with a jaundiced eye or based on ethnic sentiments, but from a national viewpoint’ (see 
Appendix III152, 156). 
The army even accused the SLPP of fuelling the flames of ethno-regionalism and alleged that it 
(as seen in FDP’s 4th and 11thApril, 2003 editions) was ruthlessly persecuting soldiers. FDP (see 
Appendix III145) also accused the SLPP of providing Kamajors with the requisite resources that 
were not made available to the army. Neither ST nor Awoko reflected these allegations. They 
only made the fact salient that the Kamajors sacrificed their lives in defence of Sierra Leone 
(see Appendix III377, 382); for which they were never paid (see Appendix III56, 65). It appears that 
the soldiers’ accusations reflected in FDP’s publications that the SLPP fuelled ethno-regionalism 
and simultaneously condoned the criminality of the Kamajors, (see Appendix III152, 156, 203, 207, 236-
237) is manifested in the hunt for Northerners by the Kamajors. This is corroborated by credible 
witnesses that testified before the TRC and SCSL: 
‘Regionalism: Kamajors Killed 150 Northerners’-Witness tells Special Court (see 
Appendix III231). 
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The link between the conflict and ethnicity lies in the way in which certain factions 
turned ethnicity into an instrument of prejudice and violence against perceived 
opponents or those who did not ‘belong’. People of Northern origins were found to 
have been targeted in the Southern and Eastern regions during the latter part of the 
war. The Kamajors committed disproportionate levels of violations against such ethnic 
groups as the Themne, Koranko, Loko, Limba and Yalunka.43 
Analytically, as reflected in ST (but not in Awoko), the army which the SLPP inherited was not 
regionally- balanced; it was largely Northern-dominated (see Appendix III306). And the SLPP 
being a South-Eastern party had little or no trust in an army that had staged two foiled coups 
and a successful, but a devastating one (Hirsch, op.cit:53) within nine months. Thus, the 
coverage of this issue was characterised by three (3) main themes. Firstly, FDP questioned the 
elections that brought the SLPP to power in 1996 and called it an undemocratic regime (see 
Appendix III237, 257). Both ST and Awoko reflected the SLPP’s democratic legitimacy. In fact, as far 
back as 1996, the international community validated the conduct of the 1996 elections as 
credible, free and fair (see Appendix III503). Secondly, FDP drew a connection between 
Norman’s appointment and the exacerbation of the war. It carried a notably controversial story 
(‘Norman’s War’ under the column People’s Feature), which was extremely critical of Norman 
and the SLPP. FDP opined that the RUF’s war ended with the signing of the LPA, but Norman’s 
war started on becoming Deputy Minister: 
Sitting in his Bonthe Island prison cell, Hinga Norman former war lord of the disbanded 
ethnic Kamajor army will have enough time pondering about the war he created in 
Sierra Leone on becoming Deputy Defence Minister... As Deputy Defence Minister and 
head of the ethnic Kamajor militia, Norman was wearing two totally different caps... 
Norman started inciting Kamajors to attack soldiers. First in Njala, then in Kenema, and 
subsequently a whole brigade headquarters in Bo was attacked by the ethnic army. This 
was the beginning of Norman’s war (see Appendix III156). 
                                                          
43
TRC Report, Volume II, 2004:11. 
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This story line was not seen in the articles of neither ST nor Awoko (for the entire period for 
which this study is designed). It appears that the story was neither supported by the existing 
literature, nor any piece of evidence, adduced during the trial, neither was it in line with any of 
the issues addressed in the trial’s judgment or, indeed, the coverage of other newspapers. FDP 
(see Appendix III189) also alleged that upon the formation of the Kamajor society, the 
Tamaboros and the Donsos were disbanded by the SLPP because it wanted to legitimise the 
‘ethnic Kamajor army’ and ‘undermine the national army’. Both ST and Awoko did not reflect 
this.  
Finally, whilst FDP stated that Major Koroma was incarcerated on the allegation that he was 
involved in the killings of Kamajors in Moyamba; ST and Awoko (as referenced above) 
represented that Koroma’s arrest was in respect of a failed coup that preceded that of the 
AFRC/RUF. ST (see Appendix III395) and Awoko (see Appendix III56) reflected that Parliament 
approved the use of arms by Kamajors. FDP (see Appendix III218) however commented that 
Parliament only legitimated the use of arms by the CDF. Analytically, the CDF was not an 
embodiment of the Kamajor society alone; it was rather an amalgam of the Gbethis, Kapras, 
Kamajors and Donsos etc. Thus, it cannot be argued that the CDF hadn’t any legality to carry 
arms. Essentially, the nuances adopted by the papers are a reflection of whether the indictees 
had or hadn’t any legality to carry arms. 
The North-South Divide 
The Tamaboros, Kapras and the Gbethis engaged the ‘so-bels’ in the North. The Kamajors 
initially operated in the South-East, but were subsequently brought to the Western Area, when 
ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) launched its attack 
to flush out the junta. Though the Kapras and Gbethis were formally part of the CDF, according 
to FDP, the SLPP gave much preference to the Kamajors at the expense of the Kapras, Gbethis 
and Donsos. FDP (Monday, 28th May, 2003, Friday, 22nd August, 2003) also stated that all the 
above ethno-regional militias became defunct, when the SLPP ascended the throne of power. 
The paper (Friday, 11th April, 2003) dubbed the Kamajors society an ‘ethnic army’ created to 
protect the SLPP alone. It appears that FDP took the position that the formation of the 
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Kamajors society heightened the North-South divide, which had dominated the political 
landscape of Sierra Leone since independence. This analysis resonates with Bundu’s (Op.cit:55-
57) reflections on how the Kamajors society was targeting and killing Northerners during the 
war years. Thus, the testimonies of credible witnesses, spoke volumes of how Kamajors 
targeted and killed Northerners with impunity (see Appendix III207). 
After searching their belongings the Kamajors ordered the civilians to form queues 
according to their tribes. Themne, Limba and Loko members were ordered to form one 
queue, which contained 150 men and one twelve year old boy called Foday Koroma. 
Mandingo, Susu and Fullah tribe members were ordered to form a second queue. And 
Mende, Sherbro and Kissy tribe members were ordered to form the third one. 
Kamabote asked twelve year-old Foday Koroma what tribe he belonged to and the boy 
responded that he was a Loko...Kamabote responded by striking him with a machete, 
killing him (CDF Trial Judgment, op.cit:123 FDP, see also Appendix III207). 
...The remaining Lokos, Limbas and Themnes were taken 20 to 25 feet away and 
Kamabote ordered his Kamajors to kill them. They used cutlasses to kill each of the 150 
people in the queue. After wards, the Kamajors slit opened the stomach of one victim 
and displayed his entrails in a bucket before the remaining civilians ... In a different area 
of the field, where TF2-048 was staying, everyone except for the Themnes, Limbas and 
Lokos was allowed to leave. The Kamajors said the Limbas had tapped wine for the 
rebels and that they along with the Themnes and Lokos should be killed...( CDF Trial 
Judgment, op.cit: 123, see also Appendix III43). 
Another Kamajor approached her brother and showed him a list of Limbas to be killed. 
He told him that he had come there for him and then cut off his ear. The brother knelt 
down and asked the Kamajor to spare his life because he had a wife and children. The 
Kamajor cut his throat with a machete and then mutilated his body.TF2-048 witnessed 
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this, but did not reveal their relationship because she knew that the Kamajors were 
looking for Limbas.44 
The papers thus carried so many stories on this issue of Kamajors’ cruelty against Northerners. 
But FDP (as referenced above) devoted much more attention to this than any of the other 
papers. Awoko merely published the testimonies as they were adduced in court. Even though 
ST (Thursday, 22nd January, 2004, Wednesday, 4th February, 2004) published news and views 
on the testimonies, their analysis on the issue was underpinned by the Kamajors’ efforts in 
resisting the junta.  
6.2.2 Kabbah’s Role in the Conflict 
The role which President Kabbah played in the conflict was also reflected in the papers’ 
coverage. The issues in this frame are analysed within the purview of two (2) sub-frames-‘The 
Kabbah, ECOMOG and Kamajors (CDF) Alliance’ and ‘The Kabbah-Norman Friction’. 
The Kabbah, ECOMOG and Kamajors (CDF) Alliance 
 ST and Awoko reflected the high level of corruption in the upper echelons of the army (see 
Appendix III286, 372). This was a controversy that was not represented in FDP’s analysis (see 
Appendix III237, 257). Awoko (see Appendix III54-55) reported the controversies surrounding the 
supply of rice and the inflated number of personnel in the army, as notable instances of 
corruption. Thus, whilst officers received up to fifty bags of rice per month; the rank and file 
received half bag each. When this issue became enigmatic, the SLPP convinced the soldiers that 
they should be paid with money instead of rice, but the soldiers disagreed.45 Whilst President 
Kabbah grappled with the problems of reforming the army, the soldiers became disgusted with 
his actions and Norman’s affiliation and activities with the Kamajors. According to ST (17th and 
20th January, 2006), Norman received classified information about a coup plot, which he 
relayed to President Kabbah. And on 25th May, 1997, a group of disgruntled soldiers toppled the 
SLPP in a bloody coup that ushered in the AFRC junta (see Appendix III56-57). 
 
                                                          
44
CDF Trial Judgment, op.cit:123, Awoko, ibid. 
45
CDF Trial Chamber Judgment, op.cit: 17. 
 111 
 
President Kabbah and the SLPP stalwarts fled into exile in Guinea. ST (see Appendix III327) also 
reflected that all the coupists (except Tamba Gborie) were Northerners. But this fact was not 
seen in the analysis of either FDP or Awoko, though it is authenticated by what is in the existing 
literature (Hirsch op.cit:56; Penfold, op.cit:17). Hirsch (op.cit) made it clear that all the coupists 
were from the Binkolo Limba Chiefdom in Bombali District in the North (the home town of 
former President Momoh). And Gberie (2004:154-155) confirmed the extent to which the coup 
was dubbed a ‘Northern Affair’. The AFRC hurriedly joined forces with the RUF rebels to loot 
the State’s treasury, plunder the economy and unleash terror on innocent civilians (Abdallah, 
2004:5-6). 
 
 ST (Wednesday, 22nd January, 2003:9) commented that it was when the junta refused to 
relinquish power that the use of force to restore the legitimate government became a common 
concern. Even CSOs in exile and the media called for military intervention (Standard Times, 
ibid). ST (see Appendix III370, 389) further analysed how this call also motivated the CDF to form 
an alliance with ECOMOG to bring back democracy to Sierra Leone. This view is also reflected in 
Awoko’s (see Appendix III65, 104) critical analysis on the issue.  ST (see Appendix III302-303) further 
stated that the CDF’s formation was an attempt to mitigate the deep seated ethnic cleavages in 
Sierra Leone’s body- politic, but because the CDF was largely dominated by the Kamajors, it was 
never seen as having a national face. This is seen in the fact that the CDF’s operations were 
nationally co-ordinated by Norman, who was himself a Kamajor and the political party (SLPP) 
that was to be restored was South-Eastern dominated. 
The papers reflected the CDF’s hierarchical structure, pointing to President Kabbah as its head 
(see Appendix III61-62). FDP (see Appendix III230) represented Norman as the figure, who 
unilaterally created the positions of Regional Coordinators that supervised the distribution of 
food and logistics to the CDF regionally. The paper (see Appendix III166) also pointed out that 
the War Council, which hitherto took strategic decisions and enforced discipline in the CDF, 
became powerless because of Norman’s influence and Kondowai’s disdain of the Council’s 
insistent on ‘punishing Kamajors that committed atrocities’. Awoko’s (see Appendix III232, 234) 
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position on this issue resonated with that of FDP, pointing to the extent to which Norman was 
becoming more powerful than the War Council.  
 
FDP and Awoko extensively covered Kamajors’ attacks on forces loyal to the junta in the South 
and the East to make way for ECOMOG’s deployment. Hence Koribondo, Bo, Kenema, Tongo, 
Moyamba etc. were attacked and the junta dislodged, but serious atrocities were committed 
against civilians (see Appendix III61, 147, 232). There were also similarities in reporting that General 
Maxwell Khobe (a Nigerian) was appointed Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone Army and 
was asked by President Kabbah to take over the affairs and control of the CDF. Subsequently, 
General Shelpidi (a Nigerian too) took over ECOMOG’s High Command and control of the CDF 
(FDP, ibid, ST, ibid and Awoko, ibid). 
 
Thus, the junta launched ‘Operation No Living Thing’, which started in Kono district in the East, 
came through the North and ended in Freetown. According to FDP (see Appendix III141) the 
suffering of the masses heightened, when ECOMOG re-grouped and launched its reprisal 
attack. Essentially, FDP (see Appendix III146) and ST (see Appendix III292) called for the trials of 
ECOMOG forces for atrocities committed in the fight to take over Freetown. However, Awoko 
(Wednesday, 11th February, 2004:2) only reported that ECOMOG personnel were not subjected 
to war crimes trial. There was however a clear uniformity in the coverage that the Kamajors 
were also enlisted to push back the rebels out of Freetown; and the ensuing deadly battle 
occasioned the violations of the laws of war by all the warring factions (see Appendix III308). 
The Kabbah-Norman Friction 
All of the papers under scrutiny asked why the chief prosecutor, David Crane, refused to indict 
Kabbah for war crimes. Indeed, they overwhelmingly called on Crane to indict Kabbah. FDP46 
wanted Kabbah to face the SCSL, because he was the Minister of Defence and the head of the 
CDF. This was how FDP clearly reflected this: 
                                                          
46
See ‘Those Who Bear the Greatest Responsibility: Try Kabbah Now!’- Friday, 15th August, 2003:3; ‘Will Kabbah Survive Crane of Mass 
Destruction?’ Thursday, 13th March, 2003:4. 
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Kabbah’s role in our just ended ten years rebel war could not be swept under the carpet 
like that… The numerous crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Commander 
Norman, for which he is currently being detained, must be in the knowledge of 
President Kabbah. Kabbah knew majority of the works of Norman’s Kamajors/CDF. Even 
the arms and ammo used by these fighters may have been financially provided by the 
President himself. Norman was a poor brat before he became a CDF/ Kamajors head. 
Who gave him the money to purchase arms? Where did he get the money to buy the 
arms and ammunition from Bulgaria in the first instance to launch the all-out war to get 
rid of the murderous band of AFRC/RUF coalition of the willing? ’Kabbah… is a man 
whose hands are filled with blood and in most cases innocent blood. And sadly though 
he failed to see that; he was lured into signing a peace accord with rebels, whose 
atrocities were despicable. He took a shovel, dug his own grave, but it is Norman whom 
he wants to be buried in it (see Appendix III143). 
 
Even some SLPP stalwarts demanded that he be indicted and tried (‘Embarrassment...SLPP Calls 
for Kabbah’s Indictment’; ST, Friday, 14th March, 2003). Kabbah’s position statement that he 
was not aware of Norman’s arrest and would not have interfered was according to the papers 
unfounded (see Appendix III2-3, 142-143, 284-285). 
As ST (Friday 14th March, 2003: 7-8) put it: 
 
‘... He (President Kabbah) should have peacefully convinced Chief Norman to hand over 
himself to the SCSL, but instead allowed police officers to join forces with SCSL officials 
to humiliate and brutally arrest him, whilst performing his State functions’. 
 
The treatment meted out to Norman during his initial arrest and detention was given 
prominence by the papers. The seriousness with which the issue was reported opened the eyes 
of many Sierra Leoneans to the plight of Norman and the other CDF indictees (now convicts). 
FDP (see Appendix III150, 166) attacked Penfold’s analysis that some of Norman’s pre-trial rights 
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were being violated with impunity as he was locked-up in out-dated cells in Bonthe Island, 
meant for slaves. FDP (see Appendix III149, 155, 159) commented that Norman should not be given 
any preferential treatment because his ‘ethnic Kamajors army committed war crimes’ and also 
stated that ‘he deserved the treatments he received’. 
 
 ST (see Appendix III283, 287) and Awoko (see Appendix III2, 3) continued to oppose Norman’s pre-
trial detention, until his trial started. Kabbah’s refusal to testify on behalf of Norman, as 
captured by the papers (see Appendix III238, 399-400) can further strengthen the friction argument. 
Though Kabbah testified on behalf of RUF’s Issa Sesay, for his role in the peace process; he 
denied testifying on behalf of Norman, who co-ordinated the operations of the CDF, leading to 
ECOMOG’s triumph over the junta; and the eventual restoration of the SLPP. Inferentially, the 
nuances in the coverage of ST and Awoko on ‘the Norman episode’, point to the perception 
that Norman had become too powerful. Some members of the SLPP had already seen him as a 
potential successor to Kabbah, who had already begun making ways for his Vice President, 
Solomon Berewa to succeed him. So, Norman’s ‘trial and indictment’ was reportedly calculated 
to eliminate him from the political race: 
Being a lawyer by profession and believing that he should have knowledge of the 
operation of the Special Court, President Kabbah might have decided for Special Court 
as a way of getting rid of Chief Norman. This is probably not the first time President 
Kabbah has reportedly tried to get rid of Norman. Following the restoration of 
democracy in 1998, and the seeming popularity of Norman, President Kabbah 
reportedly craftily tried to get rid of Chief Norman by proposing to send him to Nigeria 
as Sierra Leone’s ambassador. Chief Norman however refused. He did not however 
escape the spreading mesh of the Special Court this time (see Appendix III332).  
To some (SLPP) party members, President Kabbah and his second in command, Solomon 
Berewa must have machinated the arrest of Hinga Norman…Some SLPP supporters 
blame in particular Berewa, who was Attorney- General and Minister of Justice when 
the Special Court was, set up...that Berewa saw Norman as a rival for the party 
leadership and that he and Kabbah were happy to see him arrested (see Appendix III465). 
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Thus, five (5) other controversial issues attracted serious media attention that appeared to 
have been central to this friction argument. The first was ‘Norman’s request (whilst in 
detention) to attend the SLPP’s Convention in 2005’, which was turned down by the SCSL (see 
Appendix III214, 379). The second was the acrimonious legal tussle that ensued in Sierra Leone’s 
Supreme Court about Norman’s eligibility to stop the holding of the SLPP’s National Convention 
in 2005, and the eventual denial of his applications by the Supreme Court (see Appendix III215, 
381, ). 
 
 The third was the contents of the critical letters (‘From Special Court Detention...Hinga Norman 
and Co. Write South-Easterners and Kamajors, ‘New Fault Lines in the Southern and Eastern 
Provinces’) (see Appendix III371), which Norman wrote to the Mendes and South-Easterners, 
warning them of Kabbah’s and Berewa’s conspiracy against the SLPP and the Mendes (see 
Appendix III48, 212). The fourth was the emergence of the People’s Movement for Democratic 
Change (PMDC), as a South-Eastern political party, and how it capitalised on the Kabbah-
Norman friction to score a political goal that partially contributed to the demise of the SLPP 
after the 2007 Presidential elections’ (see Appendix III115, 465). The fifth was ‘Norman’s natural 
(unnatural) death and its effects on Sierra Leone’s body politic’ (see Appendix III101, 103). 
 
There were similarities and differences in the papers coverage of the above issues. There were 
also overlaps in the analyses on why Norman was not allowed to attend the SLPP’s National 
Convention in 2005. The papers (see references above) alluded to the fact that Norman was an 
accused and would not have been accorded any privilege beyond what is prescribed by the 
Statute. FDP (see Appendix III262) used the Norman issue in the Supreme Court to project the 
political turmoil within the SLPP and simultaneously asserted that it would result in the 
eventual disintegration of the party. ST analysed this issue and blamed the SLPP for its 
predicaments, which it said were the machinations of Kabbah and Berewa. Awoko (see 
Appendix III50-51) covered the proceedings and the ruling that subsequently emerged, but its 
analysis reflected only the merits of the decision. Chief Norman’s warning letters to South-
Easterners and the formation of the PMDC, were the other controversial issues, which FDP (see 
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Appendix III263) relied on to predict the fall of ‘Torpoi’ (SLPP). This was how ST reflected these 
issues: 
The Southern and Eastern provinces are dominated by the Mende, whose lead the 
smaller ethnic groups follow. Traditionally the Mende support the SLPP but this is 
uncertain in the 2007 election given what many perceive as its role in the arrest and 
indictment of Hinga Norman, ex-head of the Kamajor militia, the core group of the CDF 
that fought the RUF...In prison, Norman became a rallying point for those opposed to 
the government and the Special Court, as well as for disillusioned Southern and Eastern 
Provinces youths who feel they have not benefited from the peace achieved...Margai, 
the PMDC leader, and long-time Bo resident, was lead defence counsel before the 
Special Court for one of Norman’s fellow CDF defendants (see Appendix III465). 
The circumstances leading to Norman’s death were also extensively reported by the papers 
(see Appendix III101-103, 258-259, 455-456). Divergences were not seen in the analysis that his death 
was unnatural, though the papers as well reported the ‘news’ as presented by the SCSL that he 
died after a successful hip replacement surgery (FDP, ibid, ST, ibid, Awoko, ibid). The papers 
further commented on his family position, that he died of unnatural cause and demanded 
another autopsy. The papers put out series of articles, reflecting the then opposition’s (APC’s) 
position regarding Norman’s death. The APC dubbed the SLPP as ungrateful and accused it of 
crucifying its own stalwart (see Appendix III103). Both ST (see Appendix III458) and Awoko (see 
Appendix III106) also captured CSOs’ position and projected the view that Norman was merely 
eliminated. In the final analysis, the SLPP lost the 2007 elections when the APC formed an 
alliance with the PMDC. The papers thus reflected Norman’s indictment and trial and the PMDC 
phenomenon as fundamental factors that led to the SLPP’s demise. 
6.2.3 Territorial Integrity/Sovereignty and the Defence of Democracy/the SLPP Government 
The other issues that surfaced in the papers’ analyses are whether the Kamajors fought in 
defence of Sierra Leone’s territorial integrity/sovereignty and democracy; or whether they 
fought for the restoration of the South-Eastern dominated SLPP Government. The thematic 
issues in this frame are collapsed into two sub-frames- ‘Defending Sierra Leone’s Sovereignty 
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and Democracy/ the SLPP Government’ and ‘the CDF Indictee and Convicts: National Heroes or 
War Criminals?’ I will deal with the salient issues in these sub-frames as they unfolded in the 
coverage. 
Defending Sierra Leone’s Sovereignty and Democracy/the SLPP Government 
From the analysis on the ‘Kamajors - Army Debacle’47 it is clear that the Kamajors society had 
been in existence even before the SLPP re-surfaced in 1996. And the Kamajors initially operated 
in the South-East. However, it was when the SLPP took power that the Kamajors came to be 
involved in national security. ST (see Appendix III297, 306) reflected the army’s role in a 
democracy and emphasised that it had no business in governance and further condemned the 
junta’s intervention. FDP (see Appendix III148) condemned the executions of the mutineers 
(mostly Northerners) by the SLPP in 1998.  Awoko (see Appendix III40-41) alluded to the illegality 
of the May 25th 1997 coup, without condemning the SLPP for executing the twenty-four (24) 
mutineers.  
ST and Awoko recounted how ECOMOG mobilised the Kamajors for the coordinated assaults 
against the junta and also made Norman’s role quite prominent.48 They slanted most of their 
stories on this issue to reflect the role the CDF played in the fight against tyranny; with little 
emphasis on the atrocities which the Kamajors committed in the process.  Conversely, FDP 
represented the Kamajors’ role in fighting the junta, with specific emphasis on the atrocities 
committed. The main issue here is whether the Kamajors either fought for democracy or the 
SLPP. Sierra Leone had been under the one-party APC dictatorship for twenty-four (24) years 
(Zack-Williams, op.cit: 13-25, Musah & Fayemi, op.cit: 86). 
The media and CSOs relentlessly pressed for democracy, until it was eventually restored in 
1996, with the return of the SLPP (See 3. 3, Hirsch, op.cit: 40-41). Significantly, ST (see Appendix 
III282, 309) reflected that the May 25th 1997 coup was Northern dominated (see also Hirsch and 
Penfold as referenced above). The two main dialectics that came to influence the national 
discourses on this issue were represented differently by the papers. The first is the idea that the 
South-Easterners suspected that the AFRC’s coup was a Northern conspiracy (Hirsch, op.cit: 56 
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See 6.3.2 
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Gberie, op.cit: 154-155), meant to rob them of their right to rule and so the Kamajors were 
relied on to reverse the coup and restore the SLPP (see references in 6.2.2). 
The second is the idea held by many Northerners that the 1996 elections which brought the 
SLPP to power were neither free nor fair. They capitalised on the facts that the Interim National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) deducted 70,000 excess votes cast in favour of the SLPP in the run-
off elections and that 25% of the country’s population (trapped in RUF’s zones) was 
disenfranchised (Bundu, op.cit:54).  Thus, ST (see Appendix III293, 373) and Awoko lauded the role 
of the CDF in the restoration of democracy. The allegation that was being trumpeted during the 
AFRC/RUF interregnum, that the Kamajors were not fighting to restore democracy or President 
Kabbah, but to impose Norman as Head of State, was debunked by Peter Penfold, Brigadier 
Richards and Dr. Demby, whose testimonies were clearly reported and critically reflected upon 
by Awoko (see 6.2.2).  
Awoko’s (see Appendix III108) Kelvin Lewis even interviewed Norman on the allegation at Base 
Zero, an allegation which he denied, and affirmed his commitment to democracy. It appears 
that ST’s and Awoko’s position resonated with the first of the two dialectics discussed above. 
Again, it seems that FDP’s position is coterminous with the second dialectics. FDP clearly 
articulated that the Kamajors did not fight for the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone. But 
they rather fought for the restoration of the SLPP and in the process violated the laws of war. 
The paper emphasised that the Kamajors would not have taken up arms to defend a 
government that was not South-Eastern dominated.49 
The CDF Indictee and Convicts: National Heroes or War Criminals? 
The two thematic issues in this sub-frame logically follow from the above analysis and they 
subsequently became discourses embedded in the media’s coverage and judgment of the CDF 
trial. The first is the ‘heroic status’, which is accorded to the CDF indictee (Norman) and convicts 
(Fofana and Kondowai), by ST and Awoko. The second is the ‘war criminal status, which FDP 
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See the following FDP’s publications on these issues: ‘Kamajors’ (headline). The photo caption reads: ‘Kamajor Militia: horrific tales of human 
butchery and cannibalism has soiled image of invincibility and fighting for true democracy to one of ulterior motives’!!!(FDP, Monday, 
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Special Court Arrests-Texts and Contexts’ (ibid: 3). ‘SLPP Young Generation Takes up Arms for Kamajors Chieftains: Norman Belongs to 
Tokpoi Family (Tuesday, April 2nd 2003: 3) etc. 
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accorded the CDF leaders, even before their trial began.50 This ‘heroic status’ which both ST and 
Awoko clearly articulated in their pre-trial and trial analyses, appeared to be biased in favour of 
the CDF. Analytically, this finding is guided by Entman’s theoretical and methodological criteria 
for evaluating ‘media biases’ in content analysis (see 2.2 and 5.1).  
This conclusion is based on the inference that the coverage appeared to have been skewed to 
communicate the ‘preferred meaning’ (The CDF’s Heroism), which the communicators (ST and 
Awoko) wanted their audiences (Sierra Leoneans and the international community) to take as a 
credible message (preferred reading). Conversely, FDP dubbed the CDF leaders ‘War Criminals’ 
even before they were convicted. This ‘nuance’ appeared to have contravened the presumption 
of innocence (Thompson, 1999:25-29, Williams, 1961:871-887). This also seems to be a 
manifestation of how FDP’s coverage was biased against the CDF. This finding is also guided by 
the same Entman’s theoretical and methodological criteria for evaluating ‘media biases’ in 
content analysis. Again, this conclusion is based on the inference that the coverage appeared to 
have been hyped to communicate the ‘preferred meaning’ (the Criminality of the CDF’s 
Operations in Sierra Leone), which the communicator (FDP) wanted its audiences (Sierra 
Leoneans and the international community) to inculcate (the preferred reading).51 
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The following ST’s and Awoko’s publications (which are  critically deconstructed in the Discourse Analysis section- 6.5) contained a plethora of 
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 ‘Penfold Says Norman is a Hero’ (Awoko, Thursday, 9th February, 2006), ‘Disclosed: Norman, Fofana and Kondowai never Planned War’ (Awoko, 
February 20, 2006), ‘Norman is More Heroic than Kabbah’- Foh (Awoko, Tuesday, 27th February, 2007), ‘Was Norman a Hero or Villain?’ 
(Awoko, ibid), ‘Kabbah Praises Norman’ (Awoko, Wednesday, 28th February, 2007), ‘Special Court is not Helping the Peace Process’ (Awoko, 
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However, the role of the CDF leaders in fighting tyranny and restoring democracy was 
recognised even by the Judges of the Trial Chamber 1, but they cautioned that that could 
neither wave their individual criminal nor command responsibility in a joint criminal enterprise. 
The Judges that gave the majority Judgment were not Sierra Leoneans. However, Justice 
Bankole Thompson (the only Sierra Leonean Judge in the Trial Chamber 1),  exonerated both 
‘convicts (Fofana and Kondowai) on all eight counts’; emphasising that the defence of 
‘necessity’, though not raised during the trial,  accounted for the reason why the CDF took up 
arms to defend democracy and the people of Sierra Leone (Annex C: CDF Trial Chamber 
Judgment, 2007:C25-38). 
The prosecution appealed the convictions of Fofana and Kondowai, claiming that the 
punishments were not commensurate with the seriousness of the crimes committed (see 
Appendix III117). Fofana did not appeal his conviction, but Kondowai did.52 And the Appeals 
Chamber on 28th May, 2008, upheld the prosecution’s case and increased the sentences of 
Fofana and Kondowai to fifteen (15) and twenty (20) years, respectively (Ibid: 186-192). The 
Appeals Chamber’s final judgment seems to have dovetailed with FDP’s ‘agenda setting’ ability, 
as manifested in its ‘news selection’, ‘framing’ and ‘priming’ strategies (see 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2), 
reflecting its editorial policy. Hence, the CDF leaders were dubbed ‘war criminals’, not ‘national 
heroes’. 
ST and Awoko appeared to have set their own ‘agenda’ (through their own ‘news worthiness’ 
and ‘framing’ strategies); dubbing the CDF leaders as ‘national heroes’; as opposed to the Trial 
and Appeals Chambers’ verdicts. Another Sierra Leonean Judge of the Appeals Chamber, Justice 
Gelaga-King, in his partially dissenting judgment,53 reversed Kondowai’s convictions pursuant to 
Article 6 (1) in respect of aiding and abetting murder (count 2) and cruel treatment (count 4), 
and upheld the Trial Chamber’s 1 judgment in respect of pillage (count 5), collective 
punishment (count 7) and conscripting children under the age of 15 years into fighting forces or 
groups or actively participating in hostilities (count 8). Justice King further dismissed the 
                                                          
52
CDF Appeals Chamber Judgment, 2008:11-15. 
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See pages 1-37 of same. 
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prosecution’s appeal and pontificated that it was devoid of merit. He climaxed his dissenting 
judgment with this rhetorical question: 
Having regard to the historical facts in this case, could it be said that those of the 
International Community, such as Great Britain, the United States and Nigeria, who 
mandated Kondowai, ECOMOG, the CDF and their allies to fight for the restoration of 
the democratically elected Government and are, apparently, in a superior/subordinate 
relationship with Kondowai and the others, are guilty of War Crimes? 
It is clear in the above analysis that the two Sierra Leonean Judges, radically departed from the 
position, which their colleagues in the Trial and Appeals Chambers took. It appears that the 
Sierra Leonean judges appreciated the sacrifices which, according to ST and Awoko, the CDF 
leaders made in the fight against tyranny and the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone. 
Thus, one pertinent question that arises at this stage is whether the people of Sierra Leone 
supported the trial of the CDF leaders; or perceived it as a ‘political machination’ against their 
‘national heroes’, who liberated them from the clutches of militarism. 
6.2.4 The Resurgence of War Crimes Jurisprudence versus Political Expediency 
 The issues here are divided into two sub-frames: ‘The Resurgence of War Crimes 
Jurisprudence’ and ‘Political Expediency’. I shall sequentially analyse the papers contents in so 
far as they relate to this sub-frame to determine the respective positions, which they took in 
the political debates. 
The Resurgence of War Crimes Jurisprudence 
International judicial intervention, which emerged at the end of World War II, as a robust 
response to Nazi’s criminality (See 2.1), re-surfaced as a controversial response to intra-states 
conflicts after the Balkans’ crises;54 and was also replicated in Rwanda after the infamous 1994 
genocide.55 The conflict in Sierra Leone ended at a time when the need to subject war criminals 
to justice had become a common response to some of the most devastating conflicts in the 
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 122 
 
World. Thus, when Sierra Leone eventually resorted to bring some of its ‘war criminals’ to 
justice the papers sustained very critical debates regarding the issue. Initially, they appeared to 
have supported the need to get Sierra Leone’s ‘war criminals’ to judicially account for their 
actions. 
However, the papers’ positions in the political debate changed when the chief prosecutor, 
David Crane, unsealed the indictments of the leaders of all the warring factions (AFRC, RUF and 
CDF). ST which initially overwhelmingly supported the establishment of the SCSL suddenly 
became critical of the court after the CDF leaders were indicted. The paper opposed the SCSL 
and called it an imperial judicial institution that was meant to target the heroic figures that 
liberated Sierra Leoneans from the scourges and clutches of tyranny, oppression and carnage;56 
and called on the international community (through the ICC) to subject former President 
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, to war crimes trials for the atrocities committed 
by American and British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (Ibid). 
The paper dubbed Crane a ‘racist’, and pointed to his alleged connections with ‘mercenary 
outfits’.57 ST also alleged that Crane was ‘a biased’ and ‘an unprofessional prosecutor’, who 
prejudiced the outcome of the CDF trial by pontificating that ‘Chief Norman and the other 
indictees would never see the dawn of a free day’ (See ST’s Standard Point: ‘What Now, Mr.. 
Crane’- Wednesday, 4th June, 2003; One Thing and Another: ‘Banning Theophilus Gbenda’- 
Thursday, 10th March, 2005). The paper further accused Crane of being ‘incompetent’ and of 
‘dividing Sierra Leone’, when he announced that he was resigning as SCSL’s Chief Prosecutor. 
The following quotations from its Friday, 4th March, 2005 (‘Special Courts David Crane Bows out 
in Shame’) edition, contains some other damning comments which the paper made against 
Crane: 
David Crane came to try people for cases he virtually had little or no idea about. We told 
him that Chief Norman and his comrades are heroes not villains, but he went about 
manufacturing witnesses to prosecute them. There is certainly no way one can defame 
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See ST’s One Thing and Another: ‘David Crane, the Runaway Prosecutor’-Monday 7th March, 2005:10, ‘Crane and Mercenary Connection’, 12th 
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members of the CDF. Time without number, we have tried to let David Crane 
understand that he was here on his so-called trials because of the sacrifices of the CDF 
for as a people we had a right to self-defence, and that was just what the CDF offered. 
When terrorists hit America in September, 2001, the Americans did not sit with hands 
between their legs or resign to fate. They did not only fight to forestall another attack, 
but even went out to strike military installations in suspected locations. Why should 
David Crane and his employers imagine that the people of this nation should have sat 
down with hands between their legs and wait to be decimated? David Crane, 
considering the way he used to brag about his Special Court, one would have imagined 
that the whole issue of Special Court trials should have long been a thing of the past. 
One legacy of David Crane would be his conscious attempt to divide our society. For the 
idea and existence of Special Court has been nothing other than an attempt to put a 
wedge among us. The question is did he succeed in dividing us? Certainly not, as we still 
believe in what the CDF did and above all, after all his efforts, it is David Crane that is 
leaving us. This land is ours and we will continue to stay here, certainly even if he thinks 
we are ignorant, we will prefer to remain so rather than take his form of enlightenment. 
Perhaps with reports of widespread human rights violations in Iraq and Afghanistan by 
US and British troops the service of David Crane would be needed there... When he 
initially came most of us tried to put sense into his head, since we witnessed the war 
and all its accompanying ills, but he refused to listen, believing that being a white man 
and a lawyer, he had all the intelligence and knowledge in his head. We are not lawyers 
not white Americans but we have the common sense, which is just what it takes to 
make a lawyer. 
In fact, ST opined that the SCSL was created to try the leaders of the AFRC/RUF and not those of 
the CDF.58 Apparently, the indictment of the CDF leaders was a surprise to Awoko that 
emphasised the CDF’s patriotic role in the conflict (see references in 6.2.3). FDP however 
                                                          
58
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reflected the significance of the SCSL in ending impunity. The paper thus catalogued the 
plethora of human rights violations committed by the Kamajors and further emphasised: ‘how 
horrific tales of human butchery and cannibalism soiled (the Kamajors’) image of invincibility 
and fighting for true democracy to one of ulterior motives’!!!’ (see Appendix III203). FDF also 
drew an analogy between the indictments of the CDF leaders and that of the RUF’s Issa Sesay. 
The paper stated that had the CDF leaders been given immunity, Issa Sesay should have been 
exempt from prosecution because of his role in ending the war. FDP critically analysed this 
controversial issue within the framework of texts and contexts: 
Some guys stress the context- Chief Norman was resisting a degenerate rebellion. In 
that context, whatever else happened should be overlooked. Mr.. Issa Sesay was very 
instrumental in bringing peace to this land, given that situation, whatever else he did 
should be discounted. Many on the side of this argument blamed the government for 
not putting in place safeguards that would have prevented the arrest of persons in 
whose favour they are arguing for...The other guys stress texts, laws. They believe that 
contexts should not nullify texts. The question is whether or not the indictees violated 
legal texts and not for or against whom they violated the law’.59 
Political Expediency 
Political expediency appeared to have clouded the perceptions of SLPP supporters (mostly 
South-Easterners), regarding the arrest and detention of the CDF leaders. There were clear 
divergences in the reportage. FDP’s position is inferred from its analysis in the above sub-frame; 
that the issue of political expediency should not cloud the rule of law in an era when the 
resurgence of war crimes jurisprudence appeared to be a panacea for gross human rights 
violations in even intra-states conflict. Awoko’s contention on this issue is seen in the context 
rationalised in FDP’s critical analysis. However, though Awoko lent credence to war crimes 
jurisprudence, its analysis was skewed to reflect that only in respect of the trials of the AFRC/ 
RUF leaders. 
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The paper appeared to have taken exceptions to this in respect of the CDF trial, by emphasising 
what FDP had rationalised as ‘context’ (see 6.5 and 6.6). This ‘context argument’ is what ST 
appeared to have rationalised and transformed into that of political expediency, by stressing 
the centrality of the CDF in the SLPP’s political agenda,  Norman’s popularity and his influence 
over the Kamajors in the South-East and the tendency for the trial to cause serious 
fragmentations in the SLPP. Analytically, within the context of the CDF’s role in the conflict and 
the protection it offered the SLPP, it appeared that ST took the position that though it was 
necessary to try the AFRC/RUF leaders, it was ‘politically inexpedient’ for Kabbah to have 
allowed the CDF leaders to be indicted. 
That also appeared to have been the reason why the paper published critical articles against 
Kabbah and how the SLPP campaign team for the 2007 elections lobbied the Kamajors and the 
CDF convicts.60 However, FDP which emphasised ‘text’ appeared to have frowned at ‘selective 
justice’. The paper made this issue quite ‘salient’ in many of its articles against SLPP supporters, 
who felt the CDF leaders were betrayed.61 
6.2.5 The Prosecution- Reconciliation Debate 
 The papers carried critical arguments about the workings of the different TJ models and how 
the post-conflict reconciliation process could maintain sustainable peace. The dialectics in the 
analysis between 6.2.1 and 6.2.4 reflected how the papers represented the issues germane to 
the judicial accountability approach to TJ, which is based on the idea that there can never be 
true peace and reconciliation without justice (see 3.3). Thus, the prosecution of war criminals in 
Sierra Leone (to some extent) addressed impunity, broke the cycle of violence and ushered in 
sustainable peace and reconciliation (Making Justice Count, op.cit: 2). Inferentially, the papers 
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appeared to have lent credence to the prosecutorial approach to TJ; albeit with seeming 
‘biases’ in favour of or against the CDF. The issues of how the papers reflected the other 
reconciliatory models are thus contextualised here. ST (see Appendix III363-365, 472) condemned 
the international community for the huge finances, time and other resources expended to 
prosecute selected war criminals, whilst foot-soldiers and middle level commanders, who 
committed the atrocities were never held accountable. ST thus suggested (in the above 
editions) that such resources should have been reserved for national reconciliation and 
development. 
FDP lauded the need for judicial accountability. ST rationalised the need for reconciliation as 
opposed to the prosecution of the CDF leaders, with the intra-party political struggle that 
engulfed the SLPP.  The paper represented that Kabbah used the prosecutorial argument to 
rope in Norman to make way for Berewa to lead the SLPP62. FDP (see Appendix III157, 158) relied 
on the independence of the SCSL and articulated that Kabbah would not have prejudiced the 
court’s independence by blocking Norman’s indictment.  ST (see Appendix III359-362, 367, 457) raised 
questions regarding the court’s fairness and independence from its funders, and capitalised on 
the negative effects of the witness protection scheme, and Crane’s prejudicial comments 
before the CDF trial ended. 
The paper (see Appendix III292) also captured how the Americans forced Sierra Leone’s 
Parliament into ratifying an agreement, preventing Sierra Leone from handing Americans 
indicted by the ICC for war crimes. The paper further exposed how the Americans pressured the 
SLPP into subjecting Sierra Leone’s heroes to war crimes trials and simultaneously promoting 
impunity, when it came to prosecuting Americans. FDP (see Appendix III163, 206) also published 
some articles, questioning the independence of the SCSL from its funders, but did not oppose 
the witness protection scheme; neither did it take up issues with Crane, when he made his 
prejudicial comment against Norman. But it captured the controversy around the urge to 
convict and the act of withholding evidence from the defence and also reflected America’s 
disdain for the ICC (see Appendix III165, 206,).  
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The question of plea bargaining with equally culpable war criminals in the name of holding 
higher echelons commanders responsible was also raised by ST. Thus, the paper dubbed 
Massallay and Nallo as criminals, used by the prosecution to nail the CDF leaders. Awoko (see 
Appendix III99) projected the need to end impunity and the ideals of reconciliation, because it 
was practically impossible to try every perpetrator. FDP lent credence to the operations of the 
TRC and published ‘the entire TRC Report’, but criticised the SLPP for failing to accept some of 
its recommendations. Unlike FDP, Awoko (see Appendix III46-47) commented on some ‘salient 
issues’ in the report. It emphasised the need for the SLPP to accept the report as a blue-print 
for Sierra Leone’s post-conflict governance. ST published a much larger portion and critical 
articles of its contents than Awoko.  
The paper (see Appendix III359-362, 367, 457) also condemned the SLPP’s White Paper on the 
report and called on it to fully implement it. ST (see Appendix III352, 362) further stated that the 
CDF leaders should have been brought before the TRC. This position was also re-echoed by 
Awoko (see Appendix III99) in its analysis on the TRC and the CDF’s role in the conflict. FDP 
supported the work of the TRC, but never said the CDF leaders should only face the TRC. 
Meanwhile, there were overlaps in the papers’ analysis on the SCSL’s refusal to allow Norman 
to face the TRC. The papers also analysed the implications of that decision for TJ in Africa and 
beyond. 
The papers published critical articles condemning the SCSL and positing that Norman must be 
allowed to face the TRC, because of his pivotal role in the conflict. FDP and ST stated that 
Norman’s public testimony would discredit Kabbah and expose his collusion with his anointed 
successor. FDP however, established that though it wanted Norman to face the TRC that should 
not have extricated him from the tentacles of the SCSL. Thus, it appears that FDP’s support for 
Norman’s proposed testimony to the TRC63 was geared towards exposing Kabbah’s affiliation 
with the Kamajors. The papers opposed the simultaneous institutionalisation of the 
prosecutorial and reconciliatory approaches to TJ. ST (see Appendix III294, 296, 306) stated that 
Sierra Leone is the only country that set up a TRC and a Special Court at the same time to 
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resolve the same conflict. Regarding the reparation for war victims and the DDR programme,64 
ST and Awoko (see Appendix III371) recounted the successes which the latter recorded, but 
singled out its failures relative to widespread corruption and the fact that the CDF did not even 
benefit from the DDR programme. 
FDP (see Appendix III148, 198) did not reflect the CDF- DDR episode, but reported the widespread 
corruption that affected the programme. The papers however presented the case of the 
amputees and the war wounded soldiers. Their (see Appendix III24, 29, 151) analyses also 
encompassed the inauguration of the plethora of post-conflict governance institutions;65 and 
those that were reformed66 in building democratic legitimacy in the country. Essentially, the 
papers raised critical arguments pointing to the need for the executive to allow the above 
democratic institutions to function, consonant with the democratic ideals for which they were 
established.  
6.3 Content Analysis: The Quantitative Dimension 
From the above analysis, the papers appeared to have lent credence to judicial accountability, 
albeit with seeming ‘biases’ in favour of (ST and Awoko) or against (FDP) the CDF leaders. It is 
also clear that the papers reflected virtually all the reconciliatory models, with seeming ‘biases’ 
that the CDF leaders should or should not have only faced the TRC. Analytically, the coverage of 
the above issues, and the controversies that surrounded the discourses of the main and sub-
frames,67were characterised by seeming ‘biases’ on the part of the papers frames.’  
To further validate this finding, I shall quantitatively evaluate how the papers attempted to 
separate their ‘views’ from the actual ‘news contents’. This will, inter alia, point to the degree 
to which each of the papers strove to achieve the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’ 
(Lichtenberg, 2000: 238-254).  It will also help invalidating whether the papers’ coverage, 
appeared to have been marked by ethno-regional biases. This is against the backdrop that the 
media in Sierra Leone is still grappling with the problems of communications ethics (see 3.4). 
                                                          
64
See IV, XVI and XXIX of the LPA and ACT No.13 of 2001 as Amended by Act No. 8 of 2003. 
65
CMR.RD, NCRRR/NaCSA, ACC, NEC, NCHR and NCD 
66
The Judiciary, the Police and the Armed Forces 
67
See 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 
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Table 1: For Di People’s Reportage (CDF trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
November 2003) 
PROSECUTION  DEFENCE  
January 2007-
August 2007 
(June 2004-
May 2005) 
(January 2006-
October 2006) 
N 8 8 18 3 
V 22 11 17 3 
US 15 13 8 16 
 
Table 2: Standard Times’ Reportage (CDF trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS   
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
November 2003) 
PROSECUTION  DEFENCE  
(January 2007-
August 2007) 
(June 2004-
May 2005) 
(January 2006-
October 2006) 
N 12 17 3 10 
V 17 19 2 10 
US 15 14 12 3 
 
Table 3: Awoko’s Reportage (CDF trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS  
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
November 
2003) 
PROSECUTION  DEFENCE  
January 2007-
August 2007 
(June 2004-
May 2005) 
(January 2006-
October 2006) 
N 15 19 30 16 
V 6 5 1 13 
US 8 5 3 4 
 
The tables (1, 2 and 3) above show the representation of the publications of FDP, ST and A; 
categorised into News (N), Views (V) and Unclassified Stories(US) for the pre-trial, trial and 
post-trial phases. Even though the pre-trial period spanned for up to fifteen months (March, 
2003-June, 2004); the analysis focuses on only the first nine months (March, 2003- November, 
2003). It started in March, 2003, because that was when the CDF leaders’ indictments were 
unsealed. The trial period lasted for twenty- nine months (i.e. between June, 2004 and 
November, 2006). The analysis regarding this period is divided into the case for the prosecution 
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and that of the defence. This spanned up to fourteen (14) months; but the analysis reflecting 
this period covered only the first twelve (12) months, which are considered sufficient to gauge 
the trend in the papers’ analyses of the prosecution’s case. The case for the defence 
commenced in January and ended in October, 2006. And the analysis (see tables 1, 2 and 3) 
covered the whole period (ten months) for which the defence’s case lasted.  
The post-trial phase, which commenced after the Trial Chamber 1 delivered its judgment, 
ended with the pronouncement of the Appeals’ Chamber judgment in 2008, but the analysis 
reflects the period January to August, 2007- it would have been unrealistic to analyse all the 
contents of the papers for the period for which the trial lasted. Building on the generalisation 
that communications research observations are inevitably ‘selective’ and ‘incomplete’ 
(Treadwell, op.cit:7), the analysis is thus restricted to the periods depicted in tables 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 4: The Selected Media’s Total Reportage (CDF trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
November 2003) 
PROSECUTION  DEFENCE  
January 2007-
August 2007 
(June 2004-
May 2005) 
(January 2006-
October 2006) 
N 35 44 51 29 
V 45 35 20 26 
US 38 32 23 23 
 
 Table (4) presents the total of News, Views and Unclassified Stories of FDP, ST and A for all 
three periods. According to Allison Cooper, Chief of Press and Public Affairs and former court 
reporter, quoted in Lang (op.cit:3), ‘press coverage tends to focus on prosecution during the 
early stages when indictments are unsealed, and then shifts when defence begins to presents it 
case’. The first limb of this statement appeared to have been validated by the total pre-trial and 
trial (N 35+ V 45+ US 38=118;N 44 + V 35 + US 32= 111) publications of the papers. Thus, 
precisely 229 (118 pre-trial + 111 trial) contents were published during the periods when the 
prosecution unsealed the indictments and prosecuted the CDF leaders. This point to the level of 
attention, which the papers extended to the prosecution of the CDF leaders; and the salience 
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and valence, which they attributed to the prosecution’s case, as seen in the analysis between 
6.2.1 and 6.2.5.  Moreover, even the second limb of Coopers’ observation that media coverage 
‘shifts when the defence begins to present its case’ seems to have been supported by the 
findings in this quantitative analysis (N 51+ V 20 + US 23= 194). Thus, the precise contents 
(194), which the papers published throughout the defence’s case, are lesser than those which 
they published during both the pre-trial and trial phases. 
Table 5: Comprehensive Representation of the Reportage (CDF trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
MEDIA 
HOUSE 
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
November 
2003) 
PROSECUTION  DEFENCE  
January 2007-
August 2007 
(June 2004-
May 2005) 
(January 2006-
October 2006) 
N 
ST 12 17 3 10 
A 15 19 30 16 
FDP 8 8 18 3 
V 
ST 17 19 2 10 
A 6 5 1 13 
FDP 22 11 17 3 
US 
ST 15 14 12 3 
A 8 5 3 4 
FDP 15 13 8 16 
 
This table (5) depicts a clear breakdown of table 4 regarding the coverage of the individual 
newspapers. Essentially, this table is graphically represented for a much more clear analysis and 
presentation in the subsequent graphs. 
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The above graph shows how FDP represented the trial. The paper carried forty-five (45) pre-
trial dispatches. The News contents amounted to eight (8), the Views and Unclassified Stories, 
amounted to twenty-two (22) and fifteen (15) respectively. This indicates that FDP paid much 
more attention to the publication of Views and Unclassified Stories (22 + 15 = 37) than to the 
dispatch of the actual News contents. It can thus be contended that the Views and Unclassified 
stories were framed with the most effectively chosen nuances that reflected the media 
communicator’s (FDP’s) texts(preferred meanings) which the audiences (CSOs representatives) 
may or may not have taken (preferred readings), depending on their perceptual tendencies. 
This same trend is continued in the trial and post-trial phases. 
The News contents dispatched in both phases {trial18+8 = 26 + post-trial 3= 29), cannot be 
equated with the total contents on Views and Unclassified Stories {trial (11 + 17+ 3 =31) + post-
trial(13 + 8 +16=37); 37+ 31 =68} which the paper published during both the trial and post-trial 
phases. Analytically, this appears to have confirmed the analysis’ qualitative dimension, which 
establishes (relying on the 2007 Entman’s theoretical and conceptual framework for evaluating 
media biases) that FDP’s numerous publications, seemed to have been biased against the CDF. 
The paper’s Owner and Editor-in- Chief (Paul Kamara) being a Northerner, happens to be the 
Minister of Sports in the present Northern dominated APC Government. Paul Kamara, alongside 
other Northerners (including SU Thoronka and Sallieu Kamara), extensively covered the CDF 
trial. Building on the theoretical argument that ‘News production is a discourse anchored by the 
ideology of news producers or those who employ them’ (Watson, op.cit: 130), it appears that 
the numerous FDP’s publications were tainted with Northern ‘ethno-regional’ prejudices 
against the CDF leaders, whom the paper dubbed as ‘war criminals’ (Northern bias) and not 
‘National heroes’ (South- Eastern bias). This position became clear in FDP’s coverage even 
before the CDF leaders were convicted. Hence, it is contended that FDP appeared to have failed 
to uphold the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’ in its coverage of the CDF trial. 
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Figure 2: Standard Times’ Reportage (CDF trial) 
This graph shows how ST represented the trial. The paper published forty-four (44) pre-trial 
contents. The News contents amounted to twelve (12), the Views and Unclassified Stories, 
amounted to seventeen (17) and fifteen (15) respectively. This implies that ST paid much more 
attention to the publication of Views and Unclassified Stories (17+ 15 = 33) than to the dispatch 
of the actual News contents. It can thus be  contended that the Views and Unclassified Stories, 
were framed with the most effectively chosen nuances that reflected the media 
communicators’ (ST’s) texts (preferred meanings) which the audiences (CSOs representatives) 
may or may not have taken (preferred readings), depending on their perceptual tendencies. 
This same trend is continued in the trial and post-trial phases.  
The News contents dispatched in both phases {trial 17+ 3= 20 + post-trial 10= 30}, cannot be 
equated with the total contents on Views and Unclassified Stories {trial (19 + 2 + 10 = 31) +post-
trial (14 + 12 + 3= 27); 27+ 31 = 58} which the paper published during both the trial and post-
trial phases. Analytically, this appears to have confirmed the analysis’ qualitative dimension, 
which establishes (relying on Entman, ibid) that the numerous pre-trial, trial and post- trial 
publications of ST, seemed to have been biased in favour of the CDF. Even though the owner of 
the paper (Philip Neville) is neither a Southerner nor an Easterner, the paper’s longest serving 
Editor-in-Chief (Karim-Sei) and his committed staff (Augustine Beecher, Mohammed Abu, 
Mohammed Issa, Theophilus Gbenda and KamourNdullu), who extensively covered the CDF 
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trial are South-Easterners. Again, building on Watson’s (op.cit: 130) theoretical argument (see 
analysis on FDP above), it appears that ST’s numerous publications, seemed to have been 
tainted with South-Eastern ‘ethno- regional’ prejudices in favour of the CDF leaders, whom the 
paper dubbed as ‘National heroes’ and not ‘war criminals’. Hence, it appears that ST seemed to 
have failed to uphold the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’ in its reportage of the 
CDF trial. 
 
Figure 3: Awoko’s Reportage (CDF Trial) 
This graph shows how Awoko represented the trial. The paper published twenty-nine (29) pre-
trial contents. The News contents amounted to fifteen (15); the Views and Unclassified Stories 
amounted to six (6) and eight (8) respectively. It is clear from this quantification that Awoko 
paid much more attention to the publication of News contents (15) than the dispatches of 
Views (6) and Unclassified Stories (8) put together (6 + 8= 14). Thus, it appears that Awoko 
(unlike FDP and ST) strove in its pre-trial reportage to uphold the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘accuracy’. This finding appears to have reflected the journalist’s position of what is news 
(see 4.2).But relying on Fowler (op.cit: 1-3), Altschull (op.cit:23) Watson (op.cit: 120-141), 
Severin & Tankard (op.cit: 101-102), Smith (Op.cit:34- 41, 47-53) and Entman (Op.cit:165), it 
can be argued that Awoko’s ‘socially constructed realities’ (its pre-trial news contents) were not 
neutral.  
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Hence, they appeared to have been framed to reflect its (Awoko’s) texts (preferred meanings), 
which the audiences (CSOs representatives) may or may not have taken (preferred readings), 
depending on their perceptual tendencies. This same trend is continued in the paper’s trial and 
post-trial phases. The News contents dispatched in both phases {trial 19 + 30 = 49 + post-trial 
16= 65), cannot be equated with the total contents on Views and Unclassified Stories {trial (5 + 
1 + 13 = 19) + post-trial (5 + 3 + 4= 12); 19 + 12 = 31} which it published during both the trial and 
post-trial phases. Analytically, this appears to have confirmed the analysis’ qualitative 
dimension, which establishes (relying on Entman, ibid) that the numerous pre-trial, trial and 
post- trial publications of Awoko appeared to have been biased in favour of the CDF. 
The paper’s support for the CDF leaders is also seen in the fact that it paid much more attention 
to the CDF’s case than that of the prosecution (see graph above). Awoko thus reported the 
entire case for the defence (see graph above) with its chosen nuances and slants that factually 
informed the issues as elucidated in the qualitative dimension of this analysis. Inasmuch as 
there is evidence of Awoko’s seeming biased reportage in favour of the CDF, there is no 
evidence to substantiate the argument that that seeming ‘biasness’ was occasioned by ‘ethno-
regional’ considerations, as neither the owner of the paper, nor the reporters that covered the 
trial can be said to have had any affinity with the Southern and Eastern regions that have been 
supportive of the CDF. 
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This representation depicts the graphic presentation of the tabular data represented in table 4 
as explicated above. 
 
Figure 5: Comprehensive Representation of the Reportage (CDF trial)  
This representation depicts the graphic presentation of the tabular data represented in table 5 
as explicated above. 
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from the interviews conducted with the journalists, who covered the CDF trial, are again 
subjected to a discourse analysis in a bid to further validate the above findings.     
6.4.1 For Di People (FDP) 
 A critical analysis of the discourses that evolved from the frames and sub-frames in the 
qualitative content analysis appears to have revealed a case of serious ethno-regional tension, 
which had polarised Sierra Leone’s body-politic, even before the war started. This tension 
seemed to have reflected in the reportage of FDP, which appeared to have maintained a 
Northern posture in its News, Views and Unclassified Stories. FDP continually used words that 
unequivocally denote and connote negative semantic loads (Mautner, op.cit:38) against the 
Mendes of the South- East. It is clear from the CDF’s indictment (as enunciated in 6.1) that 
Norman, Kondowai and Fofana, were never charged with cannibalism, but FDP constantly 
reported that ‘cannibalism’68was one of the charges proffered against the CDF leaders. The 
intentional and continual use of the diction ‘cannibalism’ appears to have denoted FDP’s 
prejudices against the CDF leaders and as well demonstrates negative semantic loads, 
indicating how ferocious and deadly the Kamajors were. 
Again, FDP described the Kamajors as ‘butchers’, ‘hoodlums’, ‘blood thirsty power ethnicists’ 
(see Appendix III147, 151, 152, 158, 168, 190, 203-204, 207, 208, 237) or were dubbed ‘criminals’, ‘hooligans’, 
‘ritual killers’ and ‘looters’ (see Appendix III208, 233, 236-237, 246, 255-256 ). The choice of the above 
negative words is arguably calculated (Fowler, op.cit:1-4 Van Dijk, 1998: 241, Mautner, op.cit: 
38) to drive home some negative perceptions into the minds of audiences (CSOs 
representatives in this case). The following inciting comments are discernible from the above 
publications: 
                                                          
68
‘Norman: Charged with cannibalism’ (Monday, 23 March, 2003). ‘Special Court told howKamajors killed and Chopped Chief and Town Speaker 
(headline). The photo caption states: ‘The Only Civil Defence Militia Indicted forCannibalismin the War’ (Wednesday, 23rd June, 2004). 
‘Kamajors’ (headline): The photo caption reads: ‘Kamajors Militia: horrific tales of human butchery and cannibalism has soiled image of 
invincibility and fighting for true democracy to one of ulterior motives’!!! (Monday, 13th September, 2004). ‘They killed and ate Palm Wine 
Tapper!’(Headline)The photo caption indicates: ‘Norman: Chieftain Blamed for Cannibalism... (ibid)‘State of the People: SLAM ME not’ 
(headline) ’There were certain societies that made it a practice of feeding on human flesh or ‘yomoto’ to those that were initiated as civil 
defence members’ (ibid).‘Peter Penfold and Hinga Norman’ (headline). ‘Penfoldmight have eaten human flesh while dinning with Norman in 
Camp Zero’(FDP, Wednesday, May 7, 2003). ‘Lawyers and the Hinga Norman Propaganda’ (headline). ‘He is being charged with human rights 
abuses, including cannibalism. Let us give the court a chance for us to ponder how come a minister is engaged in cannibalism. If this is the 
case that Sierra Leoneans were chopping their fellow country- men, then the crisis is far more serious than many would want to think or 
accept...There are some people who have written articles justifying cannibalism during war’ (FDP, Wednesday, 28th  May, 2003). 
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1. The Mendes of the South and East are blood thirsty power ethnicists; who hatched a 
ferocious and demonic conspiracy to annihilate Northerners during the war years in 
defence of their regions (Juxtapose this with the interview in transcription 2). 
 
2. They condoned the criminality of the Kamajors, strengthened their capacity and 
pampered them with the much needed logistics to illegally prosecute the war (ibid). 
 
3. The Kamajors committed despicable crimes against the people of Sierra Leone 
(particularly Northerners and journalists); hence they were ‘criminals’, ‘cannibals’, 
‘butchers’ and ‘hooligans’; who were judiciously subjected to war crimes trials to account 
for their criminality (ibid). 
 
4. ‘Their political party (the SLPP) maligned and destroyed the national army to perpetuate 
their stay in power through ruthless Kamajors’ protection (ibid). 
5. That the army did not do anything wrong in deposing the SLPP ethnicists from power in 
1997 (ibid). 
6.4.2 Standard Times (ST) 
 ST appeared to have maintained a South-Eastern slant in its reportage and refrained from 
invoking words that would have portrayed the SLPP (as FDP did) as either a South-Eastern 
political party or a political entity that fanned the flames of ethno-regional prejudices and 
disenchantment. The paper did not demonise the Kamajors society (as FDP did). ST regarded 
the Kamajors as ‘national heroes’, ‘noble fighters’, ‘brave fighters’ ,‘redeemers’, ‘liberators’, 
‘patriots’, ‘restorers of peace and democracy’, and ‘a militia group that formidably resisted the 
deadly junta regime’ (see Appendix III297, 301, 306-307, 322, 324, 365, 372, 435); whereas forces loyal to the 
AFRC/RUF junta were described as ‘coupists’, ‘criminals’, ‘so-bels’, ‘deadly junta regime’, 
‘thugs’, ‘rebels’, ‘collaborators’, ‘renegade soldiers’, ‘killers’ etc (see Appendix III286, 289, 294-295, 370, 
425, 442, 450, 465). 
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The semantic values of such positive descriptions of the Kamajors and the persistent reference 
to the SLPP as the ‘democratically’ and ‘constitutionally elected government’, was  arguably 
calculated to drive home the positive perceptions into the minds of audiences that the CDF 
leaders were national heroes (see transcriptions 3 and 5); the Kamajors did not do anything 
wrong in fighting the forces loyal to  the AFRC/RUF junta (ibid), and that had it not been for 
their tireless resistance, the reign of terror and militarism would never have come to an end, 
and that the junta blatantly defiled Sierra Leone’s Constitution (ibid); and therefore had no 
legitimacy to govern; and hence the legitimate government was rightly restored (ibid). That was 
arguably how ST wanted CSOs representatives across Sierra Leone to read and interpret its pre-
trial, trial and post- trial texts (preferred readings) in condemnation of the junta, but made 
laudable commendations of the Kamajors. 
6.4.3 Awoko 
Awoko’s reportage of the discourses in the main and sub-frames was slightly different from ST, 
but different by far from that of FDP. The paper’s semantic values of the dictions, which were 
carefully chosen to report the proceedings, seemed to have contained nuances devoid of 
ethno-regional prejudices, but they were carefully framed to achieve the paper’s desired effect 
on audiences. The paper did not (as FDP did) ‘attribute responsibility to either the South-
Easterners or the SLPP for the reckless destruction of lives and property in Sierra Leone’; 
‘neither did it accuse the SLPP of marginalising and/or undermining the army and capacitating 
the Kamajors at the detriment of national disintegration’; nor did it allege that ‘the South-
Easterners had hatched a diabolic plan to systematically annihilate Northerners’ (see Appendix 
III52, 56, 80, 84 ; see also analysis between 6.3.1 and 6.3.5 for additional references). 
Awoko seldom demonised the Kamajors in its coverage, though there were some instances in 
which the paper did publish stories containing ‘horrifying testimonies’ about Kamajors’ 
atrocities. Awoko also seldom used horrific images to describe the Kamajors as ‘cannibals’, 
‘butchers’, ‘blood thirsty power ethnicists’, ‘criminals’, ‘thieves’, ‘hooligans’, ‘looters’, ‘killers’ 
(as FDP did)  etc.  There were so many instances in which the paper dubbed Norman a ‘national 
hero’; and extolled the efforts of the CDF in restoring peace and democracy to Sierra Leone (as 
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ST did). The paper often used the acronym ‘CDF’ (which is quite national) as opposed to 
‘Kamajors’ (which according to FDP denote a ‘tribal army of criminals and cannibals’) in its 
reportage.  
The very limited instances in which the paper chose ‘words’ and ‘expressions’ that denote 
‘cannibalism’, ‘butchery’, ‘criminality’ and ‘killings’ on the part of the Kamajors, were  restricted 
to only those pieces of evidence, which the prosecution elicited from their factual witnesses, 
which were later reconstructed and subsequently passed- off for societal consumption as news. 
From the perspective of Awoko, such publications can be said to be ‘quite innocuous’, 
‘balanced’ and ‘accurate’; but Awoko’s critics could employ Entman’s (op.cit:52), McQuail’s 
(op.cit:343-344) and Tankard’s (op.cit: 101)framing devices to deconstruct such texts and prove 
that even though they were sourced with the testimonies of factual witnesses; they were 
skewed against the CDF and in favour of the prosecution. 
 However, throughout the period covered by this study, I could hardly discover any ‘editorial’, 
‘commentary’, ‘feature article’, ‘opinionated piece’, or ‘view’, published by Awoko that 
described the Kamajors as ‘cannibals’, ‘butchers’, ‘killers’, ‘criminals’, ‘thieves’, ‘looters’ etc. 
Since such derogatory dictions, appeared not to have been used in the ‘Views’ and ‘Unclassified 
Stories’ and even most of the ‘News’ contents, which Awoko published between 2003 and 
2007, coupled with the articles in which Chief Norman and the CDF were extolled for the 
restoration of democracy (see Appendix III65, 71, 103, 108-109, 111); it would be reasonable to 
conclude that Awoko chose not to condemn the CDF leaders, but to commend them for what 
did they for Sierra Leone (see transcription 6).  
6.5 Semi-Structured Interviews 
To further validate the findings from the content and discourse analyses, the need arose to 
gauge the opinions of journalists, who covered the trial, through semi-structured interviews. 
Paul Kamara and SU Thoronka of FDP, Ibrahim Karim-Sei, Theophilus Gbenda and Mohammed 
Abu of ST, Kelvin Lewis and Betty Milton of Awoko consented to the interviews. They answered 
questions regarding their papers’ editorial policies on TJ; whether the setting up of the SCSL 
was of any benefit to Sierra Leone; whether their coverage was biased in favour of the 
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prosecution or the CDF, or whether it was tainted with ethno-regional biases, how the 
reportage influenced post-conflict opinions etc. I will focus on the views expressed by the 
editors, since it is they who implemented their papers’ editorial policies. 
References will be made to the supporting or opposing views expressed by their reporters. To 
the questions why they chose to be involved in the country’s TJ process and their papers’ 
editorial policies on the subject, the journalists articulated their responsibility to objectively 
communicate the country’s TJ process to all and sundry (see transcriptions 1-7).  FDP’s editor, 
Kamara, added that he had been a critical journalist and a civil society and human rights 
activist, who told the truth that was not told to the TRC (see transcription 2). Thus, the 
journalists arguably performed their role of informing and educating all and sundry about TJ in 
Sierra Leone.   
Concerning the question whether the setting up of the SCSL was of any benefit to any local or 
international persons or institutions, the responses were mixed. FDP’s staff rationalised the 
court’s successes in addressing impunity and upholding the rule of law (see transcriptions 1 & 
2). They as well contended that the moneys spent to try Sierra Leone’s war criminals, were well 
expended and that such moneys could not have been better spent on post-conflict 
reconciliation and development. These views were also shared by Awoko’s staff (see 
transcriptions 6 and 7).  
The paper’s editor, Lewis, stated that there would not have been sustainable peace and 
reconciliation in Sierra Leone without justice. He said that the moneys were wisely spent to act 
as a deterrent against criminality, noting that had they been spent on reconstruction alone, 
another rebellion would have erupted, distorting the reconstruction process. He also stated 
that the court was right in trying those who bore the greatest responsibility, because given its 
limited resources; it would have been practically unrealistic to try all the perpetrators (see 
transcription 6). Lewis furthered that the SCSL immensely benefited the country, as it worked 
towards ending impunity, though the court faced initial challenges with the TRC, because ex-
combatants felt their genuine testimonies to the TRC were going to be used against them in the 
SCSL (see transcription 6). 
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The paper’s war crimes reporter, Milton, buttressed Lewis’s arguments  and emphasised that 
though the SCSL did not completely address impunity, it sent fears to potential perpetrators 
that they would never commit war crimes and go unpunished, stating that Sierra Leone was not 
plunged into violence during the 2007 elections because of the presence of the SCSL (see 
transcriptions 6 & 7). ST’s staff acknowledged the role of the SCSL in dividing Sierra Leone, with 
specific reference to how the CDF trial was unwelcomed by many Sierra Leoneans because of 
its role in restoring the legitimate government. They further contended that the CDF leaders 
should have faced the TRC instead of the SCSL and that the moneys expended in the trials 
should have been better spent on post-conflict reconciliation and reparation for war victims 
(see transcriptions 3, 4 & 5).  
The paper’s editor, Karim-Sei, also said the initial public perception was for the SCSL to try the 
leaders of the AFRC/RUF, but when the CDF leaders were indicted, it became difficult for 
people to understand what was going on, adding that he knew the difficulty of getting factual 
witnesses and huge operating costs, were going to pose major challenges to the court. He 
furthered that SCSL did not provide the swift and sustainable justice that would have 
maintained the kind of peace and security which the country needed.  He noted that ST 
advocated for adequate compensations for amputees and war victims, who are now hopelessly 
rooming the streets of Freetown, with nobody to support them (see transcription 3).  
The paper’s senior war crimes reporter, Gbenda, explained that he conducted interviews with 
some key personnel of NaCSA on the status of the reparation schemes and they told him funds 
were not available, stating that the schemes failed because of widespread corruption. Gbenda 
further noted that the SCSL created lucrative jobs only for foreign nationals, but the victims of 
the war (the indigenes) were left in abject poverty and frustrations (see transcription 5). The 
Staff Writer, Abu, said that the DDR scheme appeared to have been successful, but the 
reparation schemes were not properly implemented (see transcriptions 5). 
On the reconciliation episode, Abu indicated that Sierra Leone should have adopted the South 
African model, which eschewed prosecution, but encouraged perpetrators to come forth and 
tell their stories, ask for forgiveness and develop a solid reconciliatory system. Instead the SCSL 
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ended up re-opening old wounds and members of the respective warring factions became 
witnesses for the prosecution against their peers with whom they committed the same 
atrocities (see transcription 5). Gbenda noted that the SCSL hampered the work of the TRC 
because it prevented indictees from appearing before the TRC, adding that even the RUF 
leaders should not have been tried, because they were not defeated in the battlefield; but they 
rather conceded to a peaceful negotiation culminating in the Amnesty clause in the LPA. He 
emphasised that genuine reconciliation should have been the only way out (see transcription 
4).  
He also posited that the CDF trial has created a kind of tribal concern and has discouraged the 
formation of ethno-regional militias, noting that whenever there is a rebellion people would be 
afraid to embark on such enterprises for fear of being prosecuted. He said that though the trial 
was meant to serve as a deterrent, the justice that was handed down was selective and biased 
because Crane had made prejudicial comments against Norman even before the trial 
commenced. He concluded by stating the challenges that beset post-conflict Sierra Leone, 
noting that the victims of the war are still languishing in the streets as beggars, as homeless 
people and the relocation camps  built for them, are far removed from the main cities (see 
transcription 4).  
On the reconciliation and reparation episodes which ST made prominent apparently because of 
Norman’s indictment, Thoronka said FDP published the TRC report in its entirety (see 
transcription 1). The editor reiterated his support for the TRC, but accused it of failing to clearly 
depict the wide spread atrocities committed by the Kamajors (see transcription 2). Both men 
explained that the reparation schemes were not managed in a way that reflected the war 
victims’ interests (see transcriptions 1 and 2). The editor further said financial mismanagement 
was what really crippled the implementation of the reparation schemes. Thoronka however 
stated that FDP played an advocacy role for Sierra Leone’s war victims and amputees to be 
compensated for their irreparable loss and the colossal war damage done to them (see 
transcription 1). 
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On these same issues, Milton explained how Awoko gave prominence to the activities of the 
TRC and accused NaCSA of mismanaging the reparation funds (see transcription 7). The paper’s 
editor explained that the TRC was absolutely necessary to foster post-conflict reconciliation and 
sustainable peace (see transcription 6). On reparation, the editor made this striking revelation:   
Well, we tried as much as possible to advocate for that. We interviewed amputees, we 
interviewed the war wounded, and we carry their stories, and we made sure that we 
were part of their appeals. As always, they tried to speak through our news medium to 
the government about their position, about their physical and economic state, and we 
believe that in some ways, the articles that we published was able to attract 
international donors, who came in and actually tried to do something for them, for 
example, the Norwegians who started building houses for them, and that sort of thing. 
They got their initial idea about the whole thing from press reports. We believe that was 
the way I think to do at that time and that was our own policy (see transcription 6) 
 Thus, FDP’s and Awoko’s staff lauded the setting up of the SCSL as a positive step in ending 
impunity. Whereas, ST saw it as a mechanism through which Sierra Leone was further divided 
because the SCSL failed to provide the swift justice that the people wanted and the unfair 
treatment meted out to the CDF that liberated the country. The editors and staff of the papers 
(for different reasons analysed above) supported the reconciliation process, berated the 
implementation of the reparation schemes, and attributed the continual sufferings of amputees 
and war victims to the apparent failure of the reparation process.    
To the questions whether it was because of ethno-regional considerations that the reportage 
was tilted in favour of the prosecution or the CDF, the responses were again mixed. FDP’s war 
crimes correspondent, Thoronka, said though he fairly reported the trial without any 
prejudices, the paper’s editor was sensationalising his stories against the CDF (see transcription 
1). This is how the editor however responded to the questions:                 
‘...Now, here was the SLPP government, they decided on a policy of making sure that 
the military becomes their own militia, the Kamajors. And this was a deliberate policy of 
the SLPP… So here you see a government that only respected one militia group. They 
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don’t give food, they don’t give ration, they don’t give allowances, and they don’t give 
foot wears to the other militia that sprouted right across the country, like the 
Tamaboros, the Donsos, the Gbethis… They just fixed their attention on just the 
tribalistic mentality that they had. Then I was the person that really rallied the nation to 
get footwears for the CDF... So therefore, I was the one that actually came out openly to 
support the CDF. But at the same time, I criticised the Kamajors because first of all, they 
were a tribalistic group. I mean, I criticised the Kamajors because they did not reflect a 
national identity. I criticised the Kamajors because they were hounding hundreds of 
people, who came from other parts of the country, including the North, especially the 
North, and especially Themnes. They were hounding them, killing them, in their 
hundreds and thousands, you understand. I also criticised them because they eat human 
flesh. They actually came out to show that they were cannibals. So therefore, if they 
have it in cannibalism, they call it ‘Yamortor’, which they even roast…’ (See transcription 
2) 
Asked what ‘Yamortor’ is, the editor responded: 
‘Well, the eating of human beings. You understand? So if you see human beings being 
put in ‘bandas’ (wire meshes), I mean, they dried them in ‘bandas’ Just like how you dry 
fish, or meat or sheep… And they eat them. They pluck your heart out, and they can eat 
your heart and kidney raw. I mean, these things happened, but they never came out for 
us to reconcile in this country, and for the truth to prevail in this country. So, if you have 
a group that does all these things, and as a journalist who respects the truth, shouldn’t I 
say them? So these were the things, which I made very clear, so it is not a question of 
being against the CDF, but it is against also crying down the evils of the CDF... (See 
transcription 2) 
The editor denied skewing his coverage against the CDF on account of ethno-regional 
considerations, but emphasised the deep seated acrimony in the country between the 
Themnes of the North and the Mendes of the South-East. He accused the Mendes of having 
destroyed the country, adding that even Siaka Stevens, who purported to have been a Limba 
was a Mende and alleged that all the ex-leaders of Sierra Leone were Mendes; and that it is 
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only now that a true Northerner is ruling the country (see transcription 2). This was how he 
climaxed his lengthy response to the question: 
‘...I was writing the truth. And if I was biased against them, then the Special Court could 
not have found them wanting... I’m sure I gave them (the Special Court) information 
about what the guys were doing...I mean, eating human beings, you know, and killing 
other people from other places, you know, and being tribalistic, believing in 
supernatural powers, you know...When they want to initiate you into the Kamajors, it is 
human flesh you eat. So therefore, all those who are Kamajors eat human flesh. And at 
the same time they even brought it to Freetown... Imagine, these guys were all the time 
up country, and then you unleash them on people. They were just pointing at people 
and saying these were rebels and they killed many people in Freetown. And then... Dr. 
Sama Banya was... saying that the Kamajors have supernatural powers to spot rebels to 
kill them. So a person like Dr. Sama Banya, you know, must be called to answer for that 
statement he made’ (See transcription 2). 
Regarding the question why he thought Kabbah should have been indicted by the SCSL, the 
editor said he caused the deaths of thousands of people by dubbing those who did not go to 
Guinea rebels. He said that the twenty-four (24) soldiers, who were killed after Kabbah’s 
restoration, were not coupists, but were rather soldiers, who stayed in the country to protect 
lives and property during the interregnum (see transcription 2). However, this was how ST’s 
editor- Karim-Sei (see transcription 3, a view which Abu also shared-see transcription 4) 
responded to the questions why ST’s publications were positively tilted in favour of the CDF and 
why the paper’s staff thought the CDF leaders were national heroes and not war criminals or 
villains: 
‘Well, you know, the CDF, these were very close to our hearts at the time because we 
thought these were the true liberators for this country after the soldiers, the Sierra 
Leone Army had failed us and we saw the role the CDF played during this war, 
particularly the liberation of the capital, Freetown, we know the role they played... We 
were not looking at it from the viewpoint of a news organ supporting a particular 
 147 
 
institution because it had played a greater role, no. We were merely reporting what was 
happening. And what was particularly striking in this whole thing was the chief of 
defence staff, who was the head of the militia, the CDF, was also one of those charged. 
And so a lot of people had that kind of sympathy, you know that a man who had played 
so many roles to liberate this country is now a victim of the Special Court… Many people 
were asking “Why did you charge Hinga Norman to court? Why did you charge the other 
CDF, the other Kamajors? Why did you have to charge them after they had fought so 
hard for this country?”... We were not actually interested in what will be the outcome, 
but we were just asking why these people were charged to court after they have played 
a tremendous role in liberating this country. And so, some of our editorials were tilted 
towards those kinds of opinions people had about Hinga Norman and others... Well, 
personally, I will consider them as national heroes, you know. Because Hinga Norman in 
particular, the founder of the CDF, and a man who, you know, left the comfort of his 
home to go into the bush and stayed there with the Kamajors, you know, I mean very 
few Sierra Leoneans can make that kind of sacrifice. So, for me personally, he was a 
hero. And up to date, I consider him a hero (see transcription 3). 
To the question whether the heroic statuses accorded to the CDF leaders were beclouded by 
their Southern and Eastern prejudices, both Karim-Sei and Mohammed Abu (Southerners) said 
the CDF issue was not ethno-regional, emphasising the national perspective of their reportage 
over ethno-regional prejudices (see transcriptions 3 and 5). But Theophilus Gbenda (an 
Easterner) was quite certain about how ethno-regional prejudices beclouded ST’s reportage of 
the CDF trial: 
… so maybe they {ST’s journalists} decided to play the role, something like this... based 
on their ethnic alliance with Norman, because whilst I will not want to judge the guys in 
question by their names, but then when you go beyond their mere names, you will find 
out that they had every reason to be sympathetic to the cause of the Kamajors...The 
Kamajors were going to turn the war into a tribal war. So there was this strong tribal 
attachment and also this strong political attachment. So, anybody who was against the 
TejanKabbah administration was already considered a target by the Kamajors. I saw so 
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many instances wherein Northerners were targeted because of their origins. I saw 
people being targeted because of their names, and so you will find out that there was 
this high level of ethnicity in the whole thing. And therefore, I remain unsurprised that 
those articles were coming in... Ethno-political considerations did influence the 
reportage of the trials for obvious reasons...‘whilst some journalists or whilst some 
newspaper contributors were writing positive things about Norman, there were other 
newspapers that were writing critical things... I cannot dissociate from the same ethnic 
considerations, right. Because one of the papers that was very critical of the CDF was 
For Di People for example. They carried lots and lots of critical articles against Norman 
to an extent that people thought it were a press war around the whole proceedings... 
(See transcription 4). 
Concerning the question whether it was because she thought the CDF fought for the 
restoration of the legitimate government that Awoko devoted more time in the coverage of the 
CDF trial, Milton said Awoko objectively reported the entire TJ process; and did not tilt any of 
its publications in favour of the CDF (see transcription 7). But the editor (Lewis) contravened 
Milton’s position and said the paper’s publications were tilted in favour of the CDF: 
Yes, and particularly so because I have had very deep involvement with the CDF. The 
CDF base which was called Base Zero, I was one of only two people who went there and 
stayed there, and it was under special circumstances. One, I could not speak the 
language, which was Mende, which was being widely spoken there. Secondly, I did not 
belong to the traditional secret society which was the criteria for you to be a part of the 
CDF movement. Thirdly, I had not been initiated as a member of the Kamajor or the CDF 
group. So my being there was very unique, and I was one of only two people who were 
allowed that special privilege. And I felt I had to tell the story of the CDF. And because of 
that we were passionate of what they did and we wanted to report them in a positive 
light ... (see transcription 6). 
Asked about their perceptions of the CDF leaders, regarding whether they are national heroes 
or war criminals, Milton said the CDF leaders were war criminals and not national heroes, 
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because they committed war crimes against Sierra Leoneans, though they were fighting for 
democracy (see transcription 7). On this point again, the editor contradicted Milton’s position 
and stated that: 
…it will be very difficult for me to see those people as war convicts, despite the fact that 
they were convicted and they are now serving their sentences. This is because… we 
were looking at the good versus the bad. And for most of the people of Sierra Leone 
including me, we saw the CDF as the good guys, because they stood up for us, they 
fought for us and they fought against the rebels, who were the marauding warriors. So it 
is difficult for me even today to accept that these people are war criminals because for 
me, they were doing a patriotic service, they stood up, they placed their lives on the line 
because of the country; it was not for their selfish reasons. Well they said atrocities 
were committed and therefore they’d been held responsible. In my mind, I still reject 
the notion of them being war criminals... For me, they should have taken the status of 
national heroes (see transcriptions 6). 
To the question whether they thought their publications have had any impacts on elites’ post-
conflict opinions, the journalists appeared to have answered the question in the affirmative. 
FDP’s editor said his paper had been an opinion leader and Sierra Leoneans had always been 
reading it to form opinions on national issues, but this trend has changed with the expansion of 
the country’s media landscape with so many newspapers and radio stations in operations. He 
furthered that though he no longer manages FDP, he believes the paper is still impacting 
society in its own way (see transcription 2).  
ST’s editor explained that his paper impacted the public’s post-conflict opinion because it was 
just reflecting what the public wanted. He said that he had no regrets for what his paper stood 
for. This view was buttressed by Gbenda and Abu (see transcriptions 4 & 5) who believed that 
their critical articles have always been influencing public opinions. They noted that so many 
people have interviewed them about their coverage of the SCSL, indicating that their views 
impacted post-conflict opinions. Lewis said Awoko expressed some opinions which he believed 
were taken in good stead and that people looked at his paper’s stance, and recognised it was 
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objective and based on that they were able to make informed decisions about issues 
concerning the war (see transcription 6). Milton’s response on this issue dovetailed with that of 
the editor (see transcription 7). 
Finally, this is how FDP’s Editor presented his present perception about the CDF and SCSL and 
their impacts in Sierra Leone’s body-politic: 
‘Well, I mean they deserve it… we must put an end to impunity. I mean, this is a starting 
point, but we must be effective, we must be constant, we must make sure that at the 
end of the day, let our own people know exactly why people were indicted and for us to 
say that “Never again shall we go through what we went through…” (See transcription 
2). 
On this point, Karim-Sei reiterated ST’s position that he thought the CDF leaders were unfairly 
treated and that they should not have subjected them to war crimes trials. He explained that 
the trial had huge political impacts, because it widened the political divide and whenever 
elections are held, the other side would use the CDF scenario to lampoon their opponents as a 
set of people, who betrayed their brothers, including their Internal Affairs Minister, the head of 
the Kamajors, who was imprisoned to die in a very horrible manner. He further said that 
economically, the trials and the court never benefited Sierra Leoneans and socially, most of 
those who were victimised are now suffering without compensations (see transcription 3) 
Gbenda said the setting up of the SCSL was a wasteful venture and reiterated the issue of how 
the court administered selective justice by targeting the wrong people, emphasising that 
Kondowai and Fofana were not members of the upper echelons of the CDF (see transcription 
4). Abu stated that the CDF leaders have been held to account for their actions, but questioned 
whether in the future another CDF would defend the rule of law and democracy. He furthered 
that regarding benefits, the SCSL’s structures have been used by the Sierra Leone Law School 
and the Prisons Service (see transcriptions 5). To the question of the trial’s impact on the 
country’s body-politic, Abu made this striking revelation: 
It affected the SLPP in the 2007 elections. Not that the APC loved the CDF, they didn’t 
like the CDF. A group of people approached Charles Margai to be a defence counsel for 
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Hinga Norman; straight off he said “What are you going to pay me.” As far as Charles 
Margai was concerned Hinga Norman had been one of his political rivals.  Hinga Norman 
had been one of the people that Margai called his antagonists. But when Hinga Norman 
was arrested, he made political gains out of it, the APC made political gains out of it. It 
was open, when the body of Hinga Norman was laid at the Victoria Park, Ernest Koroma 
(President) went there, he was then in opposition. What did he say to people? And 
there were a very large crowd there... “Look at this kind of party, somebody who fought 
for them, now he died in jail. Would you vote for such party again?” Was that not 
making political gains out of that? Not that he loved Chief Norman...’ (See transcription 
5) 
6.6 Ethnographic Surveys: Group Discussions 
The findings from the framing and discourse analyses69 and interviews70are geared towards 
answering the research question how selected media in Sierra Leone represented the CDF 
trial(i.e. research question 1). This appears to have reflected how the stimulus (media content) 
was presented by the papers for the appropriate responses from CSOs’ representatives across 
Sierra Leone.71 The extent to which CSOs’ representatives responded to the media’s contents 
(see research question 2) is the concern of this section. To do this, ethnographic surveys were 
conducted across Sierra Leone between December, 2011 and January, 2012. The CSOs’ 
representatives were invited to meet at four (4) distinct locations across the country (see 5. 6). 
 The discussions drew eleven (11) discussants each from the East and the North, and ten (10) 
each from the South and Western Area, who were asked to respond to a set of twelve (12) 
questions (see appendix iv), designed to test their awareness about the CDF trial, whether they 
considered the reportage balanced and fair, how relevant they thought the proceedings were 
to TJ and CSOs, whether they considered the trial relevant in terms of the moneys spent, 
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See the stimulus-response analysis explicated in 3.2.1 and 4.1. 
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whether they thought the CDF leaders were national heroes or war criminals (villains) and so 
on. Hence, the responses were anonymised to preserve confidentiality.72 
The discussants in all four regions affirmed that their knowledge about the CDF trial was shaped 
by media coverage which most of them followed occasionally and some regularly. However, the 
level of awareness about the CDF trial was comparatively lower in the East than in the South, 
North and Western Area. This comparatively lower level of awareness in the East is attributed 
to a lack of effective sensitisation by the Outreach Office of the SCSL and the media. This 
confirms Courtenay Griffith’s (see transcription 12) assertion of inadequate knowledge on the 
part of CSOs, regarding the court’s functionality. This is strengthened by a study done by the 
BBCMA, ICTJ and SFCG. They interviewed 1,700 adults across Sierra Leone and concluded that 
96% of the interviewees had heard of the SCSL, but only 4% knew of its proceedings73. This 
raises the question about whether CSOs’ representatives were adequately informed about 
issues regarding the presumption of innocence, witness protection, the right to fair hearing and 
the dynamics of the laws of war. 
 The above finding is however contravened by another study done jointly in 2012 by Sierra 
Leone’s Institute for International Law (SLIIL), Manifesto 99, No Peace Without Justice, Liberia’s 
NGOs Network Institute and COJA, which recorded ‘high awareness of the SCSL, its purposes 
and work in both countries, with more than 90% of overall respondents having heard of the 
SCSL, around 65% of people indicating they were interested in the Court’s work and nearly 50% 
having participated in outreach activities at some point over the 10 years of the Court’s 
existence, including listening to radio programs’(Making Justice Count, op.cit: 1) 
The perceptions of the discussants on whether the local media’s reportage was fair and 
balanced, were mixed. All the discussants (11) from the East said that the local media’s 
coverage was overtly biased against the CDF, but favoured the prosecution’s case. Seventeen 
(17) from the South and Western Area also expressed the same concern. However, four (4) 
expressed a contrary view that the reportage was biased against the prosecution, but favoured 
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the CDF’s case. All the discussants (11) in the North stated that the coverage was balanced and 
fairly done.  
That is, it was neither biased in favour of the prosecution nor against the defence. However, it 
was only five (5) discussants that could clearly articulate what they meant by ‘fair and balanced 
reportage’. When compared with the international media’s coverage (like the BBC, RFI, VOA 
etc.) of the trial, all forty-two (42) discussants in all three Provinces and the Western Area, 
praised the international media and criticised the local media for being partisan and unreliable 
(see 3.1.5). Analytically, the responses to the above question raised two significant issues of 
note. 
 The first is whether the numerous training programs which have been conducted to capacitate 
journalists since the end of the war and the beginning of the post-conflict justice, reconciliation 
and development processes in Sierra Leone, have had the desired consequences on the 
reportage of post-conflict issues (see 3.4). The second is whether the extent to which the press 
in Sierra Leone has been variously described as ‘highly partisan and unreliable, unprofessional 
and incapable of upholding ethical standards’ (see 3.4) can be justified in the light of empirical 
evidence.  
Significantly, on the basis of the findings from actual and potential consumers of mediated 
contents in Sierra Leone (CSOs’ representatives), it appears that one can empirically conclude 
(on the first issue) that despite the post-conflict initiatives and training programs meant to 
capacitate journalists to report professionally, they are yet to shrug off their overt prejudices in 
the coverage of post-conflict justice and governance issues in Sierra Leone. 
Essentially, the description of Sierra Leone’s media (the second issue) as ‘highly partisan, 
unprofessional and incapable of upholding ethical standards’ appeared to have been  validated 
in the light of empirical evidence. These accusations are thus discernible in the above analysis, 
regarding the perceptions of CSOs about the local media’s coverage of the CDF trial, relative to 
the international media’s reportage of same. However, although the local media was criticised 
for being biased, the discussants across the country agreed that media coverage of the CDF trial 
changed their perceptions in so many ways. Thus, a discussant in Kenema noted that: 
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Had it not been for the media reporting of the trials, there would have been attempts 
to revenge on perceived suspects and that would have created an eye-for-eye situation. 
But the media tried to sensitize the people that vengeance should not be encouraged 
and that we should try to reconcile with our brothers and sisters to bring about peace 
and harmony in our society’. 
 This position was echoed by some other discussants in the three Provinces and the Western 
Area. Some noted that it was the media that got them to understand due processes and 
concepts like reconciliation, development and national cohesion (see transcriptions 8, 9, 10, 
11). Others also believed that the media created the possibility for most Sierra Leoneans to 
understand the different dimensions of the war; noting that even perpetrators of offences were 
encouraged by the media to return to their villages after the war had ended in the spirit of 
reconciliation (ibid). This seems to have supported the arguments74 that the media can play a 
role, in unison with CSOs, in fostering post-conflict justice and reconciliation and in building a 
stable democracy in Sierra Leone.75On the relevance of the CDF trial to CSOs, there was a 
consensus amongst the discussants across the country that they were able to understand the 
root causes of the war, which helped them in fostering post-conflict justice and reconciliation. 
 It strengthened their quest for human rights and developing their skills in advocating for the 
grass roots, by making their views known to the government and the international community. 
It educated them on the laws of war and how the international community resolved internal 
armed conflicts. It got them to serve as liaison between the powers that be and the general 
public. And, it enabled them to know the persons who bore the greatest responsibility for the 
war in Sierra Leone and how the issue of impunity was addressed (see transcriptions, 8, 9, 10 
&11). This also appears to have validated the crucial role of CSOs in the post-conflict justice 
context, as conceptually elucidated between 3.2 and 3.4. 
To the question why the CDF leaders were dubbed national heroes or war criminals, clear 
evidence of ethno-regional prejudices are discernible in the responses of the discussants. In 
Sierra Leone (see 3.4 and 4.2) the Mendes from the South-East and the Themnes from the 
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See analysis for research question 5 in chapter eight (8) for a thorough empirical explication of the media’s role in post- conflict Sierra Leone. 
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North constitute 32% each of the country’s population {In fact, the descendants of both ethnic 
groups (64%) far exceed the rest of the country’s population}. Their languages, cultures and 
political affiliations are different. The SLPP has been largely Mende dominated and stronger in 
the South-East, where the CDF and its leaders were born.  
The CDF leaders have always been held in high esteem in those parts of Sierra Leone, because 
of the role which they played in resisting the Northern dominated AFRC/RUF junta and 
restoring the SLPP. The APC which draws overwhelming majority of its supports from the North 
is principally dominated by the Themnes and Limbas, who have always been describing the CDF 
as a Mende dominated movement for which the Gbethis, Kapras and the Tamaboros (all from 
Northern Sierra Leone) and even the national army, were marginalised by the SLPP. Thus, these 
national ideological discourses reflected the responses of the discussants in expressing their 
opinions on whether the CDF leaders were national heroes or war criminals.   
Essentially, all the eleven (11) discussants from the North dubbed the CDF leaders as war 
criminals or villains, who committed heinous crimes against the people of Sierra Leone for 
which they were accordingly punished by the SCSL according to the laws of war. They did not 
see the CDF as an organised armed group that fought for neither the liberation of Sierra Leone 
from the clutches of the junta, nor did they consider them to have fought for the rule of law 
and democracy. Conversely, the responses in the South-East significantly justified the role of 
the CDF in the conflict and strengthened the argument that the CDF sacrificed their lives in 
defence of constitutionality and democracy. Hence seventeen (17) of the twenty-one (21) 
discussants in the said regions stressed the heroic status of the CDF and affirmed that they 
were neither war criminals nor villains. 
The views on the heroic status or criminality of the CDF in the Western Area (Freetown, the 
country’s capital), which is considered cosmopolitan; and constitutes the Creoles (for whom it 
was originally bought from the Themnes); and peoples from the East, South and North were 
mixed. Despite this, a significant proportion of the discussants {six (6) of the ten (10)}, described 
the CDF leaders as national heroes, and stressed that they are neither war criminals nor villains. 
The perceptions of a majority of the discussants in the Western Area, regarding the CDF’s role 
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in the conflict (see 6.2.3) resonated with the views expressed in the dissenting judgments of 
Justices Bankole-Thompson and Gelaga-King in both the Trial and Appeals’ Chambers. 
Coincidentally, both Judges came from the same Western Area of Sierra Leone. 
 Essentially, as espoused in 3.2, notwithstanding the significant role which CSOs can play in 
building post-conflict democratic legitimacy in a post-conflict context, they can as well play a 
negative role in that direction. This negative role is clearly seen in the ethno-regional prejudices 
that characterised the CDF leaders as either national heroes or war criminals (villains) by CSOs’ 
representatives across Sierra Leone, based on whether they are South-Eastern or Northern 
dominated. To the question whether the discussants thought the moneys spent in ending 
impunity  should have been spent in tackling poverty, compensating war victims and fostering 
post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and development, a majority of the discussants 
{thirty-six (36)} across the country, answered the question in the negative. Their argument was 
that there cannot be sustainable peace and true reconciliation without justice; and that the 
trials conducted by the SCSL gave credence to, and simultaneously fostered, post-conflict 
justice and sustainable reconciliation. Only six (6) of the discussants answered the question in 
the affirmative; and stressed the argument that the moneys spent in the fight against impunity, 
should have been spent in tackling poverty, compensating war victims and fostering post-
conflict reconciliation and development (see transcriptions, 8, 9, 10 &11). 
This empirical analysis on the fight against impunity and the need to strengthen post-conflict 
reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone appeared to have dovetailed with both the 
prosecutorial and reconciliatory paradigms of TJ enunciated in 3.3. Essentially therefore, it can 
be empirically argued that CSOs’ representatives in Sierra Leone were quite supportive of the 
judicial accountability as opposed to the reconciliatory approach to TJ. This finding corroborates 
the 2012 joint study undertaken by the aforementioned institutions and NGOs in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, regarding the impact of the SCSL in ending impunity and upholding human rights 
and judicial accountability in Sierra Leone. 
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6. 7 Triangulating the Answers to Research Questions One and Two 
The qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the content analysis;76 and the findings from the 
discourse analysis77 and interviews78 with the journalists and editors, who covered the trials, 
clearly depict how the selected media represented the CDF trial (see research question 1). 
Again, it seems that evidence of ethno-regional prejudices are seen in the agenda- setting 
ability manifested in the news selection, framing and priming strategies79 in the coverage of 
both FDP and ST, regarding the CDF trial. From the findings of the above methodological 
frameworks, it can empirically be argued that both papers (FDP and ST) strove to only a very 
limited extent to separate their views from the news, which they put out for consumption at 
the psychological and sociological levels.80 
Hence, it can be empirically argued that their reportage was mostly done in contravention of 
the idealised norms of objectivity and accuracy. However, from the same methodological 
frameworks, bolstered by Entman’s81criteria for evaluating media biases, though there is 
evidence of bias in Awoko’s reportage, that bias appeared not to have been propelled by 
ethno-regional prejudices and it also appeared that the paper to a very large extent, strove to 
separate its views from the news which it published; and thus attempted to a greater degree to 
uphold the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’, as opposed to FDP and ST.  
It can be further shown that FDP, ST and Awoko, were never neutral in their analysis and 
coverage of the CDF trial.82 They appeared to have taken their respective positions in the 
ideological and political debates of whether the CDF leaders were to be subjected to war crimes 
trials or not, whether they were war criminals or national heroes, whether the moneys spent in 
addressing impunity should have been spent in tackling poverty and post-conflict 
reconstruction, the overall relevance of the trial to CSOs and TJ etc. 
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See 5.2. 
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 And it can also be argued that it was their individual ideological and political considerations 
that determined how they processed the events and issues (news selection, framing and 
priming) that permeated their analysis and coverage of the CDF trial (agenda setting). This 
seems to have confirmed the critics’ criticisms about the journalists’ purported neutrality of 
news (See 4.2- Fowler, op.cit:1-4 Van Dijk, op.cit: 241, Mautner, op.cit: 38). The question that is 
pertinent at this stage is whether the frames (Entman, op.cit: 53) in the communication texts 
catalogued in 6. 2 above, necessarily influenced audiences’ (CSOs’ representatives) thinking. 
This has to be looked at from the standpoints of both the psychological and sociological levels 
(Scheufele op.cit:305-308; de Vreese op.cit: 52). Hence the need for the levels of analysis of the 
media’s impacts on war crimes trials, CSOs’ representatives and TJ in this triangulation. 
At the psychological level, the test is to establish whether the exposure of CSOs’ 
representatives to the frames and sub-frames in 6.2, has had any change in their perceptions 
and attitudes to the issues reported at the micro level. At the sociological level, the test is to 
determine whether the exposure to the said frames impacted political socialisation, decision 
making and collective actions at the macro level (Scheufele, ibid; de Vreese, ibid). Significantly, 
it can be empirically argued that at both the psychological and sociological levels, the frames in 
the communication texts in 6.2 influenced the thought processes of CSOs’ representatives 
across Sierra Leone, as they confirmed that their knowledge about the CDF trial was shaped by 
media coverage which most of them followed occasionally and some regularly. This, therefore, 
indicates the extent to which CSOs’ representatives became interested in the proceedings of 
the SCSL; and how the media was very much involved in reporting the Court’s proceedings and 
functionality and sustaining controversial debates about the dynamics of TJ (see 3.3).  
Regarding the issue of whether the local media’s reportage was fair and balanced, the mixed 
views from the discussants across the country, strengthened the theoretical argument that the 
communication texts in the frames, either challenged or strengthened their pre-existing biases 
against the contents of different sections of the Sierra Leone media (see 4.2). This equally 
appears to have confirmed the post- modernism and structured interpretative models (see 4.2), 
emphasizing the position that media contents are polysemic and can thus be consumed by 
audiences in a way that reflect their pre-existing biases (in this case ethno-regional prejudices). 
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It seems that this finding is also bolstered by Iyengar’s (see 5.1) audience fragmentation and 
selective exposure arguments that are still giving credence to the minimal consequences theory 
in this era of ICTs (see 4. 2). Essentially, it is clear that CSOs’ representatives from the South- 
East were displeased with the media’s contents (those of FDP, not those of ST) that demonised 
the CDF. And those of the North were very much satisfied in consuming such contents (those of 
FDP only). Hence, the justification for their assertion as to why they thought the media’s 
coverage was either biased against the CDF (FDP) or the prosecution (ST). It appears that the 
media’s impact here is restricted to the psychological level. 
However, the impact at the sociological level seems to have been gauged on the issue of their 
overwhelming condemnation of the local media and their eventual commendation of the 
international media because of its seeming impartial, balanced and fair dispatches on the CDF 
trial. The media’s impact at the sociological level also appears to have been gauged on the issue 
of the relevance of the CDF trial to CSOs, as there was a consensus amongst the discussants 
across the country that through media coverage they got to understand issues relating to the 
causes of the war, human rights, post-conflict justice and reconciliation, the need to end 
impunity etc. Regarding the issue of whether the CDF leaders were national heroes or war 
criminals, the media’s impact appeared to be minimal as it either challenged or strengthened 
CSOs’ representatives pre-existing biases (ethno-regional prejudices in this case). However, at 
the psychological level, CSOs’ representatives from the North dubbed the CDF leaders as war 
criminals (villains) and not national heroes. And their colleagues in the South-East regarded 
them as national heroes and not war criminals or (villains). 
Thus, FDP, which was edited and owned by Paul Kamara, a Northerner and Minister of Sports in 
the present Northern dominated APC regime, appeared to have demonstrated a Northern 
posture in its coverage. This seemed to have dovetailed with the news consumption pattern in 
the North, regarding the criminality of the operations of the CDF, which led to their convictions 
and eventual incarcerations for war crimes. ST, which was edited by Karim-Sei, whose staff 
writer and war crimes reporter, Mohammed Abu and Theophilus Gbenda, extensively covered 
the CDF trial, healed from the South-East, where the CDF leaders are still being eulogised and 
dubbed national heroes, appeared to have demonstrated a South-Eastern posture in its 
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reportage. This seemed to have dovetailed with the news consumption pattern in the South- 
East, regarding the heroic status which is ascribed to the CDF. 
This trend in the reportage of the CDF trial by both FDP and ST, gives credence to the 
postulation that the coverage was ‘a continuation of war by other means’. This conclusion 
cannot be the case for Awoko, whose coverage was not, according to the framing and discourse 
analyses and semi-structured interviews, tainted with ethno-regional prejudices. Analytically, 
the North-South political divide, regarding the CDF’s role in the conflict, the eventual death of 
Chief Norman and final convictions of Kondowai and Fofana by the Appeals Chambers, have 
continued to negatively impact Sierra Leone’s post-conflict democratic legitimacy. This is 
accordingly analysed in the Kabbah-Norman friction sub-frame, regarding how the PMDC 
capitalised on the treatment meted out to Norman and the CDF to shoot itself into prominence 
in Sierra Leone’s body-politic. This issue is also adequately analysed in the interviews with 
Karim-Sei and Mohammed Abu of ST. 
Finally, regarding the issue of whether CSOs’ representatives thought the moneys spent in 
ending impunity in Sierra Leone should have been spent in tackling poverty, compensating war 
victims and foster post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and development, the media’s 
impact is gauged at both the psychological and sociological levels. At the sociological level, the 
overwhelming majority (36 of the 42) CSOs’ representatives across Sierra Leone, thought the 
moneys were wisely expended. This is as well their individual view (reflecting the psychological 
level of analysis). However, the six (6) discussants who expressed a contrary view constitute a 
relatively negligible number that would invalidate the conclusion that the media did influence 
CSOs’ representatives’ perceptions on the need to end impunity in Sierra Leone. This conclusion 
is even bolstered by the fact that from the content (qualitative and quantitative) and discourse 
analyses and semi-structured interviews, FDP, ST and Awoko, supported the prosecution of war 
criminals in Sierra Leone, albeit with specific biases, regarding those who should or should not 
have been tried. And the above issues as reflected by the media and consumed by CSOs 
representatives in post-conflict Sierra Leone are germane to good governance and democratic 
accountability (see 1.2 & 1.3). 
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Chapter Seven 
Data Presentation and Analysis of the Charles Taylor Trial 
7.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the media’s coverage of the CDF trial. In this chapter, I shall 
apply the same methods to analyse the Charles Taylor trial, in the order in which the research 
questions are discussed. Thus, I shall first present the qualitative and quantitative dimensions 
of the content analysis, which I will attempt to connect to the discourse analysis and semi- 
structured interviews with the journalists and editors that covered the trial. This is geared 
towards answering the question how the selected media represented the Taylor trial (see 
research question 3). Also, I shall analyse the findings from the ethnographic surveys conducted 
across the country with CSOs’ representatives, to answer the question how they perceived the 
coverage (see research question 4). I shall finally present the triangulated results of the findings 
from the respective methods, to come up with new empirical judgments about the media’s 
impacts on elite’s opinions in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
7.1 Background to the Content Analysis  
Charles Taylor was the former National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel leader, who 
became President between 1997 and 2006 (see Appendix III92, 179, 412). Prior to his ascendency to 
power, Taylor had established and nurtured an intimate relationship with the RUF, using Liberia 
as a springboard, and the NPFL as the RUF’s main external auxiliary force (see Appendix III121, 
475). This explains why many Sierra Leoneans had perceived Taylor as ‘the mastermind’ of the 
crisis that engulfed their country; long before he was even indicted for war crimes (see 
Appendix III189, 191, 431). Taylor was one of those charged with planning and instigating a joint 
criminal enterprise.  The specific offences, for which he was charged, were acts of terrorism, 
murder, violence to life, rape, sexual slavery, outrage upon personal dignity, cruel treatments, 
other inhumane acts, the use of child soldiers, enslavement and pillage.83 Taylor made his first 
appearance before the SCSL in Freetown on 3rd April, 2006 and entered a plea of not guilty to 
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The Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-O3-01-T, Judgment, 18th May, 2012 
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all eleven (11) counts.84 The prosecution formally completed its case on 30th January, 2009, 
after leading ninety-one (91) witnesses in evidence. With leave of the Trial Chamber II, the 
prosecution on 5th, 9th and 10th August, 2010, re-opened its case and called three additional 
witnesses, including Naomi Campbell, to establish Taylor’s guilt (see Appendix III494). The 
defence team however started its case on 13th July, 2009, and completed it on 12th November, 
2010, after eliciting evidence from twenty-one (21) witnesses, including Taylor, who spent eight 
(8) months testifying in his own defence.  
The trial judgment was pronounced on 26th April, 2012. Taylor was convicted on all eleven (11) 
counts. He was sentenced to fifty (50) years in prison for planning and aiding and abetting the 
commission of war crimes in Sierra Leone. But the prosecution was unable to establish two (2) 
of its principal charges: that Taylor had effective command and control of the AFRC/RUF junta 
in Sierra Leone and therefore bore individual criminal responsibility for their crimes, or that he 
was part of a joint criminal enterprise.85After a defence appeal, the Appeals Chamber 
eventually made its final judgment in September 2013, upholding Taylor’s conviction. 
7.2 Content Analysis: The Qualitative Dimension  
The papers’ coverage of Taylor’s indictment and trial has been divided into the pre-trial, trial 
and post-trial phases. A critical analysis of the contents of the papers reveals five frames, 
containing certain recurring themes and some controversial issues that were made very 
prominent in the coverage. The frames that characterized the reportage constitute the agenda, 
through which the papers’ coverage of the trial can be referenced. Significantly, most of the 
factual issues embedded in the frames are collapsed into sub-frames; while simultaneously 
maintaining the connectivity between the main and sub frames. The five frames that emerged 
from the analysis are: 
1. Charles Taylor’s Role in the Conflict 
2. The International Community’s Role in Bringing Taylor to Justice 
3. Sovereign Immunity and Extraterritoriality in the Face of War Crimes Jurisprudence 
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4. Ending Impunity versus Post-conflict Reconciliation/ Poverty Alleviation and 
5. International Conspiracy versus Regional Integration 
Interestingly, it was as if the papers looked at most of the issues that factually informed the 
discourses in the frames, through lenses coloured by the ideals of patriotism and nationalism. 
Thus, there were similarities in the coverage, regarding virtually all the issues that characterized 
the discourses embedded in the main and sub-frames. However, the subtle nuances in the 
papers’ analyses, point to how each paper prioritized the reportage of specific issues and the 
depth of the coverage. In this analysis, I shall examine the controversies in each of the above 
frames and then unpick and analyse the discourses in which the texts are clothed, to discern 
the subtleties and analogous positions of the papers, relative to the evidence adduced in the 
trial. Hence, I shall deal with the frames and the discourses in the order in which they have 
been presented above. For ease of referencing, I shall again adopt the same acronyms FDP and 
ST for ‘For Di People’ and ‘Standard Times’, respectively. And ‘Awoko’ shall be fully referenced 
in its own name. 
7.2.1 Charles Taylor’s Role in the Conflict 
There were similarities in the papers’ pre-trial and trial coverage on Taylor’s role in the conflict. 
That role is analysed within the ambits of two sub-frames: Taylor’s Pre-presidential Role and His 
Role as a President, Conspirator and Peace Mediator. 
Taylor’s Pre-presidential Role 
The papers presented Taylor as a minister in the Doe administration, who allegedly made away 
with over a million U.S dollars from Liberia and settled in the United States, where he was 
eventually arrested on an extradition order, but escaped and started a very brutal rebellion in 
Liberia that toppled the Doe administration in 1989 (see Appendix III153, 411, 421). The papers 
reflected the magnitude of the NPFL’s destruction and how the spillover fuelled the RUF 
insurgency in Sierra Leone (see Appendix III91, 187, 429). ST and Awoko attributed the spillover to 
the decision of President Momoh to allow ECOMOG to use Sierra Leone as a base for its 
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operations against the NPFL, preventing Taylor from taking over power in Liberia (ST, ibid, 
Awoko, ibid). 
FDP (see Appendix III153, 187) also established that Taylor had met Foday Sankoh in Libya and 
that Colonel Gaddafi provided both men with finances and arms to overthrow the dictatorial 
governments in Liberia and Sierra Leone and replace them with puppet regimes, that were to 
be influenced by Gaddafi’s so-called third universal theory, based on his Green Book ideology, 
which was quite popular in Africa in the 1980s. What is, however, relevant to the analysis that 
appeared in the papers was Taylor’s infamous interview with the BBC in March 1991, when he 
promised that Sierra Leone would one day ‘taste the bitterness of war’ (see Appendix III23, 183). 
This fact became part of the evidence, which both the Trial Chamber II and Appeals Chamber, 
considered in pronouncing Taylor’s conviction and eventual sentence.86 The papers had thus 
attached serious attention, salience and valence (see 4.1 and 5.1) to this fact, even before 
Taylor’s indictment was unsealed. And on the basis of this fact, coupled with his support for the 
RUF, the papers presented Taylor as if he were already a convicted war criminal (see Appendix 
III17, 182-183, 275). One pertinent issue that is central to this sub-frame, which is not reported by 
any of the papers, is that had the authorities in Ghana and Sierra Leone been vigilant enough, 
they would have prevented Taylor from causing the havoc, which he eventually wrecked in 
West Africa. This is because he was arrested in Ghana and then in Sierra Leone, for subversive 
activities in both countries in the 1980s for which he was only temporarily detained, but was 
not subjected to trials in either country. Had he been subjected to trial and convicted, his 
ambition of destabilizing Liberia and Sierra Leone could, arguably, have been forestalled.    
The other important issue which did not appear in this sub-frame is that Taylor’s initial 
involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict was virtually unconnected with his apparent insatiable 
thirst for conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone. He would not have had access to Sierra Leone’s 
diamonds at that initial period, because the NPRC junta had ceded Sierra Leone’s diamonds 
fields to mercenaries that had prevented the RUF from penetrating such areas (see 6.2.1). 
Theoretically, the absence of these two significant issues in the media’s analysis of Taylor’s pre-
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presidential role in the conflict appears to validate the framing paradigm.  Framing does not 
only encompass what is reported, but also extend to that which is unreported (see 4.1 and 5.1). 
The papers however reflected that the RUF’s first attacks in Kailahun district were spearheaded 
by NPFL rebels from Liberia (see Appendix III127, 189, 404). They also implicated Libya, Burkina Faso 
and Ivory Coast in the conflict (Ibid). ST and FDP (Ibid) dubbed the said countries as rogue states 
in the international scene, from which Taylor was getting very meaningful supports to 
destabilise Liberia and Sierra Leone. Essentially, when CSOs and the media heightened the 
quest for democratization in Sierra Leone in 1994, the RUF continued its rebellion and chose 
not to participate in the  elections of 1996 (see 3.2). 
FDP (see Appendix III156-158, 161, 176) reported that the RUF continued to receive assistance in 
manpower and arms from Taylor up to the beginning of the democratization process. It was 
about the same period that Taylor took power in Liberia, through democratic elections, 
conducted under the supervision of ECOWAS and the international community. Taylor won the 
elections by an overwhelming majority.  And all the hitherto warring factions in the Liberian 
conflict accepted the results.  
Taylor’s Role as a President: Conspirator and/or Peace Mediator 
 The papers reflected how Taylor’s ascendency to power in Liberia strengthened his relationship 
with the AFRC/RUF junta and how the junta became a puppet regime that depended on Taylor 
for survival (see Appendix III23, 183, 422). The papers emphasized different issues, incidental to 
Taylor’s involvement in the conflict (on the basis of their news selection, framing, priming and 
agenda-setting orientations and inclinations- see 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1). FDP (see Appendix III176, 183, 
189) made salient the fact that Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Liberia were among the very few 
countries that tacitly recognized the junta. The paper also catalogued how Taylor favoured the 
junta with fuel, arms and instruments of communications, in exchange for diamonds looted 
from Sierra Leone. 
 ST (see Appendix III291, 341) however emphasized how Taylor aided the junta to violate the UN 
Security Council’s sanctions. The paper also stated that the junta was getting its shipments of 
arms from Ukraine, through criminal transshipments to Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Liberia for 
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distribution in rebel held territories in Sierra Leone (see Appendix III314, 342). Awoko (see 
Appendix III36) focused on the frequent trips, which members of the junta, including Sam 
Bockarie and Paolo Bangura, made to Liberia and how Sam Bockarie transported diamonds to 
Taylor for export. Thus, the papers extensively analysed Taylor’s role in the operations of the 
junta during its nine (9) months of misrule and after it was deposed by ECOMOG.  
The papers also focused on Taylor’s backing for the junta in attacking Kono, Makeni and 
Freetown on January 6, 1999 (see Appendix III37, 175, 304). According to FDP (see Appendix III176), 
the January 6 invasion of Freetown was the most deadly of attacks for the entire period for 
which the war subsisted. ST (see Appendix III317) dubbed the said attack, ‘operation no living 
thing’. Awoko (see Appendix III26) recounted that though the attack was extremely egregious, it 
laid the foundation for the signing of the LPA. Thus, from the above analysis, similarities are 
spotted in the papers’ pre-trial and trial coverage of how Taylor indulged in exploiting and 
smuggling Sierra Leone’s diamonds in exchange for the deadly weapons that the junta used to 
destabilise Sierra Leone. It appears that the international media also paid serious attention in 
its pre-trial analysis, on how Taylor used the diamonds trade to fuel the conflict. The foreign 
press alluded to so many instances in which Taylor’s dealings in blood diamonds became the 
principal source of Liberia’s income and the main source of rebel finance for the junta in Sierra 
Leone.87 
Thus, the above issues as framed by the local and international media became the foundations 
of the testimonies that led to Taylor’s conviction.88Those testimonies also became the 
bedrocks, upon which the Appeals Chamber upheld Taylor’s fifty (50) years conviction.89 The 
pieces of evidence (Ibid: 7-8) which connect Taylor to  aiding, abetting and planning the 
commission of war crimes, for which he was indicted and convicted, supported the issues which 
the media selected (news selection), framed (framing) and made salient (agenda-setting) that 
became the foundation for Taylor’s conviction. 
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The papers’ coverage extended to even Crane’s accusation that Taylor transformed Liberia into 
a sanctuary for war crimes indictees. They (see Appendix III37, 164, 293) reported that Crane 
accused Taylor of sheltering Sam Bockarie, RUF’s Field Commander and Johnny Paul Koroma, 
Chairman of the defunct junta. FDP (see Appendix III162) and ST (see Appendix III291) followed 
the issue and seemed to have done much more thematic framings90 of how Crane proved that 
Taylor was indeed harbouring Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma in Liberia, but Taylor 
denied the allegation. The papers called on Crane to force Taylor to hand over the fugitives. 
Their coverage further detailed how Taylor executed Sam Bockarie and his entire family, 
allegedly because Taylor felt he would be roped in should Bockarie face the SCSL (see Appendix 
III10, 165, 293). 
The papers reported on the allegation of the SCSL’s Registry, that Taylor also murdered Johnny 
Paul Koroma in Liberia. Awoko (Ibid) did a thorough reflection (thematic reporting) on the 
allegation that Taylor also ended Koroma’s life because he wanted to destroy any available 
evidence and eliminate every witness that was going to expose him. Both FDP (see Appendix 
III169) and ST (see Appendix III297) were skeptical about the authenticity of the allegation from 
the SCSL Registry, that Taylor had killed Koroma.  Thus, there are reports from the local media 
in Sierra Leone in general that Koroma is alive and he is still hiding somewhere around the Ivory 
Coast and Burkina Faso border. Similarities were seen in the coverage of how Taylor 
undermined the functionality of the ECOWAS Committee of Five.  
As a member of the Committee, Taylor was a de jure and a de facto peace mediator. He took 
active part in the deliberations of the Committee, leading to its decisions to employ the use of 
force as the last resort to end the conflict in Sierra Leone.  As espoused by both the Trial 
Chamber II and Appeals Chamber,91 Taylor’s role as the President of Liberia in the Sierra Leone 
crisis, dovetailed with that of a conspirator (aider and abettor) bent on using disgruntled Sierra 
Leoneans to sustain his criminal enterprise in West Africa. This issue is also clearly reflected in 
the coverage.  
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 168 
 
Thus, before Taylor’s indictment was unsealed, the papers had been vociferously calling for 
Taylor to be tried. They published a plethora of news and views, explicating how Taylor was 
criminally responsible for the heinous crimes committed against the people of Sierra Leone 
between 1991 and 2002 (see the numerous references in this frame). Awoko (see Appendix 
III68) described Taylor as the one most responsible for the war crimes committed in Sierra 
Leone. Neither FDP (see Appendix III172) nor ST (see Appendix III484) saw him as such, but both 
dubbed him a ‘warlord’, who should not go unpunished, as one of those (not the most) 
responsible for the war crimes committed in Sierra Leone.  The trend of thoughts that are 
discernible in the coverage is that it could have been hardly denied that Taylor was not involved 
in the conflict in Sierra Leone and the papers had already dubbed him a ‘war criminal’ (see 
Appendix III123, 275, 422) even before he was indicted.  
In this regard, FDP affirmed that Taylor ill-advised the RUF not to disarm, to derail the peace 
process for his selfish interests (see Appendix III172). ST (see Appendix III299) described his 
mediation, regarding the release of the RUF’s captured peacekeepers, as a very hypocritical 
one, calculated to project his dubious influence over the RUF.  
Against this backdrop, when Foday Sankoh (the erstwhile RUF leader), was arrested and 
detained for violating the LPA and killing innocent protesters, according to Awoko (see 
Appendix III31), Taylor (as a peace mediator) hastily recommended that Sankoh be taken to a 
third country to save the peace process. This was a recommendation that was stoutly opposed 
by the SLPP.92And consonant with the framing paradigm, none of the papers could capture this 
robust response to Taylor’s suspicious recommendation and how it was treated with a pinch of 
salt. The view that was widely held in Sierra Leone, regarding Taylor’s role was that he was the 
mastermind of the conflict, even though the Trial Chamber II and Appeals Chamber did not find 
him guilty for that.   
7.2.2 The International Community’s Role in Bringing Taylor to Justice 
This frame contains a plethora of different, but related issues that were reported with many 
similarities than differences. In fact, the differences in the coverage that can best be described 
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as subtle are cognate with the depth to which the papers presented the issues for 
interpretation and internalization at both the psychological and sociological levels (see 5.1 for 
de Vreese’s and Scheufele’s theorizations of framing’s effects on audiences). The papers called 
for the indictment and trial of Taylor. ST (see Appendix III294, 403) and FDP (see Appendix III170, 
173) cautioned that the international community was not keen in getting Taylor to face justice. 
Awoko (see Appendix III37) was convinced that Taylor would one day be brought to justice. 
Neither ST (see Appendix III298-299) nor Awoko (see Appendix III15) did a clear thematic reporting 
on the operations of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Both 
papers seemed to have episodically reflected LURD’s robust operations against the Taylor 
administration. FDP however (see Appendix III172, 180, 184-185) did a detailed thematic analysis of 
LURD’s activities. The paper linked the involvement of Guinea’s President Lansana Conte to the 
insurgency, which appeared to have been a reprisal attack to Taylor’s attempt to assassinate 
him. The paper also catalogued how most Liberians were determined to see the demise of 
Taylor’s administration.  
The paper further reflected (Ibid) how ECOWAS became convinced that security in Liberia had 
degenerated into a cataclysmic situation that threatened regional peace and stability. This 
seeming detailed reportage was done under the paper’s international news column and it is 
clear that such reports were sourced through the contents of the foreign press (Ibid). The paper 
covered the ECOWAS extra-ordinary session called in Ghana on 4th June, 2003, when Taylor’s 
indictment was unsealed. This happened when West African Heads of State had assembled in 
Ghana to peacefully resolve the Liberian conflict. They condemned the timeliness of the 
indictment and said it would jeopardize the peace process (see Appendix III21, 182, 338). The 
papers opposed the view and called on Ghana to respect the legitimacy of the SCSL. 
 The Ghanaian authorities said they were not served with the warrant for Taylor’s arrest and 
that they heard of his indictment from the BBC. They further said they would not respond to a 
request to arrest and extradite Taylor, a sitting Head of State, on media information alone (see 
Appendix III174, 177, 516). The papers accused the Ghanaian Government of double standards and 
of undermining the SCSL (see Appendix III16, 179, 299). The papers also published the press 
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releases of many CSOs in Sierra Leone, including SLAJ and CGG on Ghana’s failure to arrest and 
extradite Taylor to face justice (see Appendix III16, 173, 300). FDP (see Appendix III177, 196) published 
articles debunking Ghana’s claims that they were not served with the requisite processes to 
warrant Taylor’s arrest. The paper quoted Crane at great length on the issue, saying that the 
Ghanaians were indeed served with the indictment and that the International Police 
Organisation (Interpol) was then alerted to do the arrest.  Awoko (see Appendix III18-19) 
represented how Taylor’s indictment caused unrest in Monrovia and how criminals took 
advantage of the situation to loot and cause mayhem. This happened when LURD was 
threatening to invade Monrovia.  
ST (Tuesday 27th January, 2004:2, Monday 8th March, 2004) presented another argument, that 
had Taylor been arrested in Ghana, a political vacuum in the governance of Liberia would have 
exacerbated the rebellion. Taylor’s controversial return to Liberia heightened LURD’s rebellion 
and worsened the humanitarian crisis in Monrovia and beyond. LURD maintained that its forces 
would relent when Taylor relinquished power (see Appendix III172, 180). Liberians then called for 
US intervention as the British did in Sierra Leone in 2000, but the Americans hitherto refused. 
The papers presented the international community’s U-turn in the Liberian crisis (see Appendix 
III184, 308). This finding dovetailed with Lang’s analysis on the international media’s functionality 
in upholding the ideals of war crimes jurisprudence (see 2.2). The international media became 
the mouthpiece, through which Taylor’s role in the Sierra Leone crisis was made known to the 
World.  
It also sequentially analysed LURD’s operations in Liberia, Taylor’s doubtful affiliation with al-
Qaeda and the need to get him to face international criminal justice.93 This does not 
presuppose that the international media was giving credence to Thompson’s and Shaw’s new 
journalistic paradigm (see 4.1) in its entirety. Thus, there is evidence that the issues and events 
that characterized the operations of the SCSL had been underreported by the international 
media (Lang, op.cit: 2). Its news selection policy, which had since been arguably influenced by 
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the Galtung and Ruge’s ‘cultural determinism’ and ‘geographical proximity’ model (see 4.1), 
would not have reflected its coverage of what was remotely happening in West Africa. As Lang 
(op.cit: 1) established, of the four (4) trials conducted by the SCSL, it was only the Taylor trial 
that attracted much international coverage. This can be attributed to the involvement of the US 
and the European Union Parliament to get Taylor to justice. Their campaign would not have 
been successful without the international media. Even Crane, in line with the ‘cultural 
determinism’ and ‘geographical proximity’ model, stated that the international community was 
not keen in knowing what was unfolding in West Africa. So he had to use the international 
media to bring West Africa to the attention of the World (Lang, op.cit: 3). 
However, though the SCSL conducted four (4) trials, it was Taylor’s trial that came under the 
spotlight of the international community. This appears to have confirmed Galtung and Ruge’s 
‘cultural determinism’ and ‘geographical proximity’ model. While David Crane’s (see Appendix 
III170) call on the international media to lead  the campaign to get Taylor to face justice, can 
arguably be interpreted as one that validated Thompson’s and Shaw’s responsibility to report 
every event or issue that affects the human race, irrespective of where it is unfolding (see 4.1).  
Essentially, the involvement of the international community, through the international media, 
in the quest to get Taylor to face justice, also impacted the local media’s reportage. FDP (see 
Appendix III209) reflected how the Americans pressured Taylor to resign as President of Liberia 
and how Taylor demanded the deployment of US peacekeepers in the country before he could 
resign. The paper (see Appendix III210) also represented how the Americans passed a resolution 
in their House of Representatives, calling for Taylor’s resignation and extradition to SCSL.  ST 
(see Appendix III423-424) also reflected how the EU Parliament called for Taylor’s resignation and 
extradition to the SCSL. 
 The papers covered the events that culminated in Taylor’s resignation, his consent to seek 
political asylum in Calaba (Nigeria), Nigeria’s determination to ensure his safety, and how Taylor 
accused the Americans (during the ceremony marking his resignation on 11th August, 2003) as 
the people behind LURD’s insurgency, because they wanted to exploit Liberia’s natural 
resources (see Appendix III226, 398). However, Awoko (see Appendix III93-94) did a detailed analysis 
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of Taylor’s resignation, describing him as the first elected African Head of State that voluntarily 
handed over power to enable peace to reign in a country (Liberia) that was embroiled in 
rebellion.  FDP (see Appendix III253) described Taylor as a dangerous fugitive. The paper also 
captured the issuance of Interpol ‘Red Notice’ (the international arrest warrant) for Taylor on 
4th December, 2003 in few of its December, 2003 editions. 
  ST’s (see Appendix III400) analysis on this issue was not as detailed as FDP, but the paper 
dubbed Taylor as the first sitting President indicted for war crimes. There were similarities in 
the coverage of how the papers called on the international community to exert pressure on 
Nigeria to hand over Taylor to the SCSL. The papers also reflected CSOs call to bring Taylor to 
justice and Nigeria’s unwillingness to arrest and extradite Taylor. Thus, he was eventually 
arrested when he breached a fundamental term upon which his asylum was predicated- 
namely, interfering in Liberian politics. The papers further captured Nigeria’s stance that she 
would only hand over Taylor to the newly constitutionally elected Government of Liberia if it so 
demanded (see Appendix III226, 398). 
Awoko (see Appendix III26) alleged that whilst in Nigeria, Taylor was the main sponsor of about 
twenty (20) political parties that contested the elections that brought Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to 
power. Finally, the papers (see Appendix III76, 78, 241, 243, 405, 407) covered the arrest of Taylor in 
Nigeria, his transfer to Liberia and eventual extradition to the SCSL, where he made his first 
appearance on 3rd April, 2006. Here, he challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to try him, but was 
convinced by Justice Lussick to take his plea of guilty or not guilty should he want to contest 
anything during the trial. It was only ST (see Appendix III419) that clearly recounted Taylor’s plea 
as follows: 
 ‘Most definitely, I did not and could not have committed these crimes against a sister Republic 
Sierra Leone. I think this is a plan to keep the people of Sierra Leone and Liberia divided’.  
7.2.3 Sovereign Immunity and Extraterritoriality in the Face of War Crimes Jurisprudence 
Prior to Taylor’s arrest and eventual extradition to the SCSL, some quintessential legal issues 
evolved at the pre-trial stage, which I have deliberately not analysed, within the frameworks of 
any of the above sub-frames, that form the basis of the frames, depicting either Taylor’s role in 
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the conflict in Sierra Leone or the international community’s role in bringing Taylor to justice. 
The said legal issues were given prominence in the papers analysis with very subtle nuances.  
Even though it was seen that the papers lacked the requisite legal expertise in reporting 
international judicial proceedings, they devoted much time and space in the coverage of 
technical legal issues. The first issue revolved around Taylor’s sealed indictment, signed by 
Crane on 3rd March, 2003 and confirmed by the Trial Chamber II on 7th March, 2003. This was 
about the same time that the indictments for the AFRC, RUF and CDF leaders were unsealed. 
 Against this backdrop, the papers hurriedly called for the indictment of both Presidents Kabbah 
(Sierra Leone) and Taylor (Liberia), as two other high profiled persons, who should be indicted 
as most responsible for the war crimes committed  in Sierra Leone (see 6.2.2 and 7.2.2).  Even 
though the papers continued to press for the indictment of President Kabbah in particular, their 
initial call for Taylor to face justice (see Appendix III188, 201, 211), sparked a serious debate in the 
Liberian Senate and a Senator (Thomas Nimley, then Chairman of the Senate Standing 
Committee), threatened that should Taylor be indicted, a serious instability would hit West 
Africa (regional war) because the so-called SCSL is a political court that is calculated to breed 
political unrest in the sub-region (see Appendix III120, 264). However, none of the papers analysed 
the legal implications of indicting sitting Heads of State in the face of war crimes jurisprudence, 
neither did they explicate the issue of how their arrest warrants, if indicted, could be executed; 
nor did they analyse the legal implications of the regional instability comment that was made in 
the Liberian Senate, regarding Taylor’s  indictment. 
 The second issue, which is central to all the other issues that factually informed this frame, was 
underpinned by Taylor’s challenge that his indictment was a nullity on the grounds of sovereign 
immunity and extraterritoriality in international law (see Appendix III191). According to the 
papers (see Appendix III227, 399, 419), Terrence Terry, a renowned Sierra Leonean Barrister, was 
Taylor’s lawyer, who filed a motion to the Court’s Appeals Chamber, challenging the Court’s 
jurisdiction on grounds of sovereign immunity and extraterritoriality {relying on the Judgment 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v 
Belgium- Yerodia Case}, to subject Taylor, a sitting Head of State, to a war crimes court that  
was not inaugurated, pursuant to a UN Chapter VII mandate. 
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 The immediate post-October, 2003 editions of all the papers, contained detailed analysis of 
Terry’s  applications and submissions before the Appeals Chamber, which ST in particular took 
out of context, but which Awoko and FDP, did not articulate with any legal exactitude (ibid). 
Terry relied on the old notion of sovereign immunity, which precludes a sitting Head of State, 
from standing any civil or criminal trial in respect of anything done during his incumbency. Terry 
argued that this territorial sovereign immunity of sitting Heads of State is also extraterritorially 
recognized in contemporary international law. This argument however mesmerized ST (see 
Appendix III297, 315) to publish articles, commending Terry as a Barrister, determined to expose 
the deficiencies of the SCSL.  
The paper (see Appendix III329) opined that the Appeals Chamber would rule in favour of Terry 
because, Crane did not do his assignment well.  Awoko (see Appendix III34), on this issue, stated 
that Terry’s argument might be the reasons why Ghana had failed to arrest Taylor and why 
Nigeria was hitherto reluctant to extradite him. FDP (see Appendix III197) however capitalized on 
the UN Chapter VII mandate, which the SCSL lacked. These arguments indicated how the papers 
appeared to have misrepresented this legal issue. The Appeals Chamber on 31st May, 2004 
however dismissed Terry’s application as one that completely lacked any merits in war crimes 
jurisprudence.  Applying the Entman’s test (see 5.1); biases are apparently discernible in the 
coverage against the prosecution on this issue. 
 First, none of the papers presented the prosecution’s response to Terry’s application for 
audiences’ to form their opinions (at the psychological and sociological levels) on the 
substantive application and the response thereto (see 5.1). Second, the papers took positions 
on the issue even before the Appeals Chamber made its ruling, with ST (see Appendix III329) 
concluding that Terry was legally right. Nevertheless, the bias which the papers demonstrated 
against the prosecution on this issue cannot be interpreted as a show of support for Taylor, but 
as a frustration over the SCSL’s seemingly unrewarded efforts in getting Taylor to face justice. 
The prosecution’s response, to Terry’s application, which ought to have been reported, but 
inadvertently or otherwise left out of the papers’ framing strategy, was that the Statute94 that 
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established the Court makes it clear that the status of any person cannot exonerate him/her 
from prosecution for war crimes.  
The prosecution relied on Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, Article 27(2) of the ICC’s Rome 
Statute and the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR in justification of its arguments, pursuant to 
Article 6 (2) of the SCSL’s statute that, Taylor cannot evade international criminal justice on 
grounds of sovereign immunity and extraterritoriality. This was the argument that held sway as 
seen in the Appeals Chamber ruling, demonstrating the determination of the international 
community to uphold the ideals of war crimes jurisprudence (see 2.2). Thus, human history is 
replete with instances in which political leaders devastated independent sovereign states and 
perpetrated the most egregious crimes with impunity. As established in 1.1 and 2.2, war crimes 
jurisprudence was thus resuscitated in the 1990s to defeat the beast of impunity. 
 Essentially, it would have been in contravention of the quest to end impunity, had the Appeals 
Chamber upheld Terry’s argument, which was indeed a manifestation of an attempt to 
extricate Taylor from judicial prosecution and thus give credence to impunity in international 
law. Interestingly, the Appeals Chamber’s ruling heightened CSOs’ call to bring Taylor to justice 
and the papers published a host of news and views in support of that, re-echoing the legal 
principle that sitting Heads of State are no longer immune from prosecution under international 
criminal law for war crimes (see Appendix III87-88, 252, 428). The other issue that is cognate with 
this frame, which the papers captured, is the prosecution’s application for an amendment to 
Taylor’s seventeen (17) counts indictment (ibid). The papers also covered the Trial Chamber II’s 
ruling approving the amendment that reduced Taylor’s charges from 17 to the 11 counts for 
which he was eventually convicted. 
7.2.4 Ending Impunity versus Post-conflict Reconciliation/ Poverty Alleviation 
The papers re-echoed the argument that it is through the prosecutorial model that war 
criminals can be held to judicially account for their violations. When Taylor was arraigned 
before the Trial Chamber II and took his plea of not guilty in Freetown, the local and 
international media’s coverage of this single event was seriously rife. The media dubbed the 
event a victory for war crimes jurisprudence in an era, when even Heads of State, are held to 
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account for their violations (see 7.2.3). The first issue, which suddenly became prominent in the 
papers trial analysis, was the venue for the Charles Taylor trial. 
 FDP and ST (see Appendix III241-242, 405-406) are reputed as being the trail blazers of this issue. The 
papers ran a syndicated commentary, (‘A Plea to the Government and the Special Court… 
Please Take Charles Taylor Somewhere Else!’), thanking the UN and international community 
for pioneering and overseeing the extradition of Taylor to face the SCSL, but cautioned that he 
should be taken to The Hague for the security of Sierra Leone and the stability of West Africa.  
The commentary was predicated on Article 9 of the court’s statute. This issue sparked a serious 
debate in so many quarters and the papers published critical articles, analyzing the pros and 
cons of trying Taylor in The Hague or in Freetown (see Appendix III113, 239, 245, 410, 416). But the 
argument that held sway was that which emphasized the need for the trial to be held in 
Freetown (see Appendix III260, 410, 424) as even the Sierra Leone Parliament debated and adopted 
a resolution on the issue, pursuant to a private member motion, filed by Honourable Francis B. 
S. Tengbeh (see Appendix III410). 
Hand-in-hand with the debate that was sparked and sustained by the media, regarding the 
venue for the Taylor trial, the then President of the SCSL, Justice Raga Fernando wrote to the 
UN Security Council, requesting it to come out with a resolution, demanding the transfer of the 
Taylor trial to the premises of the ICC in The Hague (see Appendix III459). The Security Council 
thus inaugurated its Resolution 1688 on 16th June, 2006, confirming the need to transfer the 
Taylor trial to The Hague because ‘his presence in the sub-region was an impediment to 
stability and a threat to the peace’.95 The Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program (SLCMP) 
responded to the said Resolution and circulated a plethora of articles to most of the 
newspapers in Sierra Leone (including the selected media), condemning the transfer of the 
Taylor trial to The Hague.  
 SLCMG96 argued that by transferring the trial to The Hague, SCSL had denied the people of 
Sierra Leone access to the trial, indicating that the lack of access to the trial did not only hinder 
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the healing process of the Sierra Leonean people, but also undermined the anticipated impact 
of the trial on the local justice system; since the lack of access to justice was one of the 
underlying causes of the war. SLCMG furthered that the lack of seriousness of the SCSL in terms 
of its commitment to accessibility eroded the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the people 
of Sierra Leone. These arguments thus became the basis for the plethora of views, expressed in 
the numerous articles published by the papers, until the period when Taylor was finally taken to 
The Hague (see Appendix III430, 432). 
A number of CSOs and NGOs, including the ICTJ and CGG, put out press releases in the papers, 
opposing the transfer of the trial to The Hague. The question that climaxed their protestations 
was: ‘What was the essence of a justice that the victims and survivors did not feel?’ (see 
Appendix III424) They raised the issues of additional costs and complications, including the 
secondary presence of the SCSL in The Hague, the constant transportation of staff, the need to 
get the prosecution and defence teams and the hundreds of witnesses to The Hague and how 
effective could the outreach program be, when Sierra Leone’s access to internet connectivity, 
electricity etc. was very poor, taking into consideration the fact that Resolution 1688 required 
that the trial be made accessible to West Africa through video- links (SLCMP, op.cit, ibid). 
 The argument was also raised that the trial in The Hague could dilute some of the Court’s 
biggest strengths: its hybrid nature that blended international legal standards with local 
participation in the trial and would make it easier for those that did not support the trial to 
distance themselves from its outcomes (see Appendix III410). The argument was that whilst 
broader political considerations such as regional stability should have been taken into account, 
they should have been weighed against the long-term benefits of holding in-country trial and 
the opposition of Charles Taylor, voiced by CSOs in Sierra Leone and Liberia (ibid). This was how 
ST (see Appendix III424) aptly reflected some of these concerns: 
There is currently little or no provision in the budget for outreach purposes, including 
getting civil society members from Sierra Leone and Liberia to witness the trial. How 
then do you expect this trial to impact the sub-regional peace and security everybody is 
craving for?   
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It appears that the concern about accessibility to the trial raised by the media, CSOs and NGOs 
became conspicuous when the prosecution opened it case on 4th June, 2006. The SLCMG again 
put out a press release published in many newspapers, condemning the SCSL for denying Sierra 
Leoneans and Liberians access to the trial. The release which also appeared all three papers 
(see Appendix III114, 261, 462) reads: 
Indeed, the proceedings took a surprising turn- one that the people of Sierra Leone 
were forced to miss- when Taylor arrived unexpectedly to plead not guilty to the 
recently amended indictment. Nor is this the first time the Sierra Leonean people have 
been denied access to observe the judicial process at work: first, the case was 
transferred out of Sierra Leone to The Hague; and then on 4 June, the morning of the 
prosecutor’s opening statements, the broadcast at the Special Court repeatedly 
sputtered and halted, with the Court eventually resorting to broadcasting coverage from 
news channel CNN; finally on 25 June, when the trial was scheduled to resume, the 
broadcast again failed. Sierra Leoneans have thus been denied any and all access to the 
trial of the man accused of sponsoring a war that killed thousands of their countrymen 
and victimized millions more. 
The papers also captured the positive steps that were subsequently made to address the 
problem of accessibility to the trial in The Hague. The first issue regarding accessibility, which 
they extensively covered was the BBCMA’s project that took journalists from Sierra Leone and 
Liberia to The Hague to do a fair and accurate reporting of the trial for the people of Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. This project aided accessibility to the trial as CSOs’ representatives across 
the country, were able to follow the proceedings, at The Hague as relayed back home (see 
Appendix III267, 480). In fact, even some newspapers in Sierra Leone, including the selected 
media, benefited from that project as they published many syndicated articles, which had 
hitherto been reported by journalists, who were recruited under the said project (see Appendix 
III132-133, 272-273, 491-492). 
 The other issue regarding accessibility which also featured in the papers is the effort which was 
eventually made by the SCSL to get representatives from CSOs across Sierra Leone and Liberia 
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to The Hague to witness the proceedings and to report back home to their entire membership. 
These strategies essentially helped in sustaining the interests of the media, CSOs and NGOs 
throughout the trial and up to when Taylor’s appeal was filed, heard and quashed by the 
Appeals’ Chamber. The next issue that also appeared prominent in the papers was the concern 
for a fair trial for Taylor. Here again, much more convergences were conspicuous in the 
coverage.  
The papers raised the concerns in some quarters in Liberia that Taylor was not going to get a 
fair Trial because the international community, through the international media, had influenced 
people’s perceptions that Taylor was already guilty of fuelling war crimes in Sierra Leone, even 
before his trial commenced (see Appendix III124, 129, 136, 271, 487, 488). Again, it appears that the 
agenda-setting, news selection, framing and priming strategies, discernible in the papers’ trial 
analysis, presented Taylor as a ‘war criminal’ before he was convicted (see 7.5).Significantly, the 
papers also captured the willingness, which the British had demonstrated to get Taylor to serve 
his sentence in the UK, should he be convicted, but there was no indication as to where should 
he go if acquitted and discharged (see Appendix III429, 439). 
According to ST and FDP (see Appendix III270, 486) on the issue of both the international and local 
media’s stereotypical presentation of Taylor as a ‘warlord’ and ‘war criminal’ at the height of 
his Trial in The Hague, this is what his lead counsel, Courtenay Griffiths had to say: 
I think the biggest challenge for the defence is the fact that public opinion has been led 
to believe over the years that Charles Taylor is guilty. The stock reaction I get from 
people when I tell them that I am defending Charles Taylor is ‘how can you defend that 
monster?’ Because there is this widely held view that he is guilty, this has been created 
by the Western media over the years. And that I think this is our biggest problem. You 
wonder whether anyone, including the prosecution and in fact also the Judges, can 
approach the case objectively with an independent frame of mind, basing their 
Judgment solely on the evidence, as opposed to whatever prejudiced they might be 
harbouring about Mr.. Taylor, from the various newspapers and media articles they 
might have read… Everyone irrespective of their position has been exposed to the 
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prejudice, which pervades this whole trial. Everyone has been exposed to it, so it is 
difficult to see what measures could be put in place to try and eradicate or erase those 
prior feelings. 
Indeed, as Griffiths asserted, issues that arose from the evidence that implicated Taylor were 
given salience and cleverly framed and primed, as seen in the news contents, stock phrases, 
nuances, quotes, photo captions etc. (see Entman’s, McQuail’s and Tankard’s theorisations on 
frames identification in 5.1) of the papers’ publications that demonised Taylor (see 7.5).  The 
first issue that was given prominence in the trial analysis (which had also been made salient in 
the pre-trial coverage) was that Taylor was the mastermind of the conflict, who supported 
AFRC/RUF junta with arms and ammunition in exchange for blood diamonds from Sierra Leone 
(see 7.2.1). 
He was also presented as a ‘murderer’ (see 7.5) and a ‘devil’ (7.5), who would stop at nothing to 
satisfy his unmitigated selfishness and rapacity. Thus, Moses Blah (his comrade in arms and 
successor to the Presidential throne) testified that he murdered Sam Bockarie and his family 
and hundreds more in Liberia (see Appendix III476, 478). The same Blah also testified that Taylor 
had rebels, who were ‘cannibals’ (see Appendix III477-478, 485-486). Other witnesses testified that 
he robbed so many children off their childhood by making them ferocious child combatants 
(Ibid).97 It also came out in the evidence that his intention was to destabilize West Africa by 
fanning the flames of rebellion (Ibid).98 The papers thus gave much prominence to the above 
issues throughout their trial analysis. 
Further, the papers, contained unsubstantiated allegations that Taylor had ill-gotten wealth, in 
millions of US dollars kept in banks overseas that should be confiscated by the Court and used 
for the reparation of war victims in Sierra Leone. However, reparation is a distinct post-conflict 
model, different from judicial accountability (see 3.1 and 3.3). And the international community 
provided funds for the successful implementation of the country’s reparation schemes, though 
the papers had reservations about how the funds were managed (see 6.2.5).  So why should the 
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papers again suggest that Taylor’s ill-gotten wealth should be used to fund the reparation 
programs, when his trial was still in progress? Was it because they had presented him as a ‘war 
criminal’ before his trial started? 
 Even though the papers later reported issues that appeared to have bolstered Taylor’s case, 
such issues were not given the prominence that would have facilitated healthy and critical 
debates in the public sphere (see 3. 2). The issues that strengthened Taylor’s case were either 
intermittently alluded to in the articles or dealt with remotely in the tail end of most of their 
publications. ST did raise the issue of the presumption of innocence and Taylor’s right to a fair 
trial, pursuant to Article 17 of the Statute in few of its publications that appeared to be anti-
Taylor (see  5.1 for Entman’s test of ‘biased coverage’).  FDP and Awoko (see Appendix III125, 266) 
raised the issues of the cost, time and resources needed for the trial, considering the funds 
expended to take witnesses to The Hague to testify and the expenses of getting the prosecution 
and defence teams to complete their case.  
 But ST (see Appendix III474) reported that over 180 million US dollars was needed for the Taylor 
defence team to do its work and asked whether such staggering sum should not have been 
spent on the war reparation schemes for war victims and poverty alleviation. This seemed to 
have further strengthened the biased posture of the papers against Taylor. They represented 
that the staggering sum expended for Taylor’s defence, should have been spent on post-conflict 
reconciliation and poverty alleviation. Thus, the papers neglected to discuss the basic legal fact 
that ‘hear the other side’ is a fundamental principle of natural justice (Craig, 2001: 259). Why 
should the papers make the concern about cost very salient, only when it came to the 
presentation of the defence’s case? Why did they not also make salient, issues relating to the 
cost which the prosecution needed to complete their case? 
 Rather, ironically, ST emphasized the position that ‘justice’ and ‘peace’ cannot be measured in 
monetary terms, only when the prosecution re-opened its case, to elicit additional evidence 
from four witnesses, including Naomi Campbell (see Appendix III487-488, 493). This representation 
begs the question whether the jurisprudential concept of justice should only be looked at 
through lenses coloured by the prosecution’s case. FDP (see Appendix III245) however argued 
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that though the people needed post-conflict justice, there was also the need for reparation for 
the war affected victims. Issues relating to the Court’s credibility, impartiality and 
independence, which are intertwined with the presumption of innocence and the need for a 
fair trial, were also not fairly raised and addressed by either of the papers. 
 This is simply because neither of the papers could fairly articulate this point beyond what 
Courtney Griffiths had said to the international media about the Court. Griffiths had also raised 
concerns about how the financiers of the Court would want to see Taylor behind bars forever, 
confirming ‘the urge to convict’ episode, a fundamental flaw in war crimes jurisprudence (see 
3.3). Arguably, the above issues should have been thoroughly articulated by the papers to 
promote a healthy debate in the public sphere (see 3.2) because there were CSOs and NGOs in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia that spent some time, debating the impossibility of giving Taylor a fair 
trial.   Even the issues of ‘coaching’ and ‘protection of witnesses’ (see 3.3) which Griffiths and 
Taylor openly opposed were not well articulated by the papers. 
 Taylor condemned all the prosecution’s 91 witnesses, saying that they went to The Hague to 
falsely implicate him (see Appendix III126-127, 439, 481, 483). Griffiths stated that the prosecution’s 
case was so weak that no reasonable tribunal of fact, that dispensed justice without fear or 
favour, affection or ill-will, would give credence to the testimonies of witnesses, who were 
coached and paid to testify against Taylor (see Appendix III276). Griffiths mentioned the case of 
Moses Blah, who became an insider witness for the prosecution. Blah first travelled to Ghana 
for medical attention (and the Court paid up to 5000 US dollars for that) before he was taken to 
The Hague at the expense of the Court to implicate Taylor.99 
Given this scenario, how independent was the Court from the Prosecution’s Office and Court’s 
Financiers? This question strikes a chord with the manner in which Crane had used the media to 
bring the World’s attention to the operations of the SCSL. Before the defence commenced its 
case, Griffiths filed a motion on a submission of no case to answer on 4th May, 2009, 
discrediting the prosecution’s case and pointing to instances in which witnesses were allegedly 
bribed to testify against Taylor, but the Trial Chamber II dismissed the application. The defence 
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team led twenty-one (21) witnesses in evidence to debunk the prosecution’s case. However, 
neither the motion on a submission of no case to answer nor Taylor’s case was given a serious 
media attention. 
 Thus, it was only Taylor’s testimony in his own defence that attracted some local media’s 
coverage (see 4.1 for Allan Bell’s attribution theorisation on the concept of newsworthiness). 
Essentially, the above scenarios thus needed some serious media attention and analyses, but 
they were not critically analysed to enable CSOs and NGOs, to thoughtfully debate the issue in 
the public sphere (see 3.2). The reason why such scenarios were not made salient by any of the 
papers can be inferred that the papers were not keen to present Taylor’s case, because they 
wanted to see him convicted. Interestingly, when the prosecution came up with an application, 
after it had closed it case, for additional four (4) witnesses to be allowed to testify against 
Taylor, the papers lent serious credence to the application, affirming the need for the Court to 
allow the application and thus extensively covered their testimonies (see Appendix III137, 272-273, 
494). 
The Court’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure did not expressly address issues relating to the 
test for the admissibility of fresh evidence,100 but other international tribunals have ordered 
that prosecutions can re-open their case in circumstances, where they are now faced with fresh 
pieces of evidence that were not available, when they initially presented their case, provided 
the fresh evidence’s probative value outweighs its prejudicial effects (see Appendix III494). 
Although the defence opposed the application, the Trial Chamber II upheld it and allowed 
Naomi Campbell (the supermodel), Carole White (Naomi’s agent) and Mia Farrow (a Hollywood 
actress), to testify about an event that took place in South Africa, during which Taylor allegedly 
gave some ‘dirty looking pieces of stones’ (rough and uncut diamonds) to Naomi, through some 
unknown persons (see Appendix III274-275, 490). 
The celebrities’ testimonies were analysed to present Taylor as the person who sent the uncut 
diamonds to Naomi, who never established whether the diamonds she received and eventually 
gave to the Nelson Mandela Children’s Foundation actually came from Taylor (see Appendix 
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III273). It appeared that even the international media was very interested in the testimonies of 
the celebrities (see Appendix III276). Apparently, this in tandem with Bell’s postulation that the 
elites are the persons that actually make the news- see 4.1 for Bell’s attribution theorisation on 
the concept of newsworthiness. Thus, the papers devoted much time and space to the 
celebrities’ testimonies, indicating their leanings towards the prosecution. 
Significantly, the papers came to be interested in the trial again when the closing arguments 
were made between 8th February and 11th March, 2011, by both the prosecution and defence. 
With the papers speculating that Taylor, would not go unpunished for the war crimes 
committed in Sierra Leone (see Appendix III276-277). The papers also covered both the Trial and 
Sentencing Judgments delivered on 26th April and 30th May, 2012. They analysed the judgments 
and conducted interviews with CSOs’ and NGOs’ representatives, students, journalists and 
unemployed youths, who demonstrated support for Taylor’s conviction and sentence of 50 
years imprisonment,  though there were also comments that the prosecution’s request for an 
80 year sentence, would have been preferable (see 7. 5). 
The papers also captured the scathing comments which Griffiths continued to make against the 
Court after his client’s conviction. Griffiths affirmed that the judgment came as no surprise to 
him because he knew his client had been demonised by the media and there were overt 
prejudices throughout the trial. He described the Court as a ‘form of 21st Century neo-
colonialism’, ‘a Court that has contaminated the pure waters of justice’ etc (see Appendix III134, 
136, 278-279, 496-497). The papers also represented Griffiths’ dissatisfaction with the prosecution’s 
decision to appeal the Trial Chamber’s judgment, asking how much more did they want, when 
he knew his client would in effect be in prison for life as he was already sixty-three (63) old 
when he was convicted (ibid). He thus extensively alluded to Justice El Hadji Malick Sow’s 
dissenting judgment to strengthen his accusations about the Court’s prejudices against his 
client (see 7.2.5). 
7.2.5 International Conspiracy versus Regional Integration 
The two other themes in the coverage are: international conspiracy and regional integration. 
These two issues are central to most of the highly opinionated articles, which the papers 
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published. Even though the discourses on the alleged international conspiracy that factually 
informed the debate, were never made salient by any of the papers, they constituted a 
constituent part of the reportage, that would have had their own effects on audiences 
(specifically CSOs’ representatives) at both the psychological and sociological levels, irrespective 
of how they were presented in the texts (see 5.1 for Entman’s, de Vreese’s and Scheufele’s 
theorisations on framing’s effects on audiences). 
The first issue regarding international conspiracy, which collided with concerns about regional 
integration and stability, was the international community’s effort, through the international 
media, to support the call to arrest and detain Taylor in Ghana for onward extradition to the 
SCSL (see 7.2.2) though the papers expressly supported the clamour to get Ghana to extradite 
Taylor to the SCSL. They also represented Ghana’s and ECOWAS’s unwillingness to accede to 
SCSL’s call to arrest Taylor. Ghana’s and ECOWAS’s double standards, clearly contravened the 
international community’s interest on this issue (see Appendix III170, 171). 
The international community, through the international media, emphasized that the need to 
hold Taylor accountable for past violations in Sierra Leone, solidified Ghana’s obligations under 
international law to arrest and extradite him. Ghana however denied having any commitment 
to arrest Taylor, a sitting President of an ECOWAS State and an invitee of the Ghanaian 
Government, who had come for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict (see Appendix 
III169, 297, 403). ECOWAS saw the indictment as an affront to their efforts to bring peace to Liberia 
because it leadership was about to strike a peace agreement between the Taylor government 
and the LURD (see Appendix III220, 235, 332, 412). Certainly, ECOWAS eventually came out with a 
position statement, asking the SCSL to hold back Taylor’s indictment in the interest of peace 
and regional stability because the then ongoing conflict that had wrecked Liberia had the 
tendency to affect the whole of West Africa (see Appendix III242, 398, 502, 528). 
Thus, the international media opposed ECOWAS and affirmed the position that Africa was ill-
prepared to end impunity (Lang, op.cit: 4).The papers also reflected this clash of interests when 
Taylor returned to Liberia to continue with his Presidency, when Liberia was still embroiled in 
war. The papers (see Appendix III173, 201) mirrored how Sierra Leoneans were dissatisfied and 
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disillusioned with the attitudes of ECOWAS in shielding Taylor from the SCSL. Further, when 
Taylor was forced to resign and fled into exile in Nigeria, the papers continued to represent and 
make the international community’s role prominent, in their quest to get Taylor to face justice 
in Sierra Leone (see Appendix III240, 244, 398). 
The papers became more critical of ECOWAS and Nigeria and bolstered the international 
community’s zest to bring Taylor to justice (see Appendix III244-245, 412). The papers (in the above 
editions) also stated that Nigeria’s gesture to accommodate Taylor, then a war crimes indictee, 
was in contravention of international law and the dignity and authority of the SCSL for which 
Nigeria was a Member of the Court’s Management Committee. They questioned Nigeria’s 
moral obligations under international law to secure Taylor, when the rebellion, which he fuelled 
in Sierra Leone, cost Nigeria more material and human resources than any other country that 
constituted ECOMOG (see 7.6). The papers also represented Nigeria’s and ECOWAS’s position 
that, Taylor was in Nigeria on the basis of an agreement, meant to peacefully resolve the 
conflict in Liberia and maintain regional stability. 
 The international community was eventually forced, albeit tentatively, to understand the plight 
of Liberians and the peculiar circumstances under which ECOWAS was taking decisions, that 
appeared to have contravened the quest for war crimes jurisprudence in Africa. Even Crane 
later confirmed this and argued that Nigeria’s intervention at the time was politically expedient 
for peace and stability to reign in Liberia in particular and West Africa in general. And the High 
Court of Nigeria, dismissed applications brought by two Nigerians (supported by the Nigerian 
Coalition on the ICC, an amalgam of about 50 CSOs) for the extradition of Taylor to the SCSL, on 
the grounds that they were tortured and made to suffer inhuman and degrading treatments, at 
the hands of the AFRC/RUF junta in Freetown, which was under Taylor’s control (see Appendix 
III337-338). 
The Court’s decision thus reflected Nigeria’s position for Taylor not to be extradited to maintain 
its credibility in international relations and for peace to reign in Liberia (ibid). But, the 
international conspiracy heightened, when the USA and EU, joined forces to pressure Nigeria to 
turn in Taylor to the SCSL, on the allegation that he had breached a fundamental term of his 
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stay in Nigeria by interfering in Liberian politics (see 7.2.3). It was when Taylor finally took his 
plea of not guilty in Freetown and decided to sack his first crop of lawyers that some critical 
pro-Taylor articles were written and sent to the papers for publications. And the papers 
resorted to publish the said articles unedited with the disclaimers that the views expressed in 
the articles never reflected their positions concerning the trial. 
 Most of the pro-Taylor articles lampooned the international community and accused it of 
hatching a conspiracy to molest and disrespect African leaders, under the guise of war crimes 
jurisprudence. Here is a classic example of a syndicated article (published in most newspapers), 
written by Abu Saybana Kamara, one of the lawyers, detailed to represent Taylor, when he 
sacked his first set of lawyers: 
‘The present de facto and de jure political leadership in Liberia is recognized by the 
international community and must be respected by all. The fact still remains that His 
Excellency Charles Taylor was hounded out of the Presidency of Liberia, forced into exile 
and subsequently illegally arrested and jailed by a racist international criminal 
conspiracy. President Taylor’s removal was an assault on the constitutional rights of the 
people of Liberia to freely choose their political leaders: it was a mockery of the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Liberia. It was also illegal under international law. I am 
gravely disturbed to see an African Head of State in handcuffs. President Taylor was 
elected by a wide majority of Liberians in an opened, free and fair election that was 
monitored by the international community, including eminent international statesmen… 
In this case the law of the jungle was the basis for the politically motivated indictment, 
the forcible removal of President Taylor from his rightful Presidency, his exile, his illegal 
arrest and illegal imprisonment at the Special Court… It is repugnant and nauseating to 
think that this very minute in the year of our Lord 2006, a democratically elected Black 
African Head of State is sitting in Chains in a cell right here on the soil from just 
yesterday, white-chained and shipped millions of Black Africans into slavery in Europe 
and North America’ (see Appendix III81, 247, 418). 
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The other articles alluded to how the international community had even pushed for the 
establishment of the ICC, to target African leaders, with allegations of human rights violations, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. FDP (see Appendix III150, 167, 286, 360, 404) also published 
articles sent in by guest writers that catalogued how forces loyal to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) allegedly committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
former Yugoslavia, for which they were not prosecuted. On this issue, the Western media, 
however, adopted a framing strategy that absolved NATO forces (after its devastating bombing 
campaigns) from criminal liability, but heightened the call for war crimes charges against 
Milosevic and his Serbian forces (McQuail, 2000: 343-344). Can the same be said of the 
American invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq? 
 And it is no secret that three of the Permanent Members of the UNO’s Security Council(the 
USA, China and Russia) are not signatories to the ICC’s treaty (Cassese, op.cit: 728). 
Paradoxically, according to  ST (see Appendix III359-360), the USA which is said to be campaigning  
against impunity and calling for the need to promote human rights and universal justice at a 
global scale, has signed many bilateral treaties with African countries  (including Sierra 
Leone)that undermine the operations of the ICC. Thus, from the papers’ analyses, it appears 
that the fight against impunity is based on a system of ‘selective justice’ that affects the weaker 
and more vulnerable states, but protects the stronger and more powerful states in 
international relations. If this is so, can it then be argued that war crimes jurisprudence is yet to 
triumph over impunity? This is what the New African magazine101 had to say on this question: 
And so, the ICC, which during his first ten years has largely focused on African cases, is 
finally being put to test. If there is a scintilla of concern for justice and the rule of law in 
the ICC, then one would expect the Western leaders along with their key political 
functionaries, who committed as much war crimes and crimes against humanity as the 
Africans brought before the Court, would find themselves under criminal investigations 
and subject to international arrest warrant. But will the ICC apply the letter of the law to 
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the leaders of the powerful Western countries that were mainly responsible for setting 
up the ICC, and that provide the bulk of funding for the Court?  
Essentially, the above issues constitute the cornerstone of some of the critical debates that 
were being sustained by the media within the context of the international conspiracy and 
regional integration frame. However, the ICC’s analogy, which was brought into the media’s 
analysis of the dynamics of the Taylor trial, was not thoroughly commented upon. The articles 
were just published as they were sent in. The angle which is brought into the reportage that 
should have warranted a thorough media analysis was the position of African leaders, regarding 
the ICC (see Appendix III517-518). 
 However, the eventual conviction of Taylor and the decision by the Appeals Chamber to uphold 
his conviction further strengthened the international conspiracy dialectic, shrouded in power 
politics over regional integration and stability. Essentially, the papers also reflected, without 
any critical analysis, the dissenting judgment of Justice Sow, the Alternate Judge, who was the 
only West African amongst the Panel of Judges in the Trial Chamber II. Justice Sow acquitted 
and discharged Taylor of all the 11 counts and dismissed the prosecution’s case as one that was 
entirely devoid of merits (see Appendix III521). Thus, proponents of the regional integration and 
stability argument, used Justice Sow’s dissenting Judgment to decry the SCSL as a political 
court, established by an international conspiracy, to promote judicial imperialism in West Africa 
(see Appendix III522-523).102 
7.3 Content Analysis: The Quantitative Dimension    
It is discernible from the above analysis that the papers lent credence to the prosecutorial 
approach to TJ, albeit with seeming ‘biases’ in favour of the prosecution’s case.  Thus, it is also 
clear that the papers reflected most of TJ’s reconciliatory models, but simultaneously 
emphasised the need to end impunity over achieving reconciliation and poverty alleviation. 
Apparently, the coverage of the above issues and the controversies that surrounded the 
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discourses of the main and sub-frames in the analysis,103 were characterised by seeming 
‘biases’ on the part of the papers against  Taylor. 
  To further validate this finding, I will quantitatively analyse the extent (if at all) to which each 
of the papers shrugged-off its idiosyncrasies in reporting the controversial issues in the frames 
and sub-frames discussed above. In other words, I will seek to establish how the reportage was 
done by evaluating how the papers separated their views from the actual news of the trial. This 
will point to the degree to which each of the papers strove to achieve the idealised norms of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’. This quantitative component will, inter alia, help in validating 
whether the papers’ coverage appeared to have been marked by biases against Taylor.  This is 
simply because the media in Sierra Leone is still grappling with the fundamental problems of 
communications ethics (see 3.4 and 6.3). This is what Taylor’s lead counsel (Griffiths), told this 
researcher on 8th July, 2011, in London, about the unprofessionalism that characterised the 
media’s coverage of the Taylor trial: 
… In both countries – i.e. Sierra Leone/Liberia – the print media has a habit of being 
susceptible to political pressures. E.g. in Liberia, you can virtually anticipate what line a 
newspaper will take because of its political links with a party or whatever. And to an extent, 
it’s the same in SL. So, I’m not sure that the overall reporting of the proceedings was 
balanced. At another level, I got the impression that there was a further distinction – the SL 
media starting-point was very much anti-Taylor, proceeding on the assumption that Taylor 
was responsible and that the trial was a waste of time because people already knew he was 
responsible. Whereas, much of the reporting in Liberia began from the premise that, in a 
sense, Taylor had been betrayed, although the pro-government media in Liberia – i.e. the 
papers supporting Sirleaf, were a lot more critical of him – and in many ways, more critical 
of him than the SL media… (See transcription 12).  
Meanwhile, the following tables and graphs, gauge the trend of the papers’ coverage in a bid to 
establish whether the seeming biases against Taylor, discernible in the qualitative dimension of 
the content analysis, can as well be discovered, through this quantitative content analysis.    
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Table 6: For Di People’s Reportage (Taylor trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
August 2005) 
PROSECUTION DEFENCE 
(April 2012-
September 2013) 
(April 2006-
March 2008) 
 (July 2009-
December 2010) 
N 20 22 6 8 
V 6 26 0 7 
US 4 14 0 5 
 
Table 7: Standard Times’ Reportage (Taylor trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
August 2005) 
PROSECUTION DEFENCE  
(April 2012-
September 2013) 
(April 2006-
March 2008) 
(July 2009-
December 2010) 
N 23 18 10 8 
V 7 29 12 7 
US 3 14 1 8 
 
Table 8: Awoko’s Reportage (Taylor trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003-
August 2005) 
PROSECUTION DEFENCE  
(April 2012-
September2013) 
(April 2006-
March 2008) 
(July 2009-
December 2010) 
N 8 14 13 13 
V 1 6 0 7 
US 0 4 2 10 
 
The tables (6, 7 and 8) above show the representation of the numerous publications of For Di 
People, ST and Awoko categorised into News (N), Views (V) and Unclassified Stories (US). Even 
though the pre-trial period spanned up to thirty-five months (March, 2003- February, 2006), 
the analysis restricts itself to only the first thirty months (March, 2003- November, 2005). This 
period commences in March, 2003, because that was when Taylor’s indictment was unsealed. 
The trial period, which happened to be the longest, lasted for 57 months (i.e. between April, 
2006 and December, 2010). The analysis regarding this period is divided into the case for the 
prosecution and that of the defence. Since the prosecution’s case was quite elaborate (as it had 
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to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt), it led 91 witnesses in evidence between (April, 
2006 and March, 2008). This spanned up to 33 months, but the analysis reflecting this period 
covered only the first 23 months. 
 This 23 months period is deemed sufficient to gauge the trend in the papers’ analyses and 
coverage of the prosecution’s case, through the thorough quantitative analysis presented in 
tables 1, 2 and 3 in respect of the three papers. The case for the defence commenced in July, 
2009 and ended in December, 2010. This, inter alia, indicates that the defence’s case was not as 
elaborate as that of the prosecution. It called only 21 witnesses to bolster its case. And the 
analysis (see tables 1, 2 and 3) covered virtually the whole period (18 months) for which the 
defence’s case lasted. 
The post-trial phase, which commenced after the Trial Chamber II’s judgment, ended with the 
pronouncement of the Appeals’ Chamber judgment in 2013. Thus, the analysis encompasses 
the papers’ coverage mirroring the period April, 2012 to September, 2013 (i.e. 18 months). 
Essentially, it would have been unrealistic to analyse all of the papers’ contents for the entire 
period of the trial. Building on the generalisation that communications research observations 
are inevitably ‘selective’ and ‘incomplete’ (Treadwell, op.cit:7), the analysis is thus restricted to 
the periods depicted in tables 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 9: The Selected Media’s Total Reportage (Taylor trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
PRE-TRIAL TRIAL POST-TRIAL 
(March 2003 - 
August 2005) 
PROSECUTION DEFENCE 
April 2012-
August 2013 
(April 2006-
May 2008) 
(July 2009-
December 2010) 
N 51 54 29 29 
V 14 61 12 21 
US 7 32 3 23 
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Table 10: Comprehensive Representation of the Total Reportage (Taylor trial) 
MEDIA 
CONTENTS 
MEDIA 
HOUSE 
PRE-TRIAL  TRIAL  POST-TRIAL   
(March 2003 - 
August 2005) 
PROSECUTION   DEFENCE  
(April 2012 - 
September 2013) 
(April 2006 - 
May 2008) 
(July 2009 - 
December 2010) 
N 
ST 23 18 10 8 
A 8 14 13 13 
FDP 20 22 6 8 
V 
ST 7 29 12 7 
A 1 6 0 7 
FDP 6 26 0 7 
US 
ST 3 14 1 8 
A 0 4 2 10 
FDP 4 14 0 5 
Tables 9 and 10 give tabular representations of the sum total of news, views and unclassified 
Stories of FDP, ST and Awoko. For ease of referencing, I repeat Allison Cooper’s postulation, 
quoted in Lang (op.cit:3), ‘press coverage tends to focus on prosecution during the early stages 
when indictments are unsealed, and then shifts when the defence begins to presents it case’. 
The first limb of this statement appeared to have been validated by the total pre-trial and trial 
publications {pre-trial (N 51 + V 14 + US 7 = 72); trial (N 54 + V 61 + US 32= 147); (pre-trial 72 + 
trial 147= 219)} of the papers. 
Thus, 219 (72 pre-trial + 147 trial) contents were published during the periods when the 
prosecution unsealed the indictment and prosecuted Taylor. This points to the level of 
attention, which the papers paid to the prosecution of Taylor and the salience and valence, 
which they attributed to the recurring thematic issues of the prosecution’s case, are accordingly 
analysed in 7.2.1 and 7.2.5.  The second limb of Coopers’ observation that media coverage 
‘shifts when the defence begins to present its case’ is also authenticated by the findings of this 
quantitative analysis (N 29+ V 12 + US 3= 44). Thus, the precise contents (44), which the papers 
published throughout the defence’s case, are far less than those which they published during 
both the pre-trial and the period when the prosecution presented its case. 
 This clearly confirms the extent to which the papers concentrated on informing and educating 
CSOs and NGOs on the case against Taylor in comparison to the defenses available to him.  
Interestingly, even the post-trial phase, attracted much more media coverage {N (29), V (21), 
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US (23); (29 + 21 + 23 = 73) than the period when Taylor’s case was being presented. 
Meanwhile, 73 as opposed to 44 media items (N, V and US) were published during the post-trial 
phase, indicating that the papers came to be again interested in covering the entire period, 
when Taylor’s conviction was pronounced by the Trial Chamber II and upheld by the Appeals 
Chamber. Essentially, this tabular presentation is graphically represented for a clearer analysis 
and presentation in the subsequent graphs that follow. 
 
Figure 6: For Di People’s Reportage (Taylor trial) 
This graph shows how FDP represented the trial of Taylor. The paper published 30 pre-trial 
contents: 20 were news, 6 views and 4 were unclassified stories. This indicates that FDP 
appeared to have paid more attention to the publication of news than views and unclassified 
stories. This however, prima facie, presupposes that FDP (like ST and Awoko) strove in its pre-
trial reportage to uphold the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’ (see the journalist’s 
position of what news is in 4.1). 
 But relying on Fowler (op.cit: 1-3), Altschull (op.cit: 23), Watson (op.cit: 120-141), Severin & 
Tankard (op.cit: 101-102), Smith (op.cit:34- 41, 47-53) and Entman, (op.cit:165), it can be 
argued that FDP’s ‘socially constructed realities’ (its pre-trial news items) were not neutral. 
Thus, the news, views and unclassified stories, were framed with nuances that reflected the 
media communicator’s (FDP’s) texts (preferred meanings) which the audiences (CSOs 
representatives) may or may not have taken (preferred readings), depending on their own 
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predispositions. However, the trend is different in the paper’s reportage of the trial and post-
trial phases. The News contents published in both phases {trial (22 + 6) + post-trial (8) = 36}, 
cannot be equated with the total contents on views and unclassified stories {trial (26 + 0 + 7 = 
33) + post-trial (14 + 0 + 5 = 19); (33 + 19 = 52)}, which the paper published.  
Analytically, this appeared to have confirmed the qualitative dimension of the content analysis, 
which established (relying on the 2007 Entman’s test) that FDP’s publications were biased 
against Taylor. Also, building on the theoretical argument that ‘News production is a discourse 
anchored by the ideology of news producers or those who employ them’ (Watson, op.cit: 130), 
it appears that FDP’s publications were tainted with overt prejudices against Taylor, whom the 
paper dubbed as ‘war criminal’, ‘war lord’, ‘devil’ etc. This biased position against Taylor, 
became clear in the paper’s coverage even before he was convicted (see analysis between 7.2.1 
and 7.2.5). Hence, it is contended that FDP continually appeared to have failed to uphold the 
idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’ in its reportage.  
 
Figure 7: Standard Times’ Reportage (Taylor trial) 
 
This graph shows how ST represented the Taylor trial. The paper published 33 pre-trial 
contents: 23 news, 7 and 3 views and unclassified stories respectively. This indicates that ST 
appeared to have paid more attention to the publications of news (23) than to the dispatch of 
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views (7) and unclassified stories (3). This prima facie presupposes that ST (like FDP and Awoko) 
strove in its pre-trial reportage to uphold the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’. But 
relying on Fowler (op.cit: 1-3), Altschull (op.cit: 23), Watson (op.cit: 120-141), Severin & 
Tankard (op.cit: 101-102), Smith (op.cit:34- 41, 47-53) and Entman, (op.cit:165), it can be 
argued that ST’s ‘socially constructed realities’ (its pre-trial news contents) were not neutral.   
The news, views and unclassified Stories, were framed with the most effectively chosen 
nuances that  appeared to have mirrored the media communicators’ (ST’s) texts (preferred 
meanings) which the audiences (CSOs representatives) may or may not have taken (preferred 
readings), depending on their perceptual tendencies. 
 This trend is however different in the paper’s reportage of the trial and post-trial phases. The 
news contents dispatched in both phases {trial (18 + 10 = 28) + post-trial (8) = 36}, cannot be 
equated with the total contents on views and unclassified stories {trial (29 + 12+ 7 = 48) + post-
trial (14 + 1 + 8 = 23); 48 + 23 = 71} which the paper published. Analytically, this seems to have 
confirmed the qualitative dimension of the content analysis, which establishes (relying on the 
same 2007 Entman’s test) that the pre-trial, trial and post- trial publications of ST were again 
biased against Taylor.Again, building on Watson’s (op.cit: 130) theoretical argument (see 
analysis on FDP above), it appears that ST’s publications were  biased against Taylor, whom the 
paper dubbed as ‘war criminal’, ‘war lord’, ‘illegal exporter of uncut diamonds’ etc. even before 
his indictment was unsealed (see the analysis between 7.2.1 and 7.2.5). Hence, it seems that ST 
continually failed to uphold the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’ in its reportage.  
 
Figure 8: Awoko’s Reportage (Taylor trial) 
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This graph shows how Awoko represented the Taylor trial. The paper put out only 9 pre-trial 
contents: 8 news, 1 and 0 view and unclassified stories respectively. It appears from this 
quantification that Awoko paid more attention to the publication of news contents than the 
dispatches of views and unclassified stories put together (1+ 0 =1). This prima facie presupposes 
that Awoko (like FDP and ST) strove in its pre-trial reportage to uphold the idealised norms of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’. But relying on Fowler (op.cit: 1-3), Altschull (op.cit: 23), Watson 
(op.cit: 120-141), Severin & Tankard (op.cit: 101-102), Smith (op.cit:34- 41, 47-53) and Entman, 
(op.cit:165), it can be argued that Awoko’s ‘socially constructed realities’ (its pre-trial news 
contents) were not neutral. Hence they were craftily framed (see the qualitative dimension of 
the content analysis) with the most appropriately chosen nuances that reflected its (Awoko’s) 
texts (preferred meanings), which the audiences (CSOs representatives) may or may not have 
taken (preferred readings), depending on their perceptual tendencies.  
This trend is continued in the paper’s trial and post-trial phases. The news contents dispatched 
in both phases {trial (14 + 13 = 27) + post-trial (13) = 40), cannot be equated with the total 
contents on views and unclassified stories {trial (6 + 0 + 7 = 13) + post-trial (4 + 2 + 10 = 16); 13 
+ 16 = 29} which it published. Analytically, this appeared to have confirmed the qualitative 
dimension of the content analysis, which establishes (relying on the 2007 Entman’s test) that 
the pre-trial, trial and post- trial publications of Awoko were biased against Taylor.  This is also 
seen in the fact that the paper paid more attention to the prosecution’s case than that of the 
defence (see graph above). Awoko almost reported the entire case for the prosecution (see 
graph above) with its chosen nuances and slants that factually informed the issues as 
elucidated in the qualitative dimension of the analysis between 7.0 and 7.4.   
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Figure 9: The Selected Media’s Total Reportage (Taylor trial) 
This representation depicts the tabular data represented in table 9 as explicated above. 
 
Figure 10: Breakdown of the Total Reportage of the Selected Media (Taylor trial) 
This representation depicts the graphic presentation of the tabular data represented in table 10 
as explicated above. 
7.4 Discourse Analysis  
The qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the content analysis (see 7.2 and 7.3) clearly 
depict how the papers represented the Taylor trial (see research question 3). There appeared 
to have been evidence of national prejudices against Taylor in the agenda-setting ability 
manifested in the papers’ framing and priming strategies. And the papers, to some extent, 
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strove to separate their views from the actual news contents, which they published for 
consumption at the psychological and sociological levels (see de Vreese’s and Scheufele’s 
theorisations on framing’s effects on audiences in 5.1).Thus, even when it comes to the media’s 
impacts on audiences’ perceptions of issues, it tends not to matter greatly how much 
prominence the media may have given to particular issues because audiences are prone to 
believe only those bits of the texts that are cognate with their own personal mental schemas 
(see Entman’s theorisation in 5.1). 
Prominence thus depicts the leanings of the communicators on the issues. The issues in this 
analysis are the indictment, trial, conviction and eventual sentence of Taylor to 50 years 
imprison; a sentence, which Taylor appealed, but was upheld by the Appeals Chamber. These 
issues eventually culminated in the anti-Taylor media campaign (in the name of promulgating 
war crimes jurisprudence), which appeared to have been initially championed by the 
international media, but was subsequently fuelled by the papers, because there was a national 
perception in Sierra Leone (mainstream discourse) that Taylor was guilty even before his trial 
began.  And given the historical background to the conflict and Taylor’s role in it (see analysis 
7.2.1), the issues which the media thus made prominent, clearly resonated with the perceptions 
of audiences (CSOs representatives) across Sierra Leone (see 7.5), because Taylor’s involvement 
in the conflict in Sierra Leone, had devastating effects on their lives and property, infrastructure 
and economy etc. 
 Thus, the dynamics of the Taylor trial became overwhelmingly central to the thematic issues 
that permeated the discourses of CSOs and NGOs in Sierra Leone’s public sphere. Essentially, to 
further validate these findings, a critica discourse analysis is done on the mainstream discourses 
that permeated the frames and sub-frames analysed between 7.2.1 and 7.2.5, to establish how 
the language used in the identifiable frames that characterised the reportage might have 
influenced CSOs’ representatives’ perceptions of the indictment and trial, conviction and 
eventual sentence of Taylor. 
 Again, the instrumentality of discourse analysis in the deconstruction of the mainstream 
discourses that factually informed the said identifiable frames cannot be overemphasized 
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(Mautner, op.cit: 33). Thus, effective deconstruction can aid identification of the patterns in the 
dictions that are embedded in the frames and sub-frames that characterised the coverage. 
Invariably, the dictions used in the reportage would have had ‘unequivocally negative (or 
positive) semantic loads, depending on how they were used in sentences. Even figures 
(numbers) can aid the analysis, because of the ‘rhetorical effects’ they would have had in the 
interpretation of the contents within the frames (Mautner, op.cit: 38-39). 
 Thus, the international media and a Sierra Leonean diaspora newspaper published online from 
Canada (The Patriotic Vanguard) used words that unequivocally denote and connote negative 
semantic loads (Mautner, op.cit:38) against Taylor. The following abstractions contained a 
plethora of words and phrases (underlined) that tend to validate this finding: 
1. ‘… a notorious Liberian ex-President and warlord’ {Caption: ‘The Beginning of the end of 
Impunity for the World’s once all powerful thugs’: The Economist, Thursday, 5th July, 
2007} 
 
2. ‘… once one of Africa’s most feared warlords’ {Caption: Taylor sanctions impair defence, 
says lawyer: Agence France- Presse, Thursday, 16th August, 2007} 
 
3. … the most notorious indictee of the SCSL {The Taylor trial and confidence level of Sierra 
Leoneans: The Patriotic Vanguard, Thursday, 5th July, 2007} 
 
4. ‘… he continued to act like a warlord, abusing citizens and selling Liberia’s natural 
resources for personal gains {Caption: Justice for Taylor: Can these war crimes court get 
it right? The Christian Science Monitor, Thursday, 5th July, 2007} 
The dictions ‘notorious’, ‘warlord’, ‘thugs’, etc. which the international media and the said 
Sierra Leonean diaspora online newspaper appeared to have intentionally and continually used 
to describe Taylor, manifestly denote their prejudices against him and as well demonstrate 
negative semantic loads, indicating how ferocious and deadly Taylor was. This was geared 
towards the campaign of not only getting Taylor to face war crimes trial, but to convict and 
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punish him as well (see 7.2.4). The emphasis on conviction and punishment before the trial 
ended, which the international media projected, appeared to have contravened the idealised 
journalistic norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’ and the legal principle of presumption of 
innocence, which is central to war crimes jurisprudence (see 3.3). 
Interestingly, the papers’ coverage of the indictment and trial, conviction and sentence of 
Taylor, was not dissimilar to how the international media represented the dynamics of his trial. 
Hence, from the discourses in the frames and sub-frames analysed above, it appeared that the 
papers, intentionally and continually demonised Taylor and dubbed him  ‘murderer’ and ‘killer’ 
(see Appendix III122),  ‘war criminal’ (see Appendix III422), ‘notorious ex-President’, ‘criminal’ and 
‘prisoner (see Appendix III422), ‘warlord’ (see Appendix III205, 421), ‘devil’ (see Appendix III272), 
‘illegal exporter of uncut and blood diamonds’ (see Appendix III276, 495), ‘warlord turned 
President’ (see Appendix III478), ‘tyrant’ and ‘bigot’ (see Appendix III311) ‘the God father of the 
illegal and demonic AFRC/RUF alliance’ (see Appendix III79, 289), ‘a military terrorist’ (see 
Appendix III128), ‘the bad boy of West Africa’ (see Appendix III172), ‘the former butcher in West 
Africa’ (see Appendix III437), ‘a blood thirsty and barbaric person’ (see Appendix III484) and ‘…a 
villain, a onetime US jail-escapee, an indicted international criminal and a fugitive from 
international justice’ (see Appendix III64). 
Meanwhile, the plethora of ferocious descriptions, which the papers attributed to Taylor, 
throughout the pre-trial, trial and post-trial phases, undoubtedly denoted and connoted 
negative semantic loads about Taylor and  his operations that eventually resulted in his 
indictment and trial, conviction and sentence. Essentially, the said descriptions had their 
influences on the perceptions of CSOs and NGOs across Sierra Leone, because they were 
consciously involved in the country’s entire TJ process. Below are typical examples of how the 
papers reflected the perceptions of CSOs’ representatives’ on the eventual conviction and 
sentence of Taylor: 
1. ‘No Conviction of Command Responsibility… But Taylor is Guilty on 11 Counts’ {Awoko 
Monday, 30th April, 2012} 
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2. ‘This judgment is strong message for potential perpetrators of violence {Awoko, ibid } 
 
3. We Sierra Leonean students are grateful to the international community for the support 
in bringing Taylor to justice’ {Awoko, ibid} 
 
4. ‘No hiding place for war criminals’ {Awoko, ibid} 
 
5. ‘People of Sierra Leone let this verdict unit us!’ {Awoko, ibid} 
 
6. ‘The conviction of Charles Taylor is a landmark moment for international justice’ {FDP, 
30th April, 2012} 
 
7. ‘It clearly demonstrates that those who commit atrocities will be held to account and 
that no matter their position they will not enjoy impunity’ { ST, 30th April, 2012} 
Further, even when the Appeals Chamber dismissed Taylor’s appeal and upheld his conviction 
and 50 years sentence, the papers positively represented the Appeals Chamber decision, as one 
that resonated with the mainstream discourses prevalent in Sierra Leone’s public sphere at the 
time. The following publications are instructive on this issue: 
1. ‘Justice Gelaga King said Taylor fuelled a conflict that became a threat to international 
peace and security’ {FDP, Friday, 27th September, 2013} 
 
2. ‘Human rights groups have welcomed the outcome of the appeal. In a statement 
Amnesty International said that it sent a clear message to the leaders across the World  
that no-one is immune from justice’ {FDP, 27th September, 2013} 
 
3. ‘This conviction of Charles Taylor must pave the way for further prosecution’ {FDP, 
Wednesday, 16th October, 2013} 
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4. ‘Charles Taylor is the first former head of state to be convicted of war crimes since 
World War II’ {ST, Wednesday, 16th October, 2013} 
 
5. ‘… the sentence does not replace the amputated limbs, it does not bring back to life 
those who were murdered and it does not heal the wounds of those who are victims of 
sexual violence, but the sentence bring a level of justice and reflect the condemnation 
of all members of the global community for the suffering inflicted on innocent men, 
women and children {Awoko, Thursday, 17th October, 2013}  
7.5 Semi-Structured Interviews 
To further validate the findings from the content (qualitative and quantitative dimensions) and 
discourse analyses in 7.2 and 7.3 above (see research question 3), the need arose to gauge the 
opinions of some of the journalists that covered the trial through semi-structured interviews on 
the recurring themes of the coverage.  Ibrahim Sorie Sesay (then member of the Editorial Board 
of FDP), Ibrahim Karim-Sei (then Editor- in- Chief of ST) and Kelvin Lewis (still Editor- in-Chief of 
Awoko), were the journalists that consented to the interviews. The three (3) journalists 
answered questions regarding their interests in the trial, their perceptions of Nigeria in 
providing a safe haven for Taylor, the international community’s role in getting Taylor to face 
justice, the reason why they presented Taylor as if he were already guilty before his trial 
commenced, the impacts of the trial on CSOs and regional integration in West Africa, their 
personal views on the Trial Chamber’s II and Appeals Chamber’s Judgments etc. 
To the questions why the papers devoted so much time and space in the coverage of the Taylor 
trial and why they appeared to have tilted their publications against Taylor and in favour of the 
prosecution, the responses were not dissimilar. Sesay said FDP monitored the trial in The Hague 
because the paper wanted to assist the SCSL with vital information to ensure that those who 
bore the greatest responsibility for the conflict (including Taylor) are brought to justice, noting 
that the paper never tilted its stories against Taylor, but it highlighted Taylor’s role in the 
conflict and how his utterances of making Sierra Leone tasting the bitterness of war were 
actualised (see transcription 13). Karim-Sei stated that ST merely reflected the overwhelming 
public perception that Taylor was responsible for the carnage in Sierra Leone and as a news 
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medium, he thought his paper was obliged to represent what was happening in the court to the 
people, adding that the paper did not tilt its stories in favour of the prosecution, but presented 
it in a way that mirrored the sufferings of Sierra Leoneans at the hands of Taylor (see 
transcription 14). 
Lewis explained that Awoko paid greater attention to the trial because it was topical and had to 
do with a war that brought untold sufferings to Sierra Leoneans. He furthered that Awoko 
never tilted its publications to favour the prosecution’s case because the paper reported 
objectively what was said in court. He cautioned that it would appear that Awoko gave 
prominence to the prosecution’s case because they were talking a lot more time than the 
defence lawyers and the paper had to report the proceedings (see transcription 15). Thus, from 
the above responses, it can be inferred that the papers considered the trial important and 
upheld their responsibility to report the proceedings because they were cognate with the 
mainstream discourses of the society. This appears to have dovetailed with Shaw’s human 
rights journalism and Thompson’s new journalistic paradigm (see 2.2 and 4.1).  Also, it appears 
(at this stage) that the papers attributed responsibility for the conflict to Taylor.     
 On Nigeria’s role in providing a safe haven for Taylor after he was indicted, the responses 
appeared to be similar with slight technical variations. Sesay said FDP noticed Nigeria’s double 
standards in the whole episode. He stated that it appeared that Nigeria which had spent human 
and material resources in ending the war was now providing asylum for Taylor to escape 
justice. He however furthered that had Taylor sought asylum in another country, it would have 
been difficult to get him to face justice, adding that it was a blessing in disguise, when Nigeria 
opted to rescue Taylor after he was kicked out of power in Liberia (see transcription 13). Karim-
Sei confirmed that ST maintained this same position, adding that Nigeria’s intervention was to 
make sure that the tension surrounding the  Charles Taylor saga was reduced and for him to be 
kept in a place where he could be easily extradited to face justice (see transcription 14). 
 Lewis said Awoko saw it as a continuation of the regime change theory, which ECOWAS had 
started with the RUF leadership, by replacing Foday Sankoh with Issa Sesay, noting that Taylor 
was replaced as President of Liberia in the interest of regional stability and was temporarily 
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granted asylum in Nigeria. Concerning the papers’ positions on the UN Security Council’s 
Resolution 1688, which called for the transfer of the Taylor trial to The Hague, FDP and ST 
unreservedly supported the resolution on grounds of regional security and stability, with Sesay 
emphasizing President Sirleaf feared that Taylor still had loyalists determined to disrupt the 
peace processes in Sierra Leone and Liberia (see transcription 13). Karim-Sei cautioned that the 
commencement of the trial in Freetown affected the relationship between Sierra Leone and 
Liberia because some Liberians had not wanted their ex-President to be tried in Freetown by a 
UN based Sierra Leonean court (see transcription 14). Awoko however though affirmed the 
regional stability and security saga, stated that it would have been better had the trial been 
held in Freetown. This is how Lewis (see transcription 15) explained the paper’s position:  
But for us, we felt that taking the Taylor trial away was in fact moving the spotlight from where 
the whole thing happened. And as you would have realized, the trial did not get as much 
publicity as it would have got if the trial was still going on in Sierra Leone. The publicity for the 
trial was now confined to bits and pieces of juicy material. For example, when the issue of 
Naomi Campbell and the diamond that was or was not given came up, that was broadcasted 
worldwide, but the day-to-day happenings in the trial never came to the public view as it would 
have been if the trial was in Freetown, Sierra Leone. So our view was it was not in the best 
interest of all of us. 
To the question why the papers presented Taylor as if he was already guilty before his Trial 
started, the responses also appeared to be similar with some minor technical variations. Sesay 
stated that FDP catalogued a chronicle of Taylor’s criminal activities against the people of Sierra 
Leone as evidence upon which the SCSL could rely, emphasizing that it was for the court to 
establish whether what the paper presented was credible or not (see transcription 13). Karim-
Sei said Taylor was presented as a convict before his trial started because he had said Sierra 
Leoneans would taste the bitterness of war. He furthered that it was Taylor that convicted 
himself before the trial started, noting that ST merely reflected what was in the public’s domain 
that Taylor was responsible for the war crimes committed in Sierra Leone (see transcription 14). 
Lewis affirmed that Awoko indeed presented Taylor as guilty before his trial started because 
the paper had first-hand information about what he did to Sierra Leoneans, leading to his trial, 
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noting that Awoko was never wrong because Taylor was eventually convicted in the end (see 
transcription 15).        
Regarding the staggering costs incurred to bring Taylor to justice and whether they think that 
such moneys should have been expended on post-conflict reconciliation and poverty 
alleviations, the responses were not dissimilar. The editors affirmed the points that though the 
international community expended huge sums in bringing Taylor to justice, the moneys were 
well spent because impunity was addressed and the message has been sent  that irrespective of 
people’s positions, they cannot commit war crimes and crimes against humanity anywhere with 
impunity. They also expressed the same views that though it would have been good for the 
moneys to have been spent in post-conflict reconciliation and poverty alleviation, it was better 
that impunity was addressed and that justice of any kind is expensive (see transcriptions 13, 14 
and 15).  
 On the controversial issue of whether the Taylor trial was largely precipitated by an 
international conspiracy or the genuine quest for international justice, the editors affirmed that 
the trial was precipitated by a genuine quest for justice for Sierra Leoneans:  
‘… it was not a question of Western conspiracy, it was just a process to end impunity on the 
part of some of our despotic rulers in Africa’ (Sesay of FDP - see transcription 13). 
 ‘I think it was a genuine quest for international justice. Whatever conspiracy may have arisen 
at that time, I believe it was simply because the international community was responding to the 
desires of the people of this region to get rid of terrorism in the region. So for us, the effort was 
genuine and we are happy that at the end of the day, justice was served’ (Karim-Sei of ST- see 
transcription 14). 
‘I think it was precipitated by a genuine quest for international justice. It was a new form of 
justice. What had happened in Sierra Leone was unique and it was shocking to the whole world, 
and the world had to stand up and address that sort of behavior. And if we look back at the 
Special Court, it set some precedents. It was a new way of attacking or resolving a new 
problem…’ (Lewis of Awoko- see transcription 15). 
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Regarding the impact of the media’s coverage of the Taylor trial on CSOs representatives, the 
editors affirmed: 
‘Well the impact is that it has created some awareness among most civil societies. The outreach 
section of the special court carried out a lot of sensitization programs before, during and after 
the trial, and that goes a long way to sort of sensitize our own civil society movements and the 
newspapers and journalists themselves were at the forefront of all these things. And also, civil 
society now believes that they can be very vocal especially on issues that borders their 
wellbeing or issues that relate to the security of the state or issues that pertain to the justice of 
the state. So, in one way or the other, it goes a long way to actually promote civil society 
activities in Sierra Leone.’ (Sesay of FDP-see transcription 13) 
‘Well interestingly, after the war, civil society organizations did not have the kind of steam, the 
cohesion they had during the war, before the war. It is like we were only united as civil society 
during the war. But at the end of the war, you know what happened to civil societies. Most of 
them disintegrated, some became political groupings. And so for us, it was a disappointment 
that what we stood for at that time, even though we accomplished it, but we did not continue 
to pursue the objective of bringing civil societies together to fight a common cause. Today, I 
don’t think that we even have a civil society in this country. Because everybody is now a self-
seeker, everybody is seeking his own personal interest. And so for me, the impact was not as 
great as we expected. We wanted that as a civil society group which came together to fight a 
common cause, a common enemy, we shall continue in that light so that today we can even 
stand against systems that are not working in the interest of the public. But that does not exist 
anymore.’ (Karim-Sei of ST-see transcription 14) 
‘Well, I think they followed the media, they now realize that role of the media. They engaged 
with the media, and they now know to a large extent that they can get the support of the 
media in their advocacy work. And so for them, it was an eye opener; it was a new way of 
working with the media, it was a new way of knowing how to propagate issues, and it was a 
new way of using the media as a tool for advocacy’ (Lewis of Awoko- see transcription 15). 
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On the issue of the trial’s impact on regional integration in West Africa the editors commented 
that: 
‘One of the major impacts it had is that first, people came up with the suggestion that instead 
of us looking at those that bear the greatest responsibility, we should also try people that in 
one way or the other connected with ‘those that bear the greatest responsibility’. So that 
awareness was actually raised. And there were a lot of pressure from people within the sub- 
region to bring those that are connected to some of the atrocities committed to justice. That’s 
one impact. And the other impact is that, as I said earlier, it’s a clear signal to end impunity, 
that is, those that hold political leadership should not use it to terrorize their own people.’ 
(Sesay of FDP- see transcription 13).  
‘Well, first of all, I don’t believe what we have gone through will happen again. Few people 
cannot wake up in the morning, take up arms against their own people because we have a 
system now in place, a precedent has been set that when you do this that is what will happen 
to you. So for us, it has impact on peace, lasting peace for that matter. Because that was the 
quest, the genuine quest of many people in this region that we wanted peace. And so, 
whatever was the result, the outcome of Charles Taylor trial or whatever, I think we appreciate 
that greatly’. (Karim-Sei- see transcription 15). 
‘I think if anything, it made the case for the region to come together because the initial 
response of the whole crisis was for a regional army, and now we have seen progress on that 
with regional logistics centers being setup, regional standing army being setup. So I think it had 
positive effect on the call for regional integration’ (Lewis- see transcriptions 15). 
Finally, to the Trial and Appeals Chambers’ Judgments the editors reiterated the facts that: 
‘… When Taylor was convicted, the prosecution suggested eighty years imprisonment. The 
defence counsel said that was too much. Later, the sentence itself was reduced to fifty years 
imprisonment. Now, my opinion on that is that I think a precedent has been set; a precedent 
wherein our rulers will never think of using power to terrorize their own people. Before the 
trial, Taylor’s counsels were arguing that he should have that diplomatic immunity becauseat 
the time when these atrocities were committed, he was still a sitting President in Liberia. So 
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this trial has made nonsense of all those principles, so to say. So, in my opinion, I believe that 
Taylor deserve to do the fifty years’ (Sesay of FDP-see transcription 13). 
‘We are so grateful that Special Court has been able to achieve our own goal, and that was 
what we were looking forward to because impunity should not continue indefinitely. And the 
effort of the Special Court to end impunity in so far as rebel movements or threat to the peace 
in the sub-region is concerned, I think we should highly appreciate it’ (Karim-Sei-see 
transcription 14). 
‘Well, I’m not a lawyer, but I think there were sound arguments and those arguments were 
thrashed out and I think they came to a logical conclusion. I felt that Taylor would have been 
convicted for a lot more things than he was convicted for. I was surprised that he got away with 
quite a number of things and he was actually being held responsible for only one. So that tells 
you that the trial itself was very fair and I think it sets some precedents, which are laudable. At 
the end of the day, I think justice was achieved’ (Lewis of Awoko- see transcription 15). 
7.6 Ethnographic Surveys: Group Discussions 
The findings from the above analyses (framing-qualitative and quantitative, discourse and semi-
structured interviews) are geared towards answering the research question how selected 
media in Sierra Leone represented the Taylor trial (i.e. research question 3). This reflects how 
the stimulus (media content) was presented by the papers for responses from CSOs’ 
representatives across Sierra Leone.104 Thus, how the representatives of CSOs responded to the 
media’s contents, regarding the Taylor trial is the concern of this section (see research question 
4). However, questions concerning the selection and districts (regions) of the discussants, for 
the ethnographic surveys; how, when and where, the group discussions were held, have 
already been answered in 5.5 and 6.6. 
 Significantly, the discussants were questioned on a number of issues, including whether and 
how often they followed the coverage, whether they thought the coverage was balanced and 
fair, how relevant they thought the proceedings were to TJ and CSOs, whether they considered 
                                                          
104
See the stimulus-response analysis explicated in 3.2.1 and 4.1. 
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the trial relevant in terms of the financial resources expended to bring Taylor to justice, 
whether they thought such funds should have been spent to promote post-conflict 
reconciliation and poverty alleviation etc. Again, the responses were accordingly anonymised to 
preserve confidentiality.105 
 To the question how aware were the discussants about the media’s coverage of the Taylor 
trial, in Freetown (Western Area), the proportion was nine to one. That is nine of the ten 
discussants confirmed that they were well aware of the media’s coverage of the trial. All ten 
(10) discussants from the North were aware of the coverage. For the South as well, all eleven 
discussants were aware, but for the East, ten of the eleven discussants were aware of the 
media’s coverage of the trial. Thus, the level of awareness of the media’s coverage of the trial 
was quite overwhelming on the part of CSOs representatives. 
Asked how regularly they followed the trial, in Freetown, nine claimed to have followed the 
trial occasionally, whilst one claimed to have done so regularly. In the North, only three 
followed it regularly, but seven claimed to have done so occasionally. In the South, the 
proportion was four to seven. That is, four out of eleven, followed and monitored the trial 
regularly, whilst seven did so occasionally. In the East, the proportion was one to ten. That is, 
ten followed the trial occasionally, but it was only one that did so regularly. Amongst the ten 
that occasionally followed the trial in the East, a discussant in Kenema had this to say: 
‘As a grassroots woman, living in a dull village, and with access to no media 
gadgets, and therefore I did not follow the trials at all’ (Kenema Discussant). 
 
Thus, it can be inferred from the above analysis, that a significant proportion (over 75%) of 
CSOs representatives did not regularly follow the coverage. Regarding the issue of whether the 
coverage of the trial was fair and balanced, in Freetown, the proportion was four out of six who 
said it was fair.  In the North eight considered the reportage to be fair and balanced with two 
disagreeing. In the South, ten said the coverage was fair and balanced, with one disagreeing.  In 
the East, ten considered the reportage to be unfair and imbalanced with one disagreeing. 
                                                          
105
See transcriptions 8, 9, 10 and 11 to validate the findings from the group discussions in all four regions of Sierra Leone. 
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Concerning the issue of whether the local media actually provided a fair and balanced coverage 
of the trial, in Freetown seven said the local media did not provide a fair and balanced 
coverage, but three said the reportage was fair and balanced. 
 In the North, nine said the reportage was fairly done, but one did not agree that the reportage 
was fair and balanced. In the South, ten out of eleven stated the reportage was biased in favour 
of the prosecution as against Taylor, but one said it was fair and balanced. In the East, eight said 
the reportage was biased in favour of the prosecution, but three took the contrary position. 
Analytically, 52% said the reportage was positively tilted in favour of the prosecution, but 48% 
said it was fair and that the media only reflected the facts embedded in the evidence that 
unfolded during the trial.  
Regarding the issue of fairness in the reportage of both the local and international media, the 
discussants (in all four regions) overwhelmingly agreed that the international media was much 
more consistent with its fair and balanced reportage, during certain stages of the trial. 
Nationally, the international media was commended because they had the requisite staff that 
were present at the trial and with the available resources at their disposal, they filed in credible 
and detailed report via the internet and satellite, and thus making it possible for more people 
to access and see the events live as they unfolded in The Hague. On the part of the local media, 
the credit given to their coverage was not unconnected with their attempts to translate the 
proceedings in the trial into different local dialects. 
Regional variations were also evident in the responses to the question: should the money spent 
on the trial have been used for post-conflict reconciliation and poverty alleviation. In Freetown 
the proportion was seven to two; whereas in the North nine of the ten respondents believed 
the moneys were well expended to achieve justice. In the South, eight said the moneys were 
well expended to attain the ideal of justice, but three said the moneys should have been spent 
on poverty alleviation and reconstruction; whereas in the East, six favoured the justice 
argument, but five supported the poverty alleviation and reconstruction arguments. 
7. 7 Triangulating the Answers to Research Questions Three and Four 
The qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the content analysis (see 7.2 and 7.3) and the 
findings from the discourse analysis (see 7. 4) and interviews (see 7. 5) with the editors, who 
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covered the trials, depict how the selected media represented the Taylor trial (see research 
question 3). Again, it appears that evidence of national prejudices are seen in the agenda- 
setting ability manifested in the news selection, framing and priming strategies (see 3. 1, 4. 1, 5. 
1) of the papers  in the coverage. From the findings of the above methodological frameworks, it 
can be concluded that the papers, to a very limited extent, strove to separate their views from 
the actual news contents, which they published (see 4. 1 and 5. 1). 
 Hence, based on the empirical evidence it can be argued that their reportage appeared to have 
been done in contravention of the idealised norms of ‘objectivity’ and ‘accuracy’. Essentially, 
from the same methodological frameworks, it can be further concluded that FDP, ST and 
Awoko, appeared not to have been neutral in their coverage of the Taylor trial (see 4.1).The 
papers’ seemed to have taken the same position in the ideological and political debates on the 
need to get Taylor to face justice. And it was their individual ideological and political 
considerations that determined how they processed and presented the events and issues (news 
selection, framing and priming) that permeated their coverage of the Taylor trial (agenda 
setting).  
This seems to confirm criticisms about the journalists’ purported neutrality of news (See 4. 2- 
Fowler, op.cit:1-4 Van Dijk, op.cit: 241, Mautner, op.cit: 38).The question that is pertinent at 
this stage is whether the frames (Entman, op.cit: 53)in the communications texts catalogued in 
7.2 above, necessarily influenced audiences’ (CSOs’ representatives) thinking.This has to be 
looked at from the standpoints of both the psychological and sociological levels (Scheufele 
op.cit:305-308; de Vreese op.cit: 52), hence the need for the levels of analysis of the media’s 
impacts on the Taylor trial and CSOs’ representatives in this triangulation. Thus, the tests for 
both the psychological and sociological analyses are clearly explicated in 6.7. 
 Arguably, it can be concluded that at both the psychological and sociological levels, the frames 
in the communications texts in 7.2 influenced the thought processes of CSOs’ representatives 
across Sierra Leone because they confirmed that their knowledge about the Taylor trial was 
shaped by media coverage, which most of them followed occasionally and some regularly. This, 
therefore, indicates the extent to which CSOs’ representatives became interested in the 
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proceedings of the Taylor trial in particular, and how the media sustained the controversial 
debates that factually informed the trial (see 3.4). Regarding the issue of whether the local 
media’s reportage of the trial was fair and balanced, the mixed views from the discussants 
across the country, appeared to have strengthened the theoretical argument that the 
communications texts in the frames, either challenged or strengthened their pre-existing biases 
against the contents of different sections of the Sierra Leone media (see 4.1). 
 This seems to confirm the post-modernism and structured interpretative models (see 4.2), 
emphasizing the position that media contents are polysemic and can thus be consumed by 
audiences in a way that reflect their pre-existing biases (in this case the perception that Taylor 
was the mastermind behind the conflict in Sierra Leone and was thus guilty of the offences for 
which he was charged). This can be bolstered by Iyengar’s (see 5.1) audience fragmentation and 
selective exposure arguments that are still giving credence to the minimal consequences theory 
in this era of ICTs (see 4.2). However, the impact at the sociological level is gauged on the issue 
of their overwhelming condemnation of the local media and their eventual commendation of 
the international media because of its impartial, balanced and fair dispatches on the trial. 
 The media’s impact at the sociological level is also gauged on the issue of the relevance of the 
trial, as there was a consensus amongst the discussants across the country that through media 
coverage they got to understand issues relating to the causes of the war, human rights, post-
conflict justice and reconciliation, those who bore the greatest responsibility, the need to end 
impunity etc. (see transcriptions 8, 9, 10 and 11). Again, in all four regions, there was 
overwhelming agreement that where CSOs representatives had been exposed to media 
coverage, they felt that myths had been dispelled and the course of justice and reconciliation 
served: 
To me, the media helped in changing the perceptions of the people. People 
were of the opinion that anyone indicted by the Special Court was going to be 
slowly poisoned, tortured and even sentenced to death {A discussant from the 
North, Bombali district- see transcription 9}  
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The reporting of the trial of Charles Taylor helped in changing the mindset of our 
people from seeing Liberians in general as our enemies, but rather as 
neighbours {A discussant from the Freetown-see transcription 8} 
One thing we have learnt from the media is that we are not living in isolation 
and one will face the ICC if one uses a machete to butcher others {A discussant 
from the South, Bo district- see transcription 10} 
The media changed the decisions of people somehow because the issue of 
revenge was frowned upon and it became a non-option, especially for the 
victims and their relations… {A discussant from the East, Kenema-see 
transcription 11}     
Finally, regarding the issue of whether CSOs’ representatives thought the money spent in 
seeking to end impunity in Sierra Leone should have been spent in tackling poverty, 
compensating war victims and fostering post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and 
development, at the sociological level, the overwhelming majority (36 of the 42) CSOs’ 
representatives across Sierra Leone, thought the money had been wisely expended. This is as 
well their individual view (reflecting the psychological level of analysis). However, the six (6) 
discussants who expressed a contrary view constitute a comparatively insignificant number that 
would not invalidate the conclusion that the media did influence CSOs’ perceptions on the need 
to end impunity in Sierra Leone. 
 This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that from the content (qualitative and 
quantitative) and discourse analyses and semi-structured interviews, FDP, ST and Awoko, 
appeared to have lent credence to the indictment, trial and conviction of Taylor. Inferentially, 
the above analysis does not seem to support the first aim and objective of the study, which 
seeks to establish whether the coverage of the Taylor trial amounted to ‘a continuation of war 
by other means’. However, the second aim and objective of the study appears to be validated 
by the fact that the dynamics of the plethora of issues discussed in the frames and sub-frames 
in the analysis between 7.2.1 and 7.2.5, as triangulated with the responses of CSOs 
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representatives across Sierra Leone, are inextricably linked with discourses of good governance 
and democratic accountability. 
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Chapter Eight 
 Data Presentation and Analysis on the Media’s Influence on Transitional Justice in Sierra 
Leone 
8.0 Introduction 
 To further test the validity and reliability of the findings in both chapters six and seven, 
regarding CSOs’ representatives’ perceptions on post-conflict justice issues, the study was 
replicated across the country, with a comparatively broader sample size, to that of the group 
discussions. However, the issues concerning the sample size, data collection procedures (i.e. 
how the questionnaires were administered) and how the study was replicated, are clearly 
articulated in the methodological frameworks chapter (see analysis between 5.6 and 5.8). 
 This chapter, which is calculated to respond to the issue of drawing generalisations from the 
comparatively smaller sample size designed for the group discussions, critically analyses the 
findings relative to research question 5. The analysis here is divided into three sections. The 
first section presents the respondents’ bio-data and the second and third sections examine the 
influences, which the media’s coverage of the CDF and Taylor trials and the TRC, has had on 
elites’ opinions to come up with credible generalisations, about the media’s impacts on issues 
relative to post-conflict justice, war crimes jurisprudence, good governance and democratic 
accountability in Sierra Leone. 
8.1 Section A: Respondents’ Bio data 
This section deals with the following issues: 
 - Occupational Distribution 
 - Sex Distribution 
 - Age Distribution 
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Table 11: Occupational Distribution  
Occupation 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western  
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency (RF =%) 
Barristers/Solicitors 0 0 13 0 13 4.74 
Civil/Public Servants 33 23 44 22 122 44.53 
Civil Society Activists 0 0 0 4 4 1.46 
Clergy 0 0 0 2 2 0.73 
Commercial Workers 9 4 7 24 44 16.06 
Engineers 0 1 1 0 2 0.73 
Journalists 0 0 1 4 5 1.82 
Students 22 22 8 25 77 28.10 
Military 1 0 4 0 5 1.82 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
 
Table 11 depicts the occupational distribution of the respondents. The table clearly shows that 
the respondents were drawn from a large swathe of occupations ranging from the legal 
profession to the military. This clearly establishes the extent to which the occupational 
distribution of this national study is quite diverse to draw credible conclusions, regarding the 
views expressed by respondents coming from different socio-economic backgrounds. The table 
also depicts that the views expressed by particularly civil/public servants (44. 53%), students 
(28.10%) and commercial works (16.6%) far exceeded those expressed by barristers/solicitors 
(4.7%), CSOs activists (1. 46%), the clergy (0. 73%), engineers (0. 73%), journalists (1. 82%) and 
military personnel (1.82%).  
Table 12: Sex Distribution 
Sex 
 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency (AF) 
Relative Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Male 50 40 66 44 200 72.99 
Female 15 10 12 37 74 27.01 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
Table 12 presents the sex distribution of the respondents. It is clear from the quantifications 
that the views of both sexes were elicited across the country. What is obvious, however, is that 
most of the views expressed by the respondents (73%) came from the male population; with 
only 27% coming from the female population. Regionally, the Northern Province is recorded as 
that which had the highest female responses comparatively to the other regions.  
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Table 13: Age Distribution 
Age 
Distribution 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency (AF) 
Relative Frequency 
(RF = %) 
20 - 30 8 11 4 15 38 13.87 
31 - 40 17 14 40 28 99 36.13 
41 - 50 25 15 11 22 73 26.64 
51 - 60 9 6 12 10 37 13.50 
61 - 70 4 3 7 6 20 7.30 
71 and above 2 1 4 0 7 2.55 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
 
Table 13 shows the age distribution of the respondents. The socio-economic, political and legal 
issues that emerged from the decade long conflict, which eventually led to the 
institutionalisation of the various post-conflict justice mechanisms that became the subjects of 
the media’s coverage, would have been of much significance to Sierra Leoneans, who are above 
the 20-30 age brackets. This is simply because, those within the said age bracket, would not 
have felt the impacts of the war that led to the trial as those who are above that age bracket 
(31-40, 41-50, 51- 60, 61-70, 71 and above), and were in the position to furnish the researcher 
with informed data. That stated, to capture the views of all age brackets, even those in the age 
bracket (20-30) were targeted in order to gauge their responses in tandem with those in the 
upper age brackets (31 upward). 
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The above figure depicts the graphical representation of the respondents’ age distribution. 
8.2 Section B: Media Reporting of the CDF and Taylor Trials 
Table 14: Respondents’ Awareness of the Media’s reporting of the CDF and Taylor Trials 
Response 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency (AF) 
Relative Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Yes 64 50 78 44 236 86.13 
No 1 0 0 37 38 13.87 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
 
Table 14 represents the respondents’ awareness of the media’s coverage of the CDF and Taylor 
trials. A significant proportion of the respondents (86.13% as against 13.87%) from all four 
regions indicated that they were quite aware about the media’s reportage of both the CDF and 
Taylor trials. Regionally, the Western Area is recorded as the region that had the highest rate of 
awareness. This is comparatively followed by the Eastern, Southern and Northern Provinces, 
respectively. This high rate of awareness in the Western Area can be attributed to its 
cosmopolitan outlook and the fact that it is the hub of majority of the country’s media outlets 
and the CDF trial, which attracted serious media attention than the Taylor trial, was conducted 
in the Western Area. 
Table 15: Sources of Information about the Trials 
Sources 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency (AF) 
Relative Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Newspaper 19 12 24 11 66 19.13 
Radio 52 36 69 73 230 66.67 
Television 12 5 25 7 49 14.20 
Total 83 53 118 91 345 100 
 
Table 15 establishes how the respondents came to know about the trial. The vast majority 
(66.67%) became aware about the media’s coverage of both trials through radio, but 19.13% 
and 14.20% got to know about the trials through newspapers and television respectively. This 
bolsters the fact that radio has been the most widespread and effective means of 
communication in Sierra Leone. However, given the reasons canvassed in 1.1 and 5.2 the study 
is based on newspapers coverage as a credible alternative to radio. 
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Table 16: Responses to Whether the Respondents Understood what the Media Reported 
about the CDF Trial 
Response 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency (AF) 
Relative Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Yes 62 49 76 68 255 93.07 
No 3 1 2 13 19 6.93 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
 
Table 16 establishes how the respondents understood the contents of the media’s coverage of 
the CDF trial. A huge proportion (93.07% as against 6.93%) understood the contents which the 
media put out on the CDF trial. This therefore puts 255 of the 274 respondents in a better 
position to subject the media’s coverage of the CDF trial into their own interpretations, which 
are gauged in table 9.  
Table 17: Responses to Whether the Respondents Understood what the Media Reported 
about the Taylor Trial 
Response 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency (AF) 
Relative Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Yes 60 48 77 73 258 94.16 
No 5 2 1 8 16 5.84 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
Table 17 shows how the respondents understood the contents of the media’s coverage of the 
Taylor trial. A significant proportion (94.16% as against 5.84%) understood the media’s contents 
relative to the Taylor trial. This therefore puts 258 of the 274 respondents in a better position 
to subject the media’s coverage of the Taylor trial into their own interpretations, which are 
gauged in table 10.   
Table 18: Responses to Whether the Media’s Coverage Provided Vital Information about the 
Trial of the CDF Leaders  
Response 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency (AF) 
Relative Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Yes 32 25 63 53 173 63.14 
No 33 25 15 28 101 36.86 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
 
Table 18 clearly depicts that most of the respondents (173 as against 101) indicated that the 
media supplied them with very vital information regarding the dynamics of the CDF trial. 
Regionally, the Western Area (63) and Northern Province (53) are recorded as the regions that 
most appreciated the media’s coverage of the trial. However, the respondents from the Eastern 
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(33) and Southern (25) Provinces (the regions in which the CDF leaders were born, bred and 
shot into prominence) did not comparatively appreciate the media’s coverage as those from 
the Western Area and the Northern Province. The reasons for these regional variations are 
accordingly catalogued in table 9. 
Table 19: How the Media’s Coverage of the CDF Trial Influenced Respondents’ Opinions 
Responses 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency 
(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Perceived the dual role played by the 
CDF- i.e. as villains and national heroes. 
6 4 17 16 43 15.69 
Got to know that they committed 
heinous crimes against the people of 
Sierra Leone, for which they were held 
to account by the SCSL 
8 14 18 55 
95 
 
34.67 
They were fighting for the restoration of 
democracy and the rule of law in Sierra 
Leone; hence they were national heroes 
33 24 12 1 70 25.55 
Enlightened me to appreciate that     
conflicts can best be resolved  through 
dialogue not  violence 
4 3 12 5 24 8.76 
The CDF leaders should not have been 
subjected to trial. 
14 5 19 4 42 15.33 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
 
Table 19 incisively analyses how the media’s coverage  of the CDF trial influenced the 
perceptions of the respondents.  Nationally, the media’s impact is felt by all the respondents, 
whose views are accordingly factored into the categories mentioned in the five columns 
mapped out in this tabular presentation. However, the responses indicated clear regional 
variations. Regarding the perception that the media’s coverage influenced the respondents to 
consider the CDF leaders as villains, who committed heinous crimes for which they were 
criminally held liable by the SCSL, 55 of the 81 respondents from the North subscribed to this 
view. Again, all 10 discussants (CSOs’ representatives) in the group discussions from the North 
(see 6.6) dubbed the CDF leaders as war criminals and villains (not national heroes). 
Interestingly, FDP’s representation of the CDF leaders as war criminals and villains appeared to 
have dovetailed with the perceptions of all the discussants in the Northern group discussion 
and a significant proportion of the respondents from the region that turned in their 
questionnaires. 
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Conversely, most of the respondents from the South (24 + 5 = 29) and East (33 + 14 = 47) 
strongly expressed the views that the CDF leaders fought for the restoration of democracy and 
the rule of law and should therefore not have been subjected to war crimes trials. These same 
views were expressed by a very significant proportion of the discussants from the South- East 
(See 6.6). ST, which appeared to have taken a South-Eastern posture, reflected the perception 
that the CDF leaders were national heroes (not war criminals or villains). This is the same 
perception which the vast majority of the discussants and respondents from the South-East 
clearly exhibited in both the group discussions and questionnaires (see 6.6 and 8.2). However, 
as established in 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, ethno-regional considerations were not spotted in the news 
selection, framing, priming and agenda setting strategies of Awoko. Thus, given the views 
expressed by the respondents in this analysis, it can be empirically argued that the media’s 
coverage of the CDF trial impacted the perceptions of people from various backgrounds across 
Sierra Leone. 
Table 20: How the Media’s Coverage of the Taylor Trial Influenced Respondents’ Opinions 
Responses 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency 
(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
That Charles Taylor had a serious 
stake in the S/L war 
20 12 17 32 81 29.56 
One should be mindful of his 
neighbours 
4 2 7 6 19 6.93 
That impunity is intolerable in 
modern times 
14 4 19 12 49 17.88 
Taylor master minded the whole 
war in Sierra Leone 
13 6 12 4 35 12.77 
That Taylor deserved the 
punishment meted out to him by 
the SCSL 
14 26 23 27 90 32.85 
Total 65 50 78 81 274 100 
 
Table 20 shows how the media’s coverage of the Taylor trial influenced the perceptions of the 
respondents at the national and regional levels. The views expressed above indicate the extent 
to which the media influenced Sierra Leoneans from all backgrounds, to appreciate the fact that 
Taylor was brought to justice for his role in the conflict that engulfed their country for ten 
years. This is the same view which the discussants expressed during the focus group discussions 
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conducted in all four regions (see 7. 6). Significantly, as established in 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, the news 
selection, framing, priming and agenda-setting strategies of FDP, ST and Awoko, seemed to 
have dovetailed with the views elicited from the discussants of the focus group discussions and 
the questionnaires administered throughout Sierra Leone.  
 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of whether the Media provided vital information for Respondents 
To further validate the findings represented in table 9, the above figure depicts how the 
respondents appreciated the information, which the media disseminated in relation to the 
Taylor trial. Thus, 184 (51 + 24 + 55 + 54) of the respondents from all four regions stongly 
accepted the validity of the mediated contents which the media published during the conduct 
of the Taylor trial. 
Table 21a: Responses about whether the Media’s Coverage of the CDF Trial was balanced 
Response 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
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(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
The reporting was biased against 
the CDF and in favour of the 
prosecution 
17 17 19 2 55 49.11 
Many Negative things were said 
about the CDF and ignoring the 
positive 
16 12 5 2 35 31.25 
The reporting was done mostly in 
English and in support of the SCSL 
10 3 6 3 22 19.64 
Total 43 32 30 7 112 100 
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Table 21a establishes whether the media’s coverage of the CDF trial was biased against the CDF 
or in favour of the prosecution. Again, clear regional variations are spotted in the responses. A 
significant proportion (17 + 16 +17 + 12 = 62) from the South-East said the media’s coverage of 
the CDF trial was biased against the CDF and that most of what was reported, depicted the CDF 
negatively, regardless of the role which it played in the restoration of democracy and the rule of 
law in Sierra Leone. This is the position, which is discernible in the numerous pre-trial, trial and 
post-trial contents (see 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4) of FDP relative to the CDF trial. And that is the same 
view which clearly came out of the findings from the focus group discussions held in the South- 
East (see 6.6). However, it was only 4 respondents (a negligible figure) from the North that 
shared this typical South-East view. Hence, a significant proportion of the Northern 
respondents did not subscribe to the view that the media’s coverage was biased against the 
CDF. For them, the coverage was balanced and did not favour the prosecution. This is the same 
view that permeated the Northern group discussion (see 6. 6). 
Table 21b: Responses about whether the Media’s Coverage of the Taylor Trial was balanced 
Responses 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency 
(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
The media reported very little 
about the claims of the defense 
counsel 
1 0 7 3 11 18.33 
Everything that was said was 
mostly in favour of the prosecution 
4 1 9 5 19 31.67 
The reportage was biased against 
Taylor 
60 49 62 73 30 50.00 
Total 65 50 78 81 60 100 
 
Thus, the responses as catalogued above indicated that virtually all the respondents from all 
four regions had nothing to say, other than the media’s coverage was biased against Taylor and 
that the prosecution’s case was well represented in comparison to the defence’s case. The 
responses that came up in the discourses that characterised the issue of whether the media’s 
coverage of the Taylor trial was actually balanced, really dovetailed with the actual findings in 
table 20 above.     
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Figure 13: Response about whether the money spent on the CDF trial was worthwhile 
 
The above figure shows the views expressed by the respondents on the issue of whether the 
moneys expended in the CDF trial were worth it. Thus, the reasons for their responses are 
accordingly stated in table 22.  
Table 22: Responses about why money spent on the CDF Trial not considered worthwhile. 
 
Responses 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency 
(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
The money should have been used 
for developmental purposes in the 
country (post-conflict 
Reconstruction and Development) 
23 15 15 7 63 37.97 
The harm had already been done, 
so why not give the money to the 
war victims (Reparation for War 
Victims) 
14 17 7 5 43 27.22 
No much provision was made for 
the war victims (Reparation for War 
Victims) 
13 8 5 2 11 17.72 
There was no proper explanation on 
how the money was used (Lack of 
proper Accountability and 
Transparency) 
7 2 7 11 34 17.09 
Total 57 42 34 25 151 100 
 
The findings from the contents and discourse analyses (see 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4) established the 
extent to which each of the papers supported or opposed the conduct of the CDF trial on the 
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basis of its ethno-regional leanings and considerations or for some other national concerns. The 
findings from the focus group discussions, concerning this same issue, were more clearly 
tainted with ethno-regional leanings and considerations. Thus, it is clear from table 12 that 99 
(57 +42) of the 151 respondents that answered the questions concerning the moneys expended 
in the conduct of the CDF trial, came from the South-East; whereas 44 and 25 respectively came 
from the Western Area and the North. 
 And all the responses given to the questions relative to the moneys expended to end impunity 
and uphold the rule of law concerning the CDF trial (the judicial accountability paradigm), were 
skewed towards post-conflict reconciliation and development, reparation, and democratic 
accountability and transparency (the reconciliatory paradigm). Interestingly the vast majority of 
the respondents whose views are catalogued above (99) came from the South-East. Empirically, 
it is therefore clear from the table that most South-Easterners (99) as against a limited number 
of Northerners (25)felt the moneys expended in the conduct of the CDF trial should have been 
spent in promoting post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and development; and the 
victims’ reparation schemes. Essentially, the said responses from majority of the Southerners 
would not have been devoid of their ethno-regional leanings and considerations.  
 
Figure 14: Responses about whether the money spent on the Taylor trial was worthwhile 
The above figure shows the views expressed by the respondents on the issue of whether the 
money expended in the Taylor trial was worth it. Thus, the reasons for their responses are 
accordingly tabulated in table 13. However, the vast majority of the respondents from all four 
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regions (42 + 41+ 57+ 65= 205 out of 274) said that the moneys were well expended to end 
impunity and uphold the rule of law in Sierra Leone and beyond. 
Table 23: Reasons why the Money Spent on the Taylor Trial not Considered Worthwhile 
Responses 
 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency 
(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
The money should have been used 
for developmental purposes in the 
country 
9 8 12 4 36 45.57 
Taylor did not deserve the nice 
treatment he received during the 
trial 
2 0 3 1 11 13.92 
No much provision was made for 
the war victims  
3 1 4 3 11 13.92 
The trial should have been 
conducted in S/L to save cost 
5 0 2 0 9 11.39 
There was no proper explanation of 
how the money was used 
4 0 0 8 12 15.19 
Total 23 9 21 16 79 100 
 
Table 23 presents the reasons why the remaining 79 of the 274 respondents said the moneys 
spent to conduct the Taylor trial was not worthwhile. Essentially, an issue (the conduct of the 
Taylor trial in The Hague, as opposed to Freetown) which all three newspapers made salient in 
their reportage came up as one of the reasons why some of the respondents (9) said the 
moneys spent in the conduct of the trial was not considered worthwhile.  
8.3 Section C: Respondents’ Responses to the Media’s Coverage of the TRC 
Table 24 presents the media’s impacts on the respondents regarding the operations of the TRC 
in Sierra Leone. The views expressed by all the 200 respondents, relative to the media’s role in 
relation to the TRC’s functionality, clearly depicted how the media’s coverage influenced their 
perceptions, about the reconciliatory paradigm as one of the post-conflict justice mechanisms, 
adopted to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone. Thus, the media preached the need for peace 
and reconciliation and thus actualised the philosophy of peace journalism enunciated in 3.1.5 
and 3.4 
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Table 24: Things Learned from the TRC Hearing through the Media’s Coverage 
Responses 
 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency 
(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Media preached the need for 
peace and reconciliation 
2 7 7 13 29 14.5 
Media exposed the 
perpetuators of war crimes in 
Sierra Leone 
10 10 9 24 53 26.5 
Media got us to understand 
how the TRC taught us to 
forgive and forget 
17 7 11 8 43 21.5 
Media got us to understand the 
genesis of the war through the 
TRC 
13 3 16 18 50 25 
Diamonds were very crucial in 
the Sierra Leone war 
1 0 0 2 3 1.5 
For peace to prevail justice 
must be the working tool 
4 8 4 6 22 11 
Total 47 35 47 71 200 100 
 
Table 25: Influences of the Media’s Coverage of the TRC Proceedings on the Attitudes of 
Respondents towards the Justice System of Sierra Leone 
Responses 
 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Western 
Area 
Northern 
Province 
Absolute 
Frequency 
(AF) 
Relative 
Frequency 
(RF = %) 
Media exposed through the TRC 
the weaknesses of the country’s 
justice system, and how social 
and political injustices fuelled the 
war in Sierra Leone 
10 16 11 7 44 36.97 
Media got us to understand that 
the justice system of S/L did not 
protect the fundamental rights of 
Sierra Leoneans 
4 9 12 7 32 26.89 
Media prophesized how 
injustices, nepotism and 
corruption would lead to another 
war in Sierra Leone  
12 8 12 11 43 36.13 
Total 26 33 35 25 119 100 
Essentially, the facts presented in table 25 about the media’s role in relation to the TRC’s 
functionality can as well be clearly interpreted within the contexts of the discourses in table 14 
and the analysis that follows it. Thus, from the above analysis, it can be empirically argued that 
the media in Sierra Leone significantly impacted both the judicial accountability and 
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reconciliatory paradigms, which the country adopted to attain the ideals of post-conflict and 
war crimes justice.  
And it can as well be argued that the media is also giving credence to the ideals of good 
governance and democratic accountability in Sierra Leone (the principle thrust of the study’s 
second aim and objective). However, given its ethno-regional leanings and considerations in its 
coverage of particularly the CDF trial, even this chapter which merely replicated the whole 
study, points to how ethno-regional tendencies again impacted the respondents, who were 
certainly drawn from a broad spectrum and background of Sierra Leone. This lends credence to 
the conclusion regarding the first aim and objective of this study, that the media’s reportage of 
the CDF (and not the Taylor) trial was ‘a continuation of war by other means’. 
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Chapter Nine 
 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
9.1 Summary 
The significance of this study is arguably justified by a critical analysis of its context (see chapter 
one) in the face of the literature review (see chapter two). Theoretically and empirically, the 
study seeks to contribute to the shared-body of knowledge on media and war crimes 
jurisprudence (see chapter two) by gauging the media’s impacts of the coverage of the CDF and  
Taylor trials on the functionality of CSOs in promoting post-conflict justice and democratic 
legitimacy in Sierra Leone (see empirical analysis between chapters six and eight).The study 
conceptualises media, civil society and transitional justice to establish the significance of their 
theoretical synergy in a post-conflict context (see chapter three). The media’s impact is gauged 
by contextualizing the stimulus-response paradigm in the behavioural sciences. Thus, media 
contents are rationalized as stimuli and the perceptions of CSOs’ representatives on the 
media’s coverage of the trials are deemed to be their responses (see chapter four). 
The study adopts contents (framing) and discourse analyses and semi-structured interviews to 
analyse the contents which the selected media (For Di People, Standard Times and Awoko) 
published for consumption at the psychological and sociological levels in Sierra Leone (see 
chapter five). The responses to such contents are theoretically explained with the aid of the 
structured interpretative and post-modernistic response approaches to media contents (see 
chapter four). And, methodologically, CSOs’ representatives’ responses to the media’s contents 
are elicited by ethnographic surveys (group discussions) conducted across the country (see 
chapter five). The findings from the contents and discourse analyses, semi-structured 
interviews and ethnographic surveys are triangulated to establish how the media’s coverage of 
the two trials impacted CSOs’ representatives’ perceptions on post-conflict justice and 
democratic legitimacy in Sierra Leone. 
  To test the validity and reliability of the findings from the ethnographic surveys, four hundred 
(400) questionnaires, one hundred (100) for each of the four regions (East, South, North and 
Western Area) of Sierra Leone, were administered to barristers, civil/public servants, civil 
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society activists, media practitioners, students etc. (see chapter five). The findings, which 
reflected the perceptions of people from a large swathe of opinions in Sierra Leone, appeared 
to have dovetailed with those of the CSOs’ representatives in the country (see chapter eight). 
9.2 Conclusion 
Essentially, it is discernible in the theoretical, methodological and empirical chapters (see 
analysis between 3.0 and 6.7) of this study that the local media’s coverage of the CDF trial 
appeared to have been tainted with ethno-regional prejudices, and seemed to be ‘a 
continuation of war by other means’. The mediation of the Taylor trial (see theoretical, 
methodological and empirical analysis between 3.0 and 7.7) however, appeared to have been 
devoid of ethno-regional prejudices, but seemed to have been coloured by lenses of patriotism 
and nationalism. 
The media’s reportage of both trials and the operations of the country’s TRC, in the views of the 
CSOs’ representatives and respondents in all the regions across Sierra Leone (see empirical 
analysis between 6.0 and 8.3), on balance had a positive impact on war crimes jurisprudence, 
transitional justice and democratic accountability and legitimacy in post-conflict Sierra Leone 
(see theoretical analysis between 3.0 and 3.5). The findings are therefore reflective of the 
significance of the media’s functionality in post-conflict democratic Sierra Leone. It is further 
discernible in the literature review (see 2.1 and 2.2) that the limited body of epistemology on 
the mediation of war crimes jurisprudence and post-conflict transitional justice is still evolving. 
And the case for an emerging thesis (as established in 2.2) has been accordingly justified in the 
theoretical, methodological and empirical analyses found between chapters three and eight. 
The emerging thesis that the framing of the CDF trial was more influenced by ethno-regional 
prejudices and that of the Taylor trial by nationalism and patriotism is the principal finding of 
this theoretical and empirical study, which is calculated to advance the frontiers of knowledge 
in the evolving epistemology of media and war crimes jurisprudence. 
Additionally, three distinctly different peripheral theses can also be inferred from this study. 
And they are tied to the theoretical synergy of the media, civil society and transitional justice in 
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the light of the methodological frameworks designed for the empirical analysis between 
chapters six and eight. The first thesis concerns the media relative to war crimes trials. 
 This thesis is anchored by the idea that media coverage of war crimes trials conducted in a 
multi-ethnic post-conflict country, can amount to ‘a continuation of war by other means’, when 
the dynamics of the forces that caused and fuelled the intra-state conflict, leading to the trials 
are purely internal. But when the intra-state conflict is fuelled by external actors, who are 
eventually subjected to war crimes trials, media coverage can hardly amount to ‘a continuation 
of war by other means’, because the media’s news selection, framing, priming and agenda-
setting inclinations, can be more influenced by patriotic and nationalistic ideals, as opposed to 
ethno-regional considerations. 
 The second thesis revolves around the conception of civil society in Africa. CSOs in a multi-
ethnic conflictual state can be more united and effective in their clamour to bring an 
internecine conflict that threatens national security to an end, but they can be divided on 
ethno-regional lines in the post-conflict political and governance processes that will emerge in 
the hitherto conflictual state. The third thesis is on war crimes jurisprudence. It states that the 
statutory prosecutorial discretion given to prosecutors to indict those that bear the greatest 
responsibility for war crimes, can result in a form of selective justice that undermines the fight 
against impunity. Thus, war crimes jurisprudence can mitigate (not end) the scourge of 
impunity, but the indirect promotion of democratic accountability and good governance, can be 
its more achievable and durable long term ideals. 
9.3 Recommendations 
The final recommendations from the findings of this study can again be compartmentalised 
under the conceptual umbrella of the media, civil society and transitional justice. 
9.3.1 The Media 
The significant role of the media in the quest for post-conflict justice (prosecutorial and 
reconciliatory) and building good governance and democratic legitimacy in post-war Sierra 
Leone, can account for how the media can impact society within its functional theoretical 
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frameworks, encompassing the public service model, Galtung, Lynch and McGoldrick’s peace 
journalism, Thompson’s responsibility to report and Shaw’s human rights journalism (see 3.1.5 
and 3.4 for theoretical and conceptual frameworks and chapters six, seven and eight for 
empirical analysis). 
The contraventions of Sierra Leone’s media ethics and the widespread unprofessionalism that 
permeate journalistic practices in Sierra Leone, can account for how the mass 
manipulative/propaganda and commodification of news paradigms have given credence to the 
publications of hateful and divisive contents inimical to societal stability and national cohesion. 
This seems to have strengthened the ethno-regional divide that permeates Sierra Leone’s body-
politic and thus has the tendency to fuel renewed intra-state conflict in post-war Sierra Leone 
(see theoretical and conceptual analyses between 3.1.5 and 3.4 and chapters six, seven and 
eight for empirical analysis). 
The influence of the above conflictual perspective in the practice of journalism in Sierra Leone 
can be mitigated by strengthening the instrumental approach that emphasizes the need for 
continuous media education and training, which is yet to visibly impact media performances in  
post-conflict Sierra Leone (see analyses between 3.1.5 and 3.4 for theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks and chapters six, seven and eight for empirical analysis).This can be done through 
the IMC, SLAJ and other national and international media stakeholders that have indulged in 
this exercise since the dawn of the socio-economic, political and legal transformations of Sierra 
Leone in 2001. The need for continuous media education and training is also seen in how the 
selected media appeared to have reported the CDF trial with ethno-regional and political 
considerations and how that seemed to have impacted the perceptions of CSOs’ 
representatives in the country. Thus, the fundamental ideals of journalistic ethics and practice 
in Sierra Leone’s Media Code of Practice (accuracy, balance, fairness etc.) appeared to have 
been violated by the selected media. 
 The training schemes should incorporate programs of specialized reporting including some 
sensitive issues relative to war crimes jurisprudence, which appeared to have been 
misrepresented, because the journalists that reported the two trials hadn’t any background in 
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law. Education and training (the cognitive and behavioural side) should go hand in hand with 
effective media legislative and regulatory frameworks (the structural side) to curb irresponsible 
journalism and uphold the fundamental rights and liberties of the entire citizenry, while 
protecting the ideals of freedom of expression, access to information and the media’s role in 
promoting post-conflict democratic legitimacy.  
9.3.2 Civil Society 
The role of CSOs in the clamour for post-conflict justice, good governance and democratic 
legitimacy in Sierra Leone, can account for the theoretical and empirical significance of the 
concept of civil society in Sierra Leone’s body-politic. However, the fragmentation of CSOs on 
ethno-regional and political lines, has seriously undermined their efficacy in Sierra Leone’s post-
conflict democracy. Thus,for CSOs to continue to play their crucial role in the public sphere they 
must be apolitical and be prepared to shed off their partisan and ethno-regional and political 
prejudices in the interest of societal stability and national development (see 3.2 for theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks and chapters six, seven and eight for empirical analysis). 
9.3.3 Transitional Justice 
The institutionalisation of the SCSL after the signing of the LPA that legitimizes the 
reconciliatory model negatively impacted the work of the TRC, resulting in the exclusion of the 
testimonies of some key players in the conflict, including Norman, in all four (4) volumes of the 
TRC report. This has left an indelible void in the TRC’s literature. Essentially, despite the trials 
and prosecutions of war criminals in Sierra Leone, the beast of impunity still raises its ugly head 
with the feted wounds it has occasioned for the country’s post-conflict justice system, leading 
to an alarming rate of violence and arm robbery. The failure to try and punish the foot-soldiers 
and middle level commanders; and the fact that the convicts were never tried under Sierra 
Leonean law (see Article 5); manifested the weaknesses of the distinct judicial accountability 
paradigm of Sierra Leone. 
Though the war crimes trials have thus indirectly promoted democratic good governance ideals 
in Sierra Leone, there are issues of corruption, ineptitude and lack of proper accountability and 
transparency raised by the media and CSOs relative to the functionality of virtually all the non-
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prosecutorial post-conflict justice institutions in Sierra Leone. This raises the questions of how 
effective the institutions are and the extent to which they have impacted the country’s quest 
for post-conflict justice and democratic good governance. Thus, good governance ideals will 
only be realised when the country’s democratic institutions are functional consonant with the 
ideals for which they are established. And the media and CSOs can play a positive role in that 
direction. 
The trial of the CDF leaders heightens the ethno-regional divide in the country as reflected in 
the media’s coverage and the perceptions of CSOs’ representatives. This raises the question of 
who else will come forward to fight for the cause of ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’ in the future if 
they face the threat of being treated as war criminals. Thus, the dynamics of war crimes 
jurisprudence, which emerged as international responses to end impunity at a global stage, can 
hardly effectively address the ills of a multi-ethnic post-conflict society that is divided on ethno-
regional lines. 
The trial of Issa Sesay, whose preponderance co-operation bolstered the peace process in Sierra 
Leone, much against the aspirations of the upper echelons of the RUF, has sent a signal to 
potential war lords in the continent that neither ‘blanket amnesty’ provisions in peace accords, 
nor diplomatic utterances about their assured future will lure them into laying down their 
weapons and give peace a chance. In the Sierra Leonean context, this is arguably more 
imminent, given the post-conflict justice challenges with which the country is fraught  and the 
fact that it was in Sierra Leone in which the ‘unfulfilled diplomatic promises’ were made.  
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Appendix IV: Questionnaires 
 
Topic: Media Reporting of War crimes Trials and Civil Society Responses in Post-Conflict 
Sierra Leone 
Questionnaire for Research Question Five (What Influence has Media Coverage had on 
attitudes towards Post-Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone?) 
Introduction 
Dear Respondent, my name is Abou Bhakarr M. Binneh-Kamara. I am a Sierra Leonean lawyer, 
lecturer and journalist pursuing a PhD degree in Media and War Crimes Jurisprudence at the 
University of Bedfordshire, United Kingdom). 
 
I am writing a thesis on the topic: “Media Reporting of War Crimes Trials and Civil Society 
Responses in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone.” I have already held a small number of regional focus 
groups but to provide me with a broader sense of civil society attitudes, I would be grateful if you 
would agree to respond to this questionnaire.  
Be assured that whatever information you provide will be used only for the purposes of this 
study and not shared with anyone else. If you wish to remain anonymous, please state that 
clearly at the top of the returned questionnaire.  
 
Date___________________                           
Location___________________    District__________________   Province______________ 
 
BIO DATA 
Name___________________________________________________ 
Address_________________________________________________ 
Occupation______________________________________________ 
 
Sex: Male                     Female   
Age: 20-30              31-40               41-50              51-60             61-70            71 and above   
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1. Are you aware of the war crimes trials of the CDF Leaders and that of Former Liberian 
President, Charles Taylor, conducted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone and The Hague, Netherlands, respectively?  
Yes       No   
 
2. How did you get to know about the said trials?  
Through Radio Through Newspaper                 Through Television  
 
3. Did you understand what the media reported about the trials of the CDF Leaders? 
           Yes                                          No     
 
4. Did you understand what the media reported about the Charles Taylor trial?  
 Yes         No 
 
5. Did the reporting of the trial of the CDF Leaders provide you with information you were 
previously unaware of about Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Alieu Kondowai and /or the 
conflict in Sierra Leone?  
Yes                             No 
 
   
6. If yes, how did this influence/change your opinion? 
 
  
7.   Did the reporting of the Charles Taylor trial provide you with information you were previously 
unaware of about Charles Taylor and/or the conflict in Sierra Leone? 
Yes                 No 
 
8. If yes, how did this influence/ change your opinion? 
 
 
 
 9.  Was the media‟s reporting of the trial of the CDF Leaders fair and balanced to both 
prosecution and defence?  
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Yes           No  
 
  
10. If no, in what way was it unbalanced? 
 
 
 
 
11. Was the media‟s reporting of the Charles Taylor trial fair and balanced to both prosecution 
and defence? 
 
Yes                No 
 
12. If no, in what way was it unbalanced? 
 
 
 
13. Do you think the money spent on the trial of the CDF Leaders was well used?  
Yes                   No  
 
13. If no, why?  
 
 
 
15.  Do you think the money on the trial of Charles Taylor was well used? 
Yes                 No    
 
16. If no, why? 
 
 
 
17. Would you rather such money had been spent on tackling poverty/improving infrastructure in 
Sierra Leone?  
Yes              No 
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18. Did you also follow the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearing in Sierra Leone?  
Yes                 No 
 
 
19.  If yes, did you learn more from the TRC reporting or reporting of the trials? 
 
 
 
20. If the trial reporting told you more, how has it influenced your attitude towards justice in 
Sierra Leone?  
 
 
 
21. Overall, did Civil Society benefit from the information reported in the trial of Charles Taylor? 
Yes                 No 
 
22. Overall, did Civil Society benefit from the information reported in the trial of the CDF 
Leaders? 
Yes No 
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Appendix V: Ethnographic Surveys: Focus Group Discussions and Interviews 
I developed a set of questions and forwarded them to my Director of Studies, Professor Jon 
Silverman, who modified some of them and authorised me to base the interviews and 
discussions on the following questions: 
1. How aware of the two trials were you? 
2. Did you follow them regularly, occasionally or not at all? 
3. Can you say what you consider fair and balanced, reporting to be? 
4. Within your definition of those terms, do you consider that local media provided fair and 
balanced, coverage of the Taylor and CDF trials? 
5. If not, why not? Too biased, in favour of the prosecutor? Or too biased, in favour of 
defence? 
6. What about the international media – BBC, Voice of America (VOA), Radio France 
International (FRI)? Did you hear any of it? How did it compare in 
thoroughness/accuracy/balance with local media? 
7. Did the media coverage change the people‟s views in any way? 
8. How does coverage of the trials in both countries impact the process of reconciliation 
and Justice? 
9. Was the money spent on the trials worth it? Would you rather it had been spent on 
reconstruction/alleviating poverty? 
10. How relevant were the CDF and Taylor trials to civil society in Sierra Leone and Liberia? 
11. Did the media sufficiently explain the nature of the SCSL trial/a hybrid trial before it 
began? 
12. What effects has the delay in the pronouncement of the Judgement of the Taylor trial 
had on civil society? 
Note: 
This list of questions was not exhaustive; other questions were posed as a result of the 
responses of the discussants. 
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Attendance of Discussants 
Eastern Province: 
The names of discussants and the organisations they represented in the respective districts in 
the Eastern Province are presented, below. 
 
NO NAMES 
CELL 
NUMBER 
ORGANISATION DISTRICTS 
1 Mohamed. K. Sei 076-709-908 
Friends of the Earth-Sierra 
Leone 
Kenema 
2 Bobson N. Banya 076-461-943 
Coalition of Civil Society & 
Human Rights Activists-
Sierra Leone 
Kenema 
3 Saidu A. Kekura 076-903-705 
Coalition of Civil Society & 
Human Rights Activists-
Sierra Leone 
Kailahun 
4 Edward A. Kai 076-818-371 Amnesty International-SL Kenema 
5 Brima K. Mauna 076-952-404 Health for All Coalition-SL Kailahun 
6 David J. Allieu 076-861-277 Health for All Coalition-SL Kenema 
7 Sia Foyoh 077-229-567 Young Women in Need. Kono 
8 Abdullah Bundoh 076-636-737 
Youth in Agriculture and 
Development 
Kono 
9 
Mousa Mohamed. 
Bundor 
076-538-718 Health for All Coalition-SL Kono 
10 Rebecca Momoh 077-253-485 Women in Action Kailahun 
11 Mariama Sannoh 078-388-383 Health for All Coalition-SL Kenema 
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Southern Province: 
The names of discussants and the organisations they represented in the respective districts in 
the Southern Province are presented, below. 
 
NO NAMES 
CELL 
NUMBER 
ORGANISATION DISTRICT 
1 Musa D. W. Graima 076-144-208 
Community Advocacy & 
Development Movement 
(CADM) 
Bonthe (Rutile) 
2 Muctarr Shour 076-774-550 
Amalgamated. Youths 
Movement 
Bonthe (Rutile) 
3 John C. Vanjah 076-922-740 K. C. D. A. Moyamba 
4 
Mohamed. R. 
Rogers 
033-435-792 BODBAN Bo 
5 Ibrahim S. Kpakuma 076-777-330 PYFD Pujehun 
6 Sheku A. Kanneh 076-546-745 HFAC-SL Bo 
7 
Sannoh George 
Lahai 
078-268-746 HUPANDA Pujehun 
8 Claudius S. Squire 076-455-277 
Youth Development 
Association CARC-SL 
Bo 
9 Gibril Maada Bassie 078-475-676 CARE-SL Bo 
10 M‟mama Sesay 076-654-993 NEHADO/RNS Bo 
11 Gibrilla S. Gbondo 078-268-746 NMYDA 
Moyamba 
(Njala) 
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Northern Province: 
The names of discussants and the organisations they represented in the respective districts in 
the Northern Provinces are presented. Below: 
NO NAME 
CELL 
NUMBER 
ORGANISATION DISTRICT 
1 Alfred. S. Turay  078-261-534 Health for All Coalition Bombali  
2 Salieu A. Conteh 076-404266 
Centre for Coalition of 
Human Rights Activists 
Tonkolili 
3 Peter M. Bangura 076-886-652 
Tonkolili District Human 
Rights Committee 
Tonkolili  
4 Yeabu Mansaray 076-837-948 
Koinadugu Market Women‟s 
Association 
Koinadugu  
5 
Anthony Kalawa 
Sesay 
078-700-976 
Coalition of Civil Society and 
Human Rights Activists-S/L 
Kambia  
6 Joseph Konowa 077-561-475 
Young Men Christian 
Association 
Kambia 
7 James T. Turay 077-561-475 
Human Rights Commission 
of S/L Northern Province 
Kambia  
8 Jatu Massaquoi 076-275-279 
Civic Development 
Association 
Port Loko 
9 Lincoln O. Kanu  088-952-967 HFAC/CSM-SL Port Loko 
10 Mohamed. Jalloh 078-817-692 
UPHR/WCR-United. for the 
Protection of Human Rights, 
Women and Children‟s 
Dignity 
Kambia  
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Western Area: 
The names of discussants and the organisations they represented in the Western Area are 
presented, below: 
NO NAME ORGANISATION AREA 
1 Juana V. Saawah 
Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights 
Activists in Sierra Leone  
Freetown 
2 Gracie Bagrey Health for All Coalition-Sierra Leone  Freetown 
3 
Hassan J. 
Kamara 
Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights 
Activists in Sierra Leone  
Freetown 
4 Michael Bockarie 
Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights 
Activists in Sierra Leone 
Freetown 
5 Cecilia M. Karim Health for All Coalition-Sierra Leone Freetown 
6 
Mariama M. 
Margai 
Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights 
Activists in Sierra Leone  
Freetown 
7 
Koroma Alfred.-
Minkailu Jr. 
Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights 
Activists in Sierra Leone  
Freetown  
8 
Joseph S. 
Rogers 
Health for All Coalition-Sierra Leone Freetown 
9 
Ibrahim B. 
Fofanah 
Health for All Coalition-Sierra Leone Freetown 
10 Charles Mambu 
Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights 
Activists in Sierra Leone 
Freetown 
 
NOTE: 
The membership of the coalition for Civil Society and Human Rights Activists in Sierra Leone 
consists of representatives of all registered. civil society groups across Sierra Leone. The 
discussants, who were chosen to participate in the discussions in the Western Area (Freetown), 
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are members of different civil society groups scattered across Freetown. The cell numbers of 
the discussants in Freetown were not taken, because they can be easily accessed. at their 
headquarters in Fort Street, where the discussions were held. In fact, Fort Street is just a stone 
throw to where I reside in Freetown. 
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Appendix VI: Interviews:  
Anderson P. (2011) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 26th July, 2011 
Griffiths C. (2011) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara, London, 8th July, 2011 
Philip Neville. (2013)Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 7th August, 2013 
Interviews with the Selected Media (ST, FDP Awoko)Editors: 
Karim-Sei I. (2011) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 21st July, 2011 
Kelvin, Lewis. (2012) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 12th December, 2012 
Paul Kamara. (2012) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 13th December, 2012. 
Interviews the On CDF Trials:  
Betty Milton (2013) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 25th June, 2013 
Karim-Sei I. (2013)Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 24th June, 2013 
Kelvin, Lewis. (2013)Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 26th June, 2013 
Paul Kamara. (2013)Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 27th September, 2013 
Theophilus Gbenda (2013) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 20th June, 2013 
Su Thoronka (2013) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 24th June, 2013 
Mohamed Abu (2013) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 26th June, 2013 
Interviews On the Charles G. Taylor Trial:  
Ibrahim Sorie Sesay. (2014) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown. 13th March, 
2014 
Karim-Sei I. (2014) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 10th March, 2014 
Kelvin Lewis (2014) Personal Interview with Binneh-Kamara Freetown, 11th March, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 298 
 
Appendix VII: Statutes, International Treaties, Conventions and Judgments of 
International Tribunals and Domestic Courts 
Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded. And in Armed Forces in 
the Field (1949) 
Geneva Convention II for Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded. Sick and Shipwrecked. 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949) 
General Law (Business) Start-up) (Amendment) Act, 2007 
Geneva Convention III Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) 
Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relation to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed. Conflicts (1977) 
Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12August, 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (1977) 
Government of Sierra Leone-Civil Service Code, Regulations and Rules (2011) 
 Liberia‟s Accra Comprehensive Peace Plan which was passed into law in 2005 
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), R v Bow 
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) 3 W.L.R. 1456 
House of Lords, 1998 
Sierra Leone Media Code of Practice (SLMCP) (2000) and Section: 8, 38 of Act No 12 of 2000 
as Amended in 2006 and 2007. 
Sierra Leone‟s Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National 
Reconstruction and Development Act No. 5 (1999) 
Sierra Leone‟s Lome Peace Accord (1999)  
Sierra Leone‟s Lome Peace Accord Ratification Act No. 3 (1999)  
Sierra Leone‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, (2000) 
Sierra Leone‟s Independent Media Commission Act (2000) 
Sierra Leone‟s Independent Media Commission (Amendment) Act (2006)  
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Sierra Leone‟s Independent Media Commission (Amendment) Act (2007) 
Sierra Leone‟s National Commission on Small Arms Act No. 6 (2010) 
Sierra Leone‟s National Security and Central Intelligence Act No. 10 (2010) 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002) 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Ratification) Act No. 9 (2002) 
Special Court for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber 1 Judgement on the Civil Defence Forces Trial 
(2nd August, 2007) (The Prosecutor V Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondowa – Case No SCSL-04-
14-T): 72 
Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber Judgement in the Civil Defence Forces Trial 
(28th May, 2007) (The Prosecutor V Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondowa – Case No SCSL-04-
14-T) 
The Anti-Human Trafficking Act, 2005 
The Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2005 
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2000 
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2003 
The Case:Justice Tolla Thompson v Paul Kamara 
The Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction And 
Development Act, 1999 
The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978, Chapter: ll 
The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, Chapters: 2, 3 and 4 
The Constitution of Sierra Leone, Section 5 (1) & (2), 13 
The Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2002 
The Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2008 
The Constitutional and Statutory Instruments Act, 1999 
The Courts (Amendment) Act, 2006 
The External Telecommunications Tax (Amendment) Act, 2004 
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The Government of Sierra Leone Strategic Communications Plan, “United. People, Progressive 
Nation, Attractive Country” (November 2005) 
The Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone Act No. 9 (2004) 
The Legal Practitioners (Amendment) act, 2004 
The Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Act, 2005 
The Local Courts Act, 2011 
The Lome Peace Agreement (Ratification) Act, 1999 
The National Security and Central Intelligence Act, 2002 
The National Youth Commission Act, 2009  
The Other Financial Services (Amendment) Act, 2007 
The Public Procurement Act, 2004 
The Prosecutor v Charles G Taylor SCSL 03-01 Trail Judgement May 2012 
The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana Jean–Bosco Bagayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze Case No 
ICTR/99/52/T, December, 2003 
The Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1 (ICTY) 1995 
The Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act, 1971 
The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Participation in Political and Democratic 
Processes) Act, 1999 
The Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation Act, 2009 
The Sierra Leone Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2006The Sierra Leone National Commission 
on Small Arms Act, 2010 
The Special Court Agreement, 2002 (Ratification) Act, 2002 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Media Coverage of Charles Taylor 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach, Legacy and Impact: Report on the local media in 
Sierra Leone and coverage of the Special Court (February 2008) 
 The State Proceedings Act, 2000  
 301 
 
The State of Human Rights in Sierra Leone: Annual Report of the Human Rights Commission of 
Sierra Leone (2010, 2011, 2012 & 2013) 
The Summary Ejectment (Amendment) Act, 2006 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act No. 4(2000) 
The Universities Act, 2005 
White Paper on the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (June, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
